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Imagine: at the pinnacle of the Cold War, when distrust between East and West 
has congealed into a paralysing paranoia, an engineer coincidentally acquires 
some knowledge about USA plans to develop a secret weapon. He is persuaded 
into selling this knowledge to Russian authorities, thus becoming a Soviet spy. 
However, after a while, USA officials find out about his position and urge him 
to report periodically what exactly the Soviets know about the plans for the 
weapon, thus turning him into a double agent. Suddenly the engineer sees a 
chance to gain a fortune: he runs back to the Soviets and sells them the 
information that the Americans know about them knowing about the weapon. 
Subsequently, he makes a good impression with the American authorities by 
telling them that the Soviets now know that they (the Americans) know that the 
Soviets know about the weapon. This information, that the Americans know 
that the Soviets know that the Americans know that the Soviets know about the 
weapon, can then again be sold to the Soviets, and so on… 
Cargile, who cites a version of this jest in a philosophical note in Analysis, 
remarks drily: “it seems that he is set up for life, and that the bureaucrats are 
pretty silly” (1970: 151; the idea was originally based on a comedy routine by 
Peter Ustinov). While the world of Cold War espionage indeed seems to 
provide a natural backdrop for the satirical exploration of such complexes of 
embedded knowledge states, a very similar scenario can also be implemented 
in a daily-life setting. This is demonstrated by an episode from the fifth season 
of the popular television sitcom Friends. In the episode, the characters Phoebe 
and Rachel play a practical joke on their friends Monica and Chandler after 
learning that the two are secretly dating. Phoebe and Rachel first try to keep the 
discovery to themselves, but through the not-so-clever character of Joey the 
fresh couple hear that the others know about them dating before the joke has 
crystallised into something concrete. Monica and Chandler, in turn, start 
devising a “counter-plot” based on the premise that Phoebe and Rachel do not 
know that they (the couple) know that Phoebe and Rachel know about the 
dating and are plotting against them. However, again through a clumsy 
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intervention by Joey, Phoebe and Rachel find out about the preparations for the 
counter-plot, which triggers them to come up with a cunning counter-counter-
plot. Phoebe speaks a line that has long dominated the charts of all-time most 
renowned sitcom quotes: “but they don’t know we know they know we know”. 
Rachel immediately grasps what she means, but Joey’s face looks dazzled, and 
when he is asked not to tell anything to the others, the scene ends with him 
saying: “even if I wanted to…”.1 
What the espionage parody and the episode from Friends have in common 
is that they stage several iterations of knowledge states about knowledge states, 
variously referred to as embedded intentional states or multiple-order intentionality: 
“A knows that B knows that A knows that B…”. In this way, a sequence is built 
up that exhibits a particular type of recursion: each constituent added to the left 
embeds all the constituents to its right. Logically speaking, an infinite regress is 
lurking, but in practice such a sequence quickly becomes opaque and begins to 
sound hilarious after just a few steps. This is what the satirist and the Friends 
script writer were relying on for their hilarious effects: while both scenarios are 
initially realistic, the mind-blowing possibility of infinity promptly comes into 
view by taking things just a bit too far. 
It has been argued extensively that in all sorts of situations of everyday 
social and cultural life we have to deal with embedded intentional states: we 
factor into (the planning of) our own future behaviour what we think that 
others think, know, believe, intend, desire, etc., including what we think that 
they think that we think, and what we think that they think that others think. 
Planning a dinner party, or gossiping about a neighbour’s daughter’s new 
acquaintance, to mention just two examples, arguably involves reasoning about 
all kinds of intentional states embedded into one another. And even without 
the particular complexities posed by such activities as event planning or gossipy 
conversations, we constantly have to deal with embedded intentional states––at 
least, that is what a wide array of philosophers and researchers working on this 
topic argue. For example, cognitive neuroscientists have claimed that in order 
to complete even a basic non-linguistic cooperative task one has to believe that 
the other believes that one intends to cooperate. Linguists and philosophers of 
                                                




language have suggested that even basic linguistic communication requires 
interlocutors to surpass this level, since one has to understand that the other 
intends one to know that the other intends one to believe that something is the 
case. Such arguments have been made for further aspects of everyday socio-
cultural living, such as exhibiting moral reasoning and taking part in a religious 
community (I want you to understand that God knows that we intend…), or for 
appreciating and producing stories (the author wants me to understand that 
character A believes that character B hopes that character C will believe…).2  
The examples given so far, including the two humoristic ones, seem to 
suggest a paradox: on the one hand, dealing with embedded intentional states 
has been argued to be indispensible for even basic interactions within our 
social and cultural environments, whereas on the other hand, a scenario of the 
form “A knows that B knows that A knows that B knows…” looks so puzzling 
after only a few steps that it even attracts writers of comedy and satire for its 
hilarious opacity. Pursuing this line of thought, a series of observations and 
questions can be put forward:  
 
(1) The complexity involved in dealing with intentional states of others and 
ourselves, as arguably required by all kinds of situations from daily 
social and cultural life, has generally been conceptualised as a series of 
embedded layers. Where did this conceptualisation come from? How was 
it justified? What are its alternatives? And can such alternatives provide 
other measures of complexity than the number of embedded layers?  
 
(2) Within research traditions of philosophy, psychology, ethology, and the 
cognitive sciences more broadly, the focus has often been on the 
                                                
2 All of this will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 1. For cooperation and multiple-order 
intentionality see, for instance, Yoshida et al. (2011). The argument that linguistic 
communication requires dealing with multiple orders of intentionality is rooted in Grice (1957; 
1969) and was further developed in Bennett (1976), Sperber (1994; 2000), Papp (2006), and Scott-
Phillips (2015). For multiple-order intentionality in relation to religion see Dunbar (2003; 2008) 
and Dunbar, Gamble, and Gowlett (2010), in relation to morality see Shultz & Dunbar (2007), 
and in relation to literature see Dunbar (2005), Zunshine (2006), Corballis (2011), and Carney et 
al. (2014). See also chapter 6 of Dennett’s The intentional stance (1987), which is a reworked 
version of his foundational essay ‘Intentional systems’, describing the levels of intentionality 




complexity and limits of the human capacity for processing intentional 
states, rather than its economy and expediency. In other words, the 
dominant questions seem to have been: “How many levels can X 
process?”, or “How complex is behaviour Y in terms of the orders of 
intentionality?”, rather than: “How can X perform behaviour Y with the 
least amount of processing power invested?” 
 
(3) Various discourse topics inevitably involve embedded intentional states 
(such as the above-mentioned organisation of a dinner party, gossip 
about a second-removed acquaintance, and surely double spies and 
practical jokes). How are they handled in actual language usage? What 
can be learned from the way in which such topics are represented in 
natural discourse examples—that is: examples not invented in the 
context of philosophical analysis or psychological experiments, but 
taken from novels, plays, journalistic discourse, and spoken language? 
 
(4) The conceptualisation of complexity as implying a series of embedded 
layers was implemented in various experimental paradigms and in 
(evolutionary) approaches to phenomena ranging from moral behaviour 
and cooperation to understanding and producing language and 
literature. In view of possible alternative measures of complexity (as 
suggested in (1)) and analyses of actual discourse examples (as suggested 
in (3)), how can such implementations be evaluated? What are the 
consequences for such implementations when we start from a focus on 
the economy of processing intentional states, rather than on its limits (as 
proposed in (2))? On this basis, which recommendations can be made for 
future theoretical and experimental research? 
 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to work out these observations and 
questions in detail, and in doing so, to rethink the nature of the complexity 
posed by networks of multiple, mutually connected and interlinked intentional 
states. Ultimately, I aim to contribute to an alternative view on how we handle 
such networks linguistically, in discourse, how their nature should be construed 
conceptually, and how we manage to process them cognitively without undue 
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strain. This brings us to the question of the title of this thesis: why is it called 
The Lazy Mindreader? The long answer clearly is in the chapters that follow, but 
the short answer is this: we humans live in a socio-cultural environment that 
allows us to be “lazy” regarding the investment of mindreading efforts most of 
the time. This environment, of which the conventions underlying language and 
interaction are an important part, contains the coagulated experience of many 
generations interacting with each other and the world around them. Globally, I 
think that most approaches to mindreading have placed too much of a burden 
on individuals as “isolated cognitive units”, and paid too little attention to the 
ways in which this burden can be alleviated by, for instance, lexical items, 
grammatical patterns, or narrative strategies, and by the interlocutors 
(including writers/narrators) we cooperate with to make interaction work. My 
alternative view focuses on economy and least effort: processing of complex 
networks of intentional states is not seen as something the lazy mindreaders 
envisaged in this thesis do by default, but rather as a skill that is needed when 
the context requires deviation from a default—and even then, I will argue, is 
these mindreaders’ processing often supported by mechanisms that are part of, 
mediated by, or closely tied to language and narrative. 
 
Structure 
The body of this thesis consists of six chapters, four of which read as 
independent studies (see the Reading Guide below for details). The basic 
framework will be laid out in Chapter 1, where the concept of intentionality is 
discussed in detail and positioned in the broader literature on “mindreading”, 
the capacity to assess intentional states of others and oneself. This skill, also 
known as “theory of mind”, “mentalising”, or “folk psychology”, has been 
studied extensively in a multitude of academic disciplines across the 
humanities and sciences. I will distinguish three different ways in which the 
relationship between language and mindreading has been construed 
throughout the literature, namely: language as a way to represent mindstates 
and their mutual relationships, language as a “device” providing support to (the 
development of) the profound mindreading skills typical of human adults, and 
language as being itself crucially supported by our mindreading capabilities. 
Introduction
 14 
Finally, the role of mindreading in the bigger story of the “social brain 
hypothesis” will be assessed. Many of the concepts and terms discussed in 
Chapter 1 will be built upon throughout the rest of the thesis.  
In Chapter 2 the focus will centre on the question of how literary texts 
represent complex networks of intentional states. Shakespeare’s Othello will 
serve as a case study. Already by the end of the play’s second act, a reader or 
watcher will understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona 
intends that Othello considers Cassio’s rehabilitation. While this proposition may 
look as opaque and hilarious as Phoebe’s most-renowned sitcom quote cited 
above, it is also in some sense a fair representation of (what I will call) the 
“thoughtscape” that has emerged at this point of the play’s plot. Since there is 
no doubt that this plot has been understood and appreciated by many different 
audiences for ages, regardless of whether they were reading the text or 
watching a performance on stage, the question can be put as follows: what did 
the play do to make this thoughtscape manageable and accessible without 
undue cognitive strain? A detailed answer will be provided by distinguishing 
six expository strategies available in narrative discourse, which support the 
audience in gradually developing a robust understanding of the complex 
network of embedded viewpoints involved in the plot. These strategies are: 
characterisation, focalisation/viewpoint management, framing, episodic 
structuring, time management, and redundancy. 
Chapter 3 takes this discussion into the realm of the novel. Cognitive 
literary scholar Lisa Zunshine has argued that in order to understand and 
appreciate a work such as Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, readers need to 
complete strands of reasoning of the following form: “Woolf intends us to 
recognize [...] that Richard is aware that Hugh wants Lady Bruton and Richard to 
think that because the makers of the pen believe that it will never wear out, the 
editor of the Times will respect and publish the ideas recorded by this pen” 
(Zunshine, 2006: 33, italics in original). This is again a proposition that is 
virtually impossible to process correctly by itself. I will demonstrate that novels, 
and in particular Modernistic works such as Mrs Dalloway, provide promising 
material for studying how multiple intentional states (in the context of literary 
analysis more generally referred to as perspectives) can be construed, 
entertained in series or in parallel, and mutually coordinated using linguistic 
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and narrative techniques. One finding will be that the conceptualisation of 
multiple-order intentionality as a series of embedded layers yields an unnatural 
and artificial fit with the actual material. The concept of polyphony, adapted 
from the work of Bakhtin (1984), will be introduced and discussed as the basis 
for an alternative conceptualisation: instead of focussing on complexity 
through embedding only, it outlines a model in which complexity consists of 
mental states being mutually related and interlinked in all kinds of different 
ways, delivered to the reader in manageable “chunks” by structural features of 
the text. 
In Chapter 4, a shift will be made away from literary and narrative 
analysis to linguistics, with a view to examining the grammatical and semantic 
phenomena involved in handling multiple intentional states in journalistic 
discourse. In order to explore the nature and range of these phenomena, an 
analysis will be presented of newspapers’ reporting on the so-called “Pistorius 
case”.3 Right after the shooting, journalistic sources would never have printed 
statements of the type: “a spokesperson stated that police officials declared that 
the athlete claimed that he thought that he was shooting at a burglar, while the 
responsible police detectives claimed that he knew it was his girlfriend”. 
However, if we think about it, that is more or less the content of what they 
wrote, but they “packaged” the perspectives underlying the case into more 
convenient expressions, such as “Oscar Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot dead 
his girlfriend”. Special attention will be paid to the discussion of what will be 
termed “viewpoint packages”, single lexical items implying one or more 
viewpoint layers, such as alleged(ly), accidental(ly), or mistaken(ly). Also, the 
suggestion will be developed that viewpoint packages not only serve efficient 
communication of situations involving multiple mindstates, but can also 
support cognition: they may function as “thinking tools” acquired in a socio-
cultural environment, supporting and enhancing our ability to process 
multiple-order intentionality cognitively. 
                                                
3 On February 14th, 2013, Olympic athlete Oscar Pistorius, also known as the “Blade Runner” on 
account of his blade-like carbon prosthetic legs, shot dead his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp in 
their home in Pretoria. While claiming that it was an accident, he was arrested on the charge of 
murder. In the aftermath of the shooting, news media all over the world reported on the 
incident, covering the perspectives of the athlete, police officials, witnesses, family members, 
and others involved. 
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Chapter 5 will point out a consistent pattern throughout the material 
discussed in the preceding chapters: whenever multiple intentional states are 
involved, the labour of representing and coordinating these in discourse is 
distributed over a variety of narrative features and linguistic elements across 
multiple lexical, grammatical, and narratological categories. I will demonstrate 
how the developed view provides an important link in resolving a much-
debated issue: the extent to which we need to engage in complex mindreading 
tasks when using language. Some researchers, most notably Sperber (2000) and 
Scott-Phillips (2015), take it that linguistic communication requires processing 
of what the other intends one to understand that the other wants one to believe by 
using a particular expression. However, building on Clark (1996) and Verhagen 
(2015), I argue that interlocutors in a (linguistic) interaction event should not be 
seen as two distinct cognitive units using a combination of language and 
mindreading for “pairing” their individual intentional states, but instead as one 
joint cognitive unit using language and mindreading in order to negotiate how 
a set of shared beliefs (or common ground) should be updated. While the first 
conceptualisation presupposes heavy and complex mindreading by default, the 
latter suits the “lazy mindreader” much better: only in exceptional cases, such 
as repairing a misunderstanding, complex mindreading enters the picture. This 
argument will form the basis for suggesting an updated version of the 
“construal configuration” model as previously developed by Langacker (1990) 
and Verhagen (2005). Using the updated model and its graphic representation, 
features of single linguistic elements can be highlighted along three axes, 
corresponding to three different types negotiation between a speaker and 
addressee about how to update the common ground. The y-axis indicates 
features that negotiate a relationship between interlocutors and objects that 
they jointly attend to, for example: “that football player”. The x-axis is for 
indicating negotiation of epistemic stances between interlocutors, such as “that 
great football player”. The z-axis deals with the negotiation of the degree to 
which objects of joint attention are considered from the perspectives of third-
party discourse participants, as in “that so-called great football player”. Here, 
“so-called” implies that another party, not specified here, is responsible for the 
The Lazy Mindreader
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qualification of the person attended to as a great football player.4 The merits of 
adding a third dimension to the existing model of the construal configuration 
will be discussed in the light of various examples and existing approaches to 
intersubjectivity, viewpoint management, and epistemic stance marking.  
Chapter 6 is concerned with the practice of assessing multiple-order 
intentionality experimentally. In studies part of what I refer to as the 
“mentalising paradigm” participants were asked to read, listen to, or watch 
short stories describing a particular sequence of social interactions, for instance: 
the organisation of a surprise party. These stories were then followed by 
questions of the form “Did A know that B wanted C to come to his party?”, “Did 
C know about the party?”, or “Did B want A to think that C should know about 
the party?”. Scores on such tests are being used as indicators of the “mentalising 
capability” of each individual participant, and have been shown to be 
associated with various assessments of people’s real-life social functioning, such 
as the size of their social network. However, as yet little is known of the 
mechanisms and cognitive functions these tests actually tap into, and 
consequently, of how precisely these associations must be explained and 
understood. I will make suggestions for a “reanalysis” of the questionnaires and 
the results that they have produced, based on insights accumulated in the 
preceding five chapters. 
 
Methodology 
Whereas the topic of this thesis requires the study of research done in a wide 
array of different disciplines across both the humanities and sciences, its 
methodology is clearly rooted in the humanities. In the first place this is 
reflected in the overall endeavour being qualitative and analytical in nature, 
rather than experimental, correlational, or computational. This does by no 
means entail that it is not empirical: insights will be developed and evaluated in 
                                                
4 In fact, it should be noted that “so-called” is a linguistic element operating not just along the z-
axis, but also along the x-axis, since it simultaneously signals a negative epistemic stance of the 
speaker towards the football player: “that so-called great football player” could be paraphrased 
as “others say he is a great football player, but I would not say so”. In the terms introduced in 
Chapter 4 and 5: “so-called” is a viewpoint package with a topology coordinating mindstates along 
the z- and x-axes. 
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constant interaction with examples taken from actual literary, journalistic, and 
spoken discourse, and by examining questionnaires and test results in use in 
current experimental paradigms. However, instead of being primarily 
interested in finding significant statistical associations or constructing apt 
computational models, the aim of this study is to come to a coherent and well-
wrought conceptualisation of the problems and their possible solutions in the 
targeted domain, in this case: the nature of the complexity involved in dealing 
with multiple interconnected intentional states, as required by particular 
aspects of our social and cultural environments.  
In terms of Marr’s (1982) “levels of explanation”, this thesis operates for a 
large part on what has been labelled the “W-level” of what a system (in this case 
our ability to handle multiple-order intentionality) does, why it does this, and 
under which conditions it operates. In some places it also operates on the “H-
level” of how the system works and which mechanisms are involved. The “Ph-
level” or “physical level”, which questions how the system is realised physically, 
is discussed only to a minimal degree.5 As such, the approach chosen in this 
thesis runs counter to the majority of research on this topic, which is mostly 
about the How-level and Physical level, but rarely addresses the What-level. 
Behind this choice of focus lies the conviction that in order to make progress on 
the levels of the mechanisms and their implementation in our cognitive 
structure, an accurate grasp on the nature of the task is necessary. The “output” 
of the analytical work done in this thesis aims at providing such a grasp, and 
will ideally inspire new rounds of experimental testing, formal modelling, and 
neuroscientific investigation by, or in collaboration with, researchers who have 
their backgrounds in such sciences. 
The “humanities roots” of this thesis are not only reflected in the 
qualitative and analytical nature of the approach, but also in the choice of 
concepts and methodological frameworks. The analysis of the literary texts, 
excerpts, and examples from journalistic and spoken discourse builds on 
narratological theory and on what is generally referred to as cognitive 
linguistics, cognitive literary studies, and cognitive stylistics. In Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4, there will be an important role for Dancygier’s (2012) “narrative spaces 
                                                
5 Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015) have introduced the terms “W-level” and “H-level” for 
what Marr (1982) refers to as the “computational” and “algorithmic/representational” levels.  
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framework”, which itself makes extensive use of the concepts of mental spaces, 
blending, and framing. Moreover, Chapter 5 will build on Clark’s (1996) notion 
of “common ground” and Verhagen’s (2005) “intersubjectivity” and his model of 
the “construal configuration”. At the same time, research from various 
disciplines across the social, biological, and cognitive sciences will be used. In 
Chapter 1, Dennett’s (1983; 1987) work on intentionality, which itself is based on 
discussions of ethology and animal cognition from the 1960s and 1970s, will play 
a central role. In addition, I will build on Apperly’s monograph Mindreaders 
(2011) and include the wide-ranging research done by Dunbar and colleagues in 
the context of the social brain hypothesis.  
All in all, the approach presented in this thesis is thus multidisciplinary in 
two ways.6  Firstly, it combines and integrates insights and analytical tools that 
have a long history within multiple disciplines from the humanities: literary 
studies, linguistics, and philosophy. Secondly, it seeks to contribute to a debate 
that has pervaded research in diverse fields and traditions across both sciences 
and humanities, including psychology, cognitive neuroscience, ethology, 
philosophy, and cognitively-oriented literary studies and linguistics. As such, 
this thesis embodies a plea for what I call topic-oriented scholarship: it takes a 
topic as its starting point and then seeks for the right combination of methods 
and expertise across multiple disciplines for approaching it, instead of starting 
from the set of questions and assumptions customary in a particular discipline. 
Thereby, it aims at making progress not just by contesting existing findings, but 
also by adding new perspectives on these findings. Hopefully, these 
perspectives will inspire researchers from both the sciences and the humanities 
in their future, ideally joint, research on this topic. 
 
                                                
6 In my view, “multidisciplinary” is the appropriate label when research done within multiple 
disciplines is brought together; “interdisciplinary” means that methods and conceptual 
frameworks from one discipline are applied in another one. In that sense, this thesis as a whole 
is a multidisciplinary project, but it also takes an interdisciplinary approach at times: for 






The format of this thesis can best be characterised as “hybrid”: it holds middle 
ground between a classic thesis in book form, as has long been common in the 
humanities, and a collected set of related though independent papers, as is 
common throughout the natural and social sciences. As laid out in the 
Introduction, its core consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 and the Conclusion are 
written mostly in service of the other chapters, introducing the broader context, 
concepts, methods, and terms, and eventually wrapping up and tying all lines 
together. Whereas all chapters in principle use inline citations, Chapter 1 
features footnotes wherever the introductory nature of the text would 
otherwise be jeopardised by too long lists of citations. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 read as independent studies. They begin with an 
abstract and have a paper format, rather than a chapter one. Chapter 2 was 
published separately in Langauge and Literature (see Van Duijn, Sluiter, and 
Verhagen, 2015) and inserted without modifications. Paper versions of Chapters 
3 and 4 are currently under review at a literary journal and a journal with a 
focus on cognitive linguistics respectively. Parts of Chapter 5 (especially 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4) have been presented at the Societas Linguistica Europaea 
(SLE) conference, taking place from 11-14 September 2014 in Poznan, Poland, 
and at the Perspective Project Kick-off Meeting, on 17 November 2014 in 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. A paper version of this chapter will be submitted 
for the next SLE volume (forthcoming 2016). Chapter 6, then, contains the most 
practical part of this thesis: it offers a detailed analysis of selected stimuli and 
questions from three studies done within the mentalising paradigm, thereby 
aiming at “exporting” the insights of the other chapters to the practice of the 
lab, hopefully inspiring future rounds of experimental testing. 
The chosen hybrid format has pros and cons. To start with a disadvantage 
that is particularly manifest when reading the thesis from cover to cover: some 
(especially introductory) parts of the chapters are repetitive. However, it was 
neither possible nor desirable to eliminate such repetition, given that each 
separate study interacts with different academic fields and bodies of literature, 
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and targets different audiences (roughly: psychologists and cognitively-oriented 
literary scholars and linguists in Chapter 2; literary scholars in Chapter 3; 
linguists in Chapter 4; psychologists, linguists, and philosophers of language in 
Chapter 5; philosophers and experimental psychologists in Chapter 6). 
Therefore, although certain portions may at times overlap, the focus is different 
in each chapter, and so are the choices of what to highlight and what to take for 
granted. 
Despite the inconvenience this may cause anyone reading the entire 
thesis, in the long run I believe the chosen mode of presentation can yield an 
important advantage: it will hopefully enable the separate chapters to each 
independently find their way into the different fields and reach the different 
audiences for which they were intended, without the “ballast” of being 








The bigger picture: language, narrative, and social cognition 
 
Any mentioning of intentionality or intentional states comes with an interesting 
assumption: that we can speak meaningfully about the inner lives of others and 
ourselves. Indeed, everyday language is packed with “mentalistic” expressions 
of the type: “I know what you’re after”, “he thinks she’s married”, “she believed 
that he feared nothing more than that”, etcetera, and in numerous contexts it is 
perfectly unproblematic to speak and reason in this way. At the same time, 
shifting from a run-of-the-mill perspective to one of philosophical and scientific 
inquiry, one may legitimately ask: what do we know about someone else’s 
beliefs, thoughts, intentions, desires, fears, and so on? And what ways do we 
have available to form an understanding of this? A different question may be: 
why would we bother at all? 
These questions have been central to the research into social cognition, the 
sort of cognition required for living in groups structured by social bonds and 
networks. As mentioned in the Introduction, researchers from a wide array of 
disciplines have contributed to this area, most notably psychologists, 
philosophers, anthropologists, ethologists, and neuroscientists. Most attention 
has been focused on the skill referred to as “mindreading” (also variously called 
“theory of mind”, “mentalising”, or sometimes “folk psychology”; see below), 
the capability to assess others’ intentions, knowledge states, motives, etcetera—
in short: their intentional states. As also set out in the Introduction, the main 
endeavour of this thesis consists in analysing the nature of the complexity 
involved in dealing with multiple intentional states that are mutually linked 
and/or embedded, as required by various aspects of our social and cultural 
lives, and investigating ways in which we handle such complexity linguistically 
and cognitively. Evidently, properly addressing the issue of handling multiple 
intentional states first requires knowledge of what it entails to form an 
understanding of just one intentional state. This chapter will start with a 
discussion of several possible views on this question, as given in the wider area 
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of research into mindreading. Next, a brief status quaestionis of research into 
multiple-order intentionality will be provided. The chapter will end by 
considering the links between, on the one hand, mindreading and multiple-
order intentionality, and, on the other hand, language, narrative, and various 
aspects of social interaction more widely, as discussed throughout the literature 
on (primate) sociality and social cognition. 
 
 
1.1 Mindreading and intentionality 
 
1.1.1 Mindreading 
Research into mindreading easily attracts attention, though not always for the 
right reasons. It all too often conjures up associations with myths, fairy tales, 
science-fiction stories, or even with fortune tellers and crystal gazers of the 
suspicious sort. In modern science there is of course a complete consensus that 
there is no magic involved in the way we form understandings of others’ inner 
lives—however, anyone trying to come to grips with the extensive literature on 
mindreading that has emerged over the past decades might well form the 
suspicion that this is indeed the only consensus. To give a (rough and 
preliminary) impression: some research traditions have pictured a dedicated 
mindreading “module”, forming the quintessence of the human mind (see e.g. 
Saxe, 2006). Others, by contrast, have conceived of mindreading rather as an 
“umbrella term” for a set of diverse tricks, strategies, and mechanisms that we 
use to make sense of the behaviour of ourselves and others around us (e.g. 
Apperly, 2011). Some have emphasised the role of brain functions specialised 
for mindreading (e.g. Carruthers, 2004), others have suggested that we use only 
general cognitive skills (e.g. Heyes, 2014). Some are particularly interested in the 
aspects of mindreading that are uniquely human, others emphasise their deep 
roots in our primate (or even mammalian) nervous systems (e.g. De Waal, 2013). 
Some maintain that mindreading relies on innate competencies (e.g. Fodor, 
1983), whereas others stress that the most important parts of mindreading are 
learned in the course of growing up in our typically human socio-cultural 
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environments (e.g. Heyes and Frith, 2014). According to some researchers, 
mindreading is highly “enactive” and performed by using our entire body for 
modelling someone else’s perspective (e.g. Gallagher, 2008), while others have 
suggested that we run simulations of what people around us feel and think 
using “mirror systems” in our brains (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998). At the 
same time, defenders of an “inferentialist” understanding of cognition have 
suggested that we form representations of and theories about the inner lives of 
others instead of running simulations of any form (e.g. Gopnik and Wellman, 
2012). Advocates of the “narrative practice hypothesis”, in turn, have argued that 
mindreading most often relies neither on simulation nor theorising, but rather 
on structural and semantic knowledge of folk-psychological narratives (e.g. 
Hutto, 2008). Several of these positions will be detailed and built on below. 
At the outset of his monograph Mindreaders (2011), Apperly provides a 
comprehensive overview of the main questions and debates that have occupied 
researchers of mindreading over the past decades. His book focuses mostly on 
explaining how mindreading works in terms of its underlying mechanisms, 
which means that it operates for the largest part on Marr’s H-level (“how”, 
“through which mechanisms”; see the Introduction). In line with the purposes 
of this thesis, the discussion in this chapter is mainly focused on the W-level 
(“what”): it aims at setting out a workable “task model” of mindreading by 
discussing the elements and stages of its process and the conditions under 
which it operates. Nonetheless, this chapter also contains several sections 
pertaining to the mechanistic and physical levels of explanation, as parts of 
introducing the larger field of research. 
Stripped down to its basic outlines, the task model set out here features 
five elements:  
(i) the mindreader; 
(ii) the mindreadee; 
(iii) cues; 
(iv) intentional states (which can be called “mindreads” once the 
mindreading process has taken place); and 




I will begin by discussing an introductory example, exploring some of the issues 
and terms that will be revised and built upon in the sections that follow. 
Consider the following photograph: 
 
 
Figure 1  
A normally developed adult person standing in the position of the 
photographer (the mindreader) will most likely feel inclined to give the person 
on the staircase (the mindreadee) a helping hand. The term used for the basis of 
this inclination by Frans de Waal (2005) is emotional contagion:7 we see the facial 
expression and posture of the person carrying out a heavy task and due to the 
deeply-rooted empathic tendencies we have as primates, we cannot even help 
but feel some of the burden ourselves, which triggers the impulse of providing 
targeted help (more details and alternatives will be discussed below in Section 
                                                
7 “Emotional” is here to be understood not in the narrow sense of the “basic emotions”, but 
rather as the broader category of feelings including, for instance, pain, grief, agitation, relief, 
sorrow, embarrassment, surprise, and so on (De Waal, 2005: 46-47).  
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1.1.4). Whether this help is in the end provided will clearly depend on many 
factors, such as individual features of the mindreader, relationship to the 
mindreadee, local cultural rules, and more. However, it is not hard to see that 
Figure 1 above depicts a situation in which a helping hand would in principle be 
appropriate. Now consider the following photograph: 
 
 
              Figure 2 
 
The weightlifter depicted in Figure 2 shows a posture and facial expression 
considerably similar to that of the person in Figure 1 and the tasks faced by both 
are also much alike: lifting a heavy object. Yet it is clear that this man would 
show much surprise, if not severe agitation, if the photographer or any of the 
other bystanders would offer a helping hand—and indeed, none of them shows 
the least inclination to come to his aid. (A caption making this point in a 
different way would be: “Why is this not an example of the bystander-effect?”) 
Even if the weightlifter were to look up and ask for a helping hand, the 
mindreader would probably start mining the situation for opportunities to 
provide assistance with anything other than just lifting the weight bar, such as a 
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loose shoe lace or an unfastened spring collar at one of the bar ends—at least, 
that is, as long as the weightlifter gives the impression that he has the situation 
under control. This highlights another crucial component of the inferential 
process: background knowledge—not only emotional contagion influences the 
mindreader’s decision on whether to take action or not, but also knowledge 
about the situation the mindreadee is in. In principle, one could imagine that 
someone completely unfamiliar with the context of a gym would hasten to help 
lifting the weight bar (some philosophers would suggest an empathic Martian; 
others would perhaps suggest an unworldly philosopher). He would pick up 
some of the burden felt by the mindreadee, while being unable to recruit the 
relevant background knowledge about what the possible scenarios are in this 
context. Someone who does know the context of a gym, by contrast, does have 
such scenarios available: the weightlifter wants to test or train his strength, or 
possibly show off to the bystanders. Clearly, in these scenarios help is highly 
unwanted. If he were lifting the bar from his car boot, though, a helping hand 
might again fit. 
The decision about which behaviour is appropriate in the situations 
depicted by Figures 1 and 2 relies on what I here call a mindread: the assessment 
made of someone’s intentional state in the context of a (real or imagined) social 
interaction event. Such an assessment is made on the basis of cues, which can be 
of virtually any nature. What does or does not count as a cue can only be 
defined from the perspective of the mindreader: it includes any observable 
aspect exhibited by the mindreadee and his or her “situatedness” in the context 
of the interaction that is used in the mindreader’s inferential process. The cues 
are interpreted in the light of relevant background knowledge, recruited from 
the mindreader’s memory. In practice, the resulting outcome, i.e. the mindread, 
can be made explicit or remain implicit, and can be taken for granted or 
factored into the planning of future behaviour. This behaviour can be linguistic 
(the mindread can guide form and content of an utterance or response) or non-
linguistic, as would be the case when providing a helping hand to the person in 
Figure 1. Moreover, for purposes of analysis or reflection it is possible to form 
explicit paraphrases of a mindread, for example: “this person intends to lift the 
suitcase in order to get upstairs, so will appreciate a helping hand” or “A thinks 
that B wants help” in the case of Figure 1. As will be discussed in Section 1.1.3 
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below and in Chapter 2, it is important not to confuse such paraphrases with 
the cognitive processing required to make appropriate inferences, and with 
representations of intentional states as they appear “in the wild” of actual 
discourse. The distinctions now made can be summarised as follows: 
	
	 	 	 	 no	behaviour/taken	for	granted	 	
	 	 implicit	 	 non-linguistic	behaviour	 	 e.g.	provide	helping	hand	
	 	 	 	 linguistic	behaviour	 	 e.g.	ask	“Can	I	help?”	
mindread	
	 	 	
	 	 explicit	 	 paraphrase	 	 e.g.	“A	thinks	that	B	wants	help”	
 
Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 will further elaborate on element (iv) of the list above: 
intentional states. In Section 1.1.4 element (v), the inferential process, will be 
discussed in more detail. 
 
1.1.2 Intentional states 
The concept of intentionality (not to be confused with the “intentions” we have 
when we want something to happen) has a rich history in scholarship and 
sciences of the mind. After its presumed origin in medieval scholastics,8 the 
concept was most famously developed in the nineteenth century by Franz 
Brentano (1995 [1874]), as a part of debates now considered foundational for the 
emergence of psychology as an academic discipline, and in the twentieth 
century by Daniel Dennett (1971; 1987) and John Searle (1983), in work that was 
influential in the still-ongoing trend in psychology and the cognitive sciences to 
study mindreading. Brentano used the concept of intentionality to define the 
difference between mental and physical phenomena. In brief, his distinction 
boils down to the claim that physical phenomena have an autonomous 
existence, whereas mental phenomena necessarily are about something—they 
do not exist independently of their intentional object. In Brentano’s words: “in 
                                                
8 According Chisholm’s (1967) entry in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy a very similar concept was 
already present in Saint Anselm of Canterbury’s 1078 treatise on the existence of God, but the 
term was coined later and goes back to the scholastic notion of “intentionalitas”. 
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presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or 
denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on” (1995 [1874]: 88). 
This “something” that is presented, judged, loved, etcetera, is the intentional 
object on which each intentional state depends for its existence.  
Making a distinction between mental and physical phenomena in this 
way has implications for how the ontology of mental phenomena is construed. 
Therefore, work on intentionality has always been connected to fundamental 
philosophical debates regarding “dualism” and, more recently, the mind-body 
distinction and extendedness of cognitive processes. Brentano seems to accept a 
meaningful divide between the physical or material world, in which objects 
exist as objects, and the mental world, which includes non-material phenomena 
that are about objects.9 From a non-dualist, “materialist” viewpoint this position 
is problematic, since mental phenomena are being viewed as a part of the 
physical and material world in no other sense of the words. Within the 
materialist view, a distinction can again be made between, on the one hand, 
theorists who conceive of cognitive processes as neurons in the brain “dancing” 
in a particular way, and, on the other hand, theorists who argue that cognition 
is mostly distributed over the entire body, or even beyond that: over the 
environment. Defenders of this latter position, which is known as “extended 
cognition”, allow for combinations of, for instance, people, machines, books, 
and/or cultural practices to be included in their definitions of cognitive 
processes. Some more attention to the issue of embodied cognition will be paid 
in Chapter 2, where mindreading is considered in the context of drama and 
dialogue. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will argue that part of the burden of processing 
                                                
9 Note that this does not mean that he argues that physical phenomena can be experienced 
unmediated by our senses: he sees the world as being entirely mediated by subjective 
experience; however, some parts of our experience relate to physical phenomena and others to 
psychological phenomena (see Zahavi, 1992: 30). In this sense, Brentano can be called a dualist, 
but not a Cartesian. See also Dennett (1987: chapter 10). 
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complicated mindreading tasks can be alleviated by cultural and linguistic 
“thinking tools”.10 
Dennett, who is an explicit defender of cognitive materialism, bypasses 
much of this controversy by speaking of “intentional systems” (1971; 1983). 
Whether a cognitive system is construed as an immaterial mind, a group of 
interconnected neurons “dancing” in a particular way, an entire body, or as two 
people and a calculator, in all cases it can be seen as a system capable of 
intentionality, in the sense that it can enter a state in which it is about an object. 
This object should be taken in the broadest sense of the word, including, for 
instance, a ball in the mouth of a dog, a comic figure on a computer screen, a 
picnic in a short story by a price-winning writer, or the creator of the universe. 
Whether the object exists in some form outside the realm of the intentional 
state is, in this view, not part of the question: intentionality is seen as a property 
that a system can have, regardless of how this system is realised and regardless 
of the ontological status of the object. In this way, and as mentioned in the 
Introduction above, an intentional system can enter a state in which it is about 
another intentional system, potentially also exhibiting an intentional state. For 
example, a human mind can be about another human mind’s intentional state, 
say, the other’s desire for a glass of water, intention to cooperate, or 
understanding of her brother’s love for his daughter. Such embedded or 
multiple-order intentionality will be discussed further in Section 1.2 below. 
Characteristic of intentional states, then, is that they have a “dependent” 
or “extending” nature: when considering an intentional state, one necessarily 
also has to take into account the object this state is about. A traditional way of 
studying this is using “logical” propositions. Consider the following 
expressions: 
 
(1) John believes that it is raining outside. 
                                                
10 See Dennett (1987: chapter 10) for a taxonomy and discussion of various theories about 
intentionality and their implications for the ontology of mental phenomena. Although explicit 
defence of a classical “Cartesian” dualist view is rare in modern philosophy and science, 
implicit assumptions referring to this view can be traced in many works and research traditions 
(see also Dennett, 1991: chapter 2 and 5). The latter point is also demonstrated in Sorem’s (2010) 
discussion of Searle (1992): Sorem argues how Searle’s “simple solution” (1992: 1) to the mind-
body problem yields inconsistencies, in a way that is illustrative of how deeply rooted dualistic 
views are in everyday thinking as well as in specialised philosophy. 
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(2) Mary intends that John believes that it is raining outside. 
(3) Mary talks to John and it is raining outside. 
(4) It is raining outside and Mary intends that John has another cup of tea. 
 
They can be rewritten into propositions as follows: 
 
(5) A believes that p 
(6) B intends that A believes that p 
(7) p and q 
(8) p and Mary intends that q 
 
Note that clauses expressing intentional states are rewritten using the form “A 
[intentional expression] that p”, whereas other clauses, referring to objects (in 
the broad sense, so including events, states of affaires, people, etc.), are 
rendered as single symbols (p or q). This reflects the structural property of 
intentional states discussed above: they are not independent, but reflect a 
relationship between an intentional being and a non-intentional object. In 
logical terms: a clause expressing an intentional state induces “referential 
opacity”, as can be shown by the so-called “substitution test” (Dennett 1983: 344-
345). In a proposition describing a particular state of affairs in the world, it is 
usually possible to substitute words with other words that refer to the same 
entity without consequences for the truth-value (or even referential value) of 
the sentence. In other words: “this rule is simply the logical codification of the 
maxim that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet” (Dennett, 1983: 
344). To give an example: provided that Macbeth and Hamlet were written by the 
same author, it should be possible to substitute “the author of Macbeth” with 
“the author of Hamlet” in a proposition, without the truth-value and referential 
value being affected. The propositions (9) and (10) are thus either both false or 
both true: 
 
(9) The author of Macbeth was born in Stratford-upon-Avon 




 However, in the following two propositions this is not necessarily the case: 
 
(11) John believes that the author of Macbeth was born in Stratford-upon-Avon 
(12) John believes that the author of Hamlet was born in Stratford-upon-Avon  
 
After all, what John does and does not believe is independent of the “real-world 
fact” that the author of both pieces is the same person. This is what Dennett 
calls referential opacity: “the terms in such clauses are shielded or insulated by 
a barrier to logical analysis, which normally “sees through” the terms to the 
world the terms are about” (1983: 345).11 
The take-home message from the substitution test is really that there is a 
relation of dependency between the intentional agent and the non-intentional 
proposition. In the case of “John believes that it is raining outside”, the 
intentional agent (John) and the intentional expression (believes that) are the 
responsibility of the speaker, the one who asserts the proposition, whereas the 
non-intentional proposition (it is raining outside) is placed under the 
responsibility of the staged intentional agent (John). As a consequence, it is 
“insulated”, in Dennett’s words, “shielded from logical analysis” (1983: 345). In 
“Mary intends that John believes that it is raining outside”, there are two such 
dependency relations: “John believes that it is raining outside” falls as a whole 
under the scope of “Mary intends that”, and “it is raining outside” falls under 
“John believes that”. Schematically: 
 
 
 Mary intends that John believes that it is raining outside. 
 
 
                                                
11 There is a significant difference between this “logical” approach and the natural-language 
view mostly taken throughout the rest of this thesis. Instead of looking at references to the “real 
world”, in this latter view the focus is on a speaker having a certain rhetorical goal (in this case 
presumably informing his interlocutor that John believes that the author of a particular piece 
was born in Stratford-upon-Avon). With a view to achieving this goal the speaker invites his 
interlocutor to consider the perspective of John, which he does (in accordance with local 
linguistic conventions) through the usage of a complementation construction (see Chapters 4 
and 5 in particular). 
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By contrast, in the case of a conjunction of two non-intentional propositions, 
there is no dependency in this sense: 
 
 Mary talks to John and it is raining outside. 
 
Clearly, when an intentionality proposition is combined with a non-
intentionality proposition, the latter is independent of the first: 
 
 It is raining outside and Mary intends that John has another cup of tea. 
 
Another aspect of intentional relations is what could be called their non-
transitivity.12 The following proposition features three clauses that are causally 
related: 
 
 It is raining, so they are inside, therefore they have time to talk 
 
 
In principle, it is possible to leave out the middle clause without violating the 
chain of causality expressed by this proposition: 
 
 It is raining, so they are inside, therefore they have time to talk 
 
 
In other words, if a proposition expresses “p so q therefore z”, it follows that “p 
therefore z” is also true—causal relationships could therefore be called 
“transitive”. By contrast, if one clause is left out of a chain of intentionally 
related clauses, it does not follow that the produced clause has the same truth-
value: “B believes that A believes that p” does not entail that “B believes that p”.  
The points made in this section will be of practical use when analysing 
questions from mentalising experiments in Chapter 6. Their theoretical 
importance will become clearer in Section 1.2 below and in the Chapters 2 and 
                                                
12 In formal logic transitivity is a property of certain relational predicates, such as ancestry. If A 
is an ancestor of B, and B is an ancestor of C, then it follows that A is also an ancestor of C (see 
e.g. Forbes, 1994: 275). 
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3; in fact, it can be said that the non-transitive, dependent nature of the 
relationships exhibited by multiple-order intentionality propositions is one of 
the core aspects of the problem dealt with in this thesis. 
 
1.1.3 The intentional stance 
So far in this thesis, different intentional relationships have been categorised 
using mentalistic expressions from everyday language, such as thinking, 
knowing, believing, desiring, intending, and so on. How can we be sure that 
these terms are appropriate? Do they correspond to the actual intentional states 
held by others around us? Or, for that matter, to those held by non-human 
animals? According to Dennett (1983; 1987) we do not need to be sure. He argues 
that in order to understand phenomena in the world, one can adopt various 
strategies or “stances”, corresponding to different levels of theorising (partly 
overlapping with Marr’s levels of explanation, as will be pointed out below). 
For example, for understanding why an analogue alarm clock rings, one could 
take the “physical stance” and aim at figuring out how, given the laws of 
physics, its springs exert particular forces on a system of cogwheels and axes, 
eventually triggering a clapper that hits a bell, which causes movement of air at 
particular frequencies, and so on. One could also take the “design stance”, 
looking at what the clock was designed to do when setting it to a particular time 
and switching on the alarm function. Alternatively, one can adopt the 
“intentional stance”, not towards the alarm clock itself, but to the intentional 
system who set it: one can question why someone has set it to this particular 
time and what he or she intended hearers of the alarm sound to think. If we 
decide to adopt the intentional stance, this means that we try to make sense of 
an intentional system’s behaviour by assuming that it was underlain by 
intentional states. In this view, the intentional states are really “in the eye of the 
beholder”, and their use is to understand a phenomenon in the world better. 
Intentional systems can be humans, but also other animals, for example: 
“that fox digs a hole because it wants to build a nest” or “bird X believes that bird 
Y is hiding food”. Dennett argues that usage of everyday language is not 
problematic in such cases, as long as one keeps to the appropriate level of 
theorising. To use an adapted version of his own example: when researchers 
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interested in the behaviour of a particular bird decide to call a certain berry in 
the bird’s environment “food”, they abstract from all kinds of biological and 
chemical details of nutrition and digestion. Biologists interested in such details 
might choose to refer to the same berry in terms of its composing sugars, acids, 
proteins, etcetera. Even if the latter research were still in an early stage and 
little would be known about the biochemical details of nutrition from this 
berry, those interested in the foraging behaviour of the bird could safely refer to 
it as “food” in their theories. Similarly, one can perfectly well make use of 
everyday mentalistic vocabulary as long as one is dealing with questions of 
some beings’ behaviour in their social environments, and not with the “lower-
level” mechanisms and physical processes underlying social living.13 
In some ways this is reminiscent of the distinction made between 
“explicit” and “implicit” mindreads at the end of Section 1.1.1. Normally 
developed human adults can surely reason about mental concepts in an explicit 
way: they can think or talk about themselves or others in terms of their beliefs, 
desires, fears, etcetera, thereby explaining or motivating particular behavioural 
moves and choices. However, this does by no means entail that mindreading in 
the practice of social interaction constantly uses explicit mental concepts. 
Apperly’s (2011: 3) analogy in the physical domain is the curve described by a 
ball thrown into the field: although we can in principle reason about angles, 
velocity, friction, and so on, in order to predict where it will land, this hardly 
reflects how we manage to make a catch in practice. The explicit mental 
concepts and linguistic paraphrases could be seen as the formulas dealing with 
angels, velocity, and friction: although they can in principle be used to form a 
mindread, they hardly reflect our reasoning in most cases of everyday 
interaction (more on mindreading and linguistic explications will follow in 
Section 1.2.2). 
Note that Marr’s levels of explanation can again do useful work in this 
context: both adopting the intentional stance (“the fox wants…”) and engaging 
in explicit mindreading (“A thinks that B intends…”) are unproblematic on 
                                                
13 See Dennett (1983: 344) for his version of this example. Related to this is the debate over the 
question whether the everyday mentalistic terms should be seen as temporary placeholders, 
used only until their “real” neurological correlates are figured out, or whether they have a 




Marr’s W-level, the level of “what the task is”. Terms such as thinking, knowing, 
desiring, and so on, work fine when used to describe what a mindreading 
process is about and why it is taking place. However, this may change as soon as 
one is dealing with questions on Marr’s H-level of the mechanisms at work or 
the physical level describing what machinery is used: it is likely that intentional 
terms such as thinking, knowing, or desiring have no role in, say, what drives a 
fox to dig a hole or what makes a bodybuilder lift a heavy weight bar on the 
physical level. 
In the next section, I will offer a brief discussion of various hypotheses 
operating at the level of how the inferential processes underlying mindreading 
are carried out in practice, thus switching to the H- and physical levels. 
  
1.1.4 The inferential process: theory, simulation, narrative practice 
The concept of “theory of mind” goes back to discussions about the cognitive 
features and limitations of our close primate relatives in the 1970s. The 
foundational paper on this concept was published by Premack and Woodruff in 
1978. They discussed experiments in which a chimpanzee, Sarah, was shown 
videotaped attempts of a human actor to solve particular problems, such as 
trying to grab a banana that was placed out of reach. Sarah (who, incidentally, 
was said to be familiar with the video screen from watching “commercial 
television”) had little trouble matching the videotaped problems with 
photographs that pictured the “right” solution out of several options, such as 
using a long stick to bring the banana closer. Interestingly, it seemed to matter 
to her that the actor in the videos was her favourite trainer, for whom she 
clearly felt affection, since when the same part was played by another, less well-
known acquaintance of hers in subsequent test rounds, she quite consistently 
chose photographs showing “bad” alternative solutions leading to “untoward 
outcomes” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978: 521).  
It is worthwhile looking into this early paper in some detail, as it already 
addresses a few important issues that have since been discussed extensively in 
the literature on mindreading, and are mostly still under debate. After 
establishing that the results could not be explained by mere “physical 
matching” of objects, the authors discuss three possible explanations of how 
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the chimpanzee could have managed to match the videotaped problems to the 
right solutions: “associationism”, “theory of mind”, or “empathy”. According to 
the first explanation, she would have solved the problem on the basis of 
familiarity with relevant sequences of action; in the authors’ words: “when 
shown a sequence that one recognizes, but that is incomplete, one chooses the 
element that has the effect of completing the sequence” (1978: 516). The authors 
point out that Sarah most likely had similar experiences from her own daily life 
in the lab, but that she was not familiar with the exact sequences of action used 
in the experiment and that there was sufficient reason to assume that the 
presented problems contained at least some novel elements for her. They 
therefore grant the “associationism” explanation some credibility, but regard it 
insufficient to account for the totality of their findings. 
The second explanation, “theory of mind”, is described by Premack and 
Woodruff as follows: “In looking at the videotape, [the chimpanzee] imputes at 
least two states of mind to the human actor, namely, intention or purpose on 
the one hand, and knowledge or belief on the other” (1978: 518). They thus 
suggest that, according to this explanation, Sarah somehow went through the 
following strand of reasoning:  
(i) “the human actor wants the banana and is struggling to reach it”;  
(ii) “the actor knows how to attain the banana”; and 
(iii) that will lead to the situation depicted in photograph X rather than 
photograph Y (1978: 518; italics added).  
The authors consider the third explanation, “empathy”, to be identical as 
far as step (i) is concerned, but different for step (ii) and (iii). After imputing to 
the actor the intention to grab the banana (step (i)), according to the “empathy” 
explanation Sarah would put herself “in the place of the actor” (1978: 518) and 
choose the alternative consistent with what she would do in that situation.  
Given that it mattered to Sarah’s choices whether she saw her favourite 
trainer or a more removed acquaintance on the video screen, Premack and 
Woodruff favour the “theory of mind” explanation over the “empathy” one: 
after all, if she would picture herself in the presented situations, the actor’s 
identity should not matter. They argue that this does not exclude 




in highly familiar situations, one’s expectancies are based on existing 
associations. […] In novel situations, however, one’s expectancies are 
generated, we think, from theories, and are not the product of 
associative generalization. […] There may also be developmental and 
inter-species differences in this regard. Young children and lower 
species may form expectancies by associative mechanisms, the former 
having yet to build any theories and the latter probably unable to build 
them; whereas adults and higher species may largely generate them 
from theory. (1978: 518) 
 
Extensive debates followed this early discussion, partly revolving around 
questions of which primate species had such theory-of-mind abilities and to 
what extent, and for another part focusing on analogous competences in 
humans. Later on, important contributions were made by developmental 
studies and research addressing certain psychopathological disorders. It 
seemed that some people suffering from disorders along the autistic spectrum 
were well-described as having impaired theory-of-mind abilities, which was 
generally taken as a strong indication that there must indeed be some part or 
network in the human brain responsible for theory of mind (after all, “if it can 
break, it must be there”). Another boost to the field was given by the advances 
made in the neurosciences during the 1990s and 2000s, including also the 
discovery of mirror neurons, neural networks that are involved both when an 
action is performed and when this same action is observed in someone else.14  
Notwithstanding the importance of all these subsequent findings and 
contributions to the debate, support for all three explanations given by 
Premack and Woodruff for how the inferential process works persists to the 
present day in one form or another. The aim in the remainder of this section is 
to offer a typology of the dominant positions in the current field. By way of 
illustration, work of proponents of each of these positions will be referenced 
and discussed in brief, but these discussions must by no means be taken to be 
exhaustive. For more comprehensive overviews, providing more extensive lists 
                                                
14 See Di Pellegrino et al. (1992) for one of the initial papers on the discovery of mirror neurons; 
for a full discussion see Pineda (2009). For an overview of neuroscientific research into 
mindreading see Frith and Frith (2006). For an overview of literature on mindreading and 
psychopathology see Baron-Cohen et al. (2013); Bird and Viding (2014). For mindreading across 
the primate world see Byrne and Whiten (1988; 1997); Rosati and Hare (2010); Whiten (2013). 
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of references to advocates of the different positions see Apperly (2011: especially 




Proponents of what is referred to as the “theory-theory” hypothesis suggest that 
mindreading relies on folk-psychological theories, generally held to comprise 
knowledge of rules and patterns of how social beings behave, and why they 
behave like they do, with a certain degree of abstraction. So mindreading 
competence is hypothesised to rely not (just) on knowing a collection of 
sequences of action that can be used as “exemplars” when making sense of new 
cases, but rather on more abstract rules and patterns that can be used to 
generate predictions of future intentional states and/or behaviour. There are 
multiple versions of the theory-theory hypothesis in circulation, primarily 
differing in two dimensions: “specialised versus domain-general”, and “innate 
versus learned”. High scores on both specialisation and innateness can be 
associated with, for example, Fodor’s work in this area. Roughly, his idea is that 
humans are born with “innately cognized propositional contents” (Hutto, 2008: 
144, citing Fodor, 1983: 85), which can be understood as specialised modules 
containing the basic rules of folk psychology. In the practice of social 
interaction, these rules can be applied to representations of someone’s beliefs, 
desires, and other intentional states, in order to yield predictions of someone’s 
future intentional states or behaviour, much in the fashion of steps (i), (ii), and 
(iii) above, as suggested by Premack and Woodruff. According to this view, 
mindreading capabilities are in place from birth, but they are initially 
“masked”: infants lack the ability to exploit their innate understandings of 
intentions, desires, beliefs, and so on, until they improve general skills such as 
selecting and processing information, and applying it appropriately (for a more 
recent defence of a position along these lines see Leslie, Friedman, and 
German, 2004).  
Other researchers suggest that folk-psychological theories are constructed 
rather than inherited genetically. Most notably, Gopnik and Wellman (e.g. 2012) 
argue that children use “data” gained from experience with their own and 
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others’ actions in the social world in order to infer causal structures using forms 
of statistical learning. In the course of growing up, they may test their theories 
via “informal experimentation” through play, and further refine them through 
imitation and pedagogy. According to this view, forming theories about others’ 
inner lives and social behaviours is done using the same mechanisms as 
forming theories about other aspects of the world (such as behaviour of 
physical objects). Gopnik and Wellman are thus situated at the other end of the 
theory-theory spectrum: according to them, mindreading is learned using more 




The second dominant view on mindreading is known as “simulation theory”. 
The essence of this view is that the inner lives of others can be modelled using 
one’s own mind. Like in Premack and Woodruff’s early discussion of what they 
call “empathy”15, the basic idea is that one reasons “as if being in the other’s 
shoes”. However, in more recent accounts of simulation theory a distinction is 
being made between, on the one hand, low-level simulation of actions, bodily 
expressions, and basic emotions, and, on the other hand, the high-level 
simulation of intentional states providing the motivations and conditions 
behind these actions, expressions, and emotions (see e.g. Gallese, 2001; 
Goldman, 2006; for a broader discussion and critique see Gallagher, 2012). 
Roughly, the opinion among simulation theorists is that the low-level 
component is present in infants and other primates, whereas the high-level is 
unique to humans and develops throughout childhood. The low-level 
component is argued to rely primarily on activation of mirror neurons, 
                                                
15 There are many different usages of the term “empathy” around in the literature on social 
cognition. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for mindreading, sometimes it is framed as a 
process underlying mindreading, and sometimes it is argued that the two can do without each 
other (see e.g. Gallagher, 2012, for a discussion of different positions among simulation 
theorists). In general, I think that the meaningful categories in the domain of mindreading and 
social cognition are covered in this section, though sometimes in a simplified form. It is possible 
to discuss some of these categories in light of the term “empathy”, or even to re-label some 
categories with terms such as “affective empathy”, “emotional empathy”, or “cognitive 
empathy” (e.g. De Waal, 2005; Uzefovsky et al., 2015), but this is rather a different way of cutting 
the same cake than an extension yielding genuine conceptual enrichment. 
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providing a very direct sense of another’s body movements, facial expressions, 
and (through that, probably) basic emotional states (see Note 7 above; see also 
Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006, for what they refer to as “common coding”). When 
given the example of the lady with the suitcase on the stairs discussed in 1.1.1 
above, simulation theorists would probably explain the “contagious” effect of 
this scene in terms of low-level simulation processes making one “take over” 
part of the burden—after all, the mirror-neuron view predicts that some of the 
same networks in the brain are activated when executing the action of lifting the 
heavy suitcase as when seeing someone else do this. Simulation theorists would 
probably go on to add that the higher-level component of simulation is needed 
to distinguish between the situation on the stairs and the one in the gym: after 
all, only after running a full imaginative simulation of both situations (“putting 
oneself in the shoes” of the two mindreadees in the pictures), can one become 
aware that the lifting of the heavy object has a different goal in either case and 
thus is underpinned by a different set of motivations. 
 
Narrative-practice and two-systems approaches 
The third and fourth views that have come to prominence in the literature on 
mindreading are the “narrative-practice” hypothesis (Gallagher and Hutto, 
2008) and the “two-systems” approach (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Apperly, 
2011: chapter 6 and 7). These two views can be characterised by their attitudes 
towards the first two positions: defenders of the narrative-practice hypothesis 
tend to argue that neither theories nor simulations can account for how we 
understand the inner lives of others, whereas two-systems thinkers generally 
grant the importance of elements of both theory and simulation. However, this 
difference is one of emphasis rather than of essence, since upon a closer look 
the two approaches have much in common. Both start from the view that the 
foundations of social interaction lie in the mutual coordination of actions and 
body movements, allowing for such “embodied” routines as mimicry, 
alignment, and imitation, and both approaches suggest that these processes are 
predominantly automatic, in place from early infancy, to some extent shared 
with other primates, and that the mirror-neuron system might play an 
important role. In fact, their suggestions of how the foundations of social 
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interaction work, are much in line with the low-level part of simulation theory. 
However, it is characteristic of the narrative-practice approach to emphasise 
that social interaction at this level has nothing to do with assessing intentional 
states. According to Gallagher and Hutto, the most prominent adherents of this 
view, the entire understanding of others around us in terms of intentional 
states, is an a posteriori dimension which we apply to the social world and its 
inhabitants using our experience with folk-psychological narratives. It is only 
because children are told (and adults keep telling each other) what people think, 
intend, desire, etcetera, under which conditions they do this, and how this is 
linked to behaviour, that we make sense of interaction events by referring to 
“underlying” intentional states (see Gallagher and Hutto, 2008; Hutto, 2008; 
Gallagher, 2012). Although there is debate over the precise implementation of 
this view in the practice of actual social interaction, an important part relies on 
the “matching” of previously collected exemplars with the case at hand.16 In this 
sense, this view comes closest to what Premack and Woodruff referred to as 
“associationism”, with the important difference that chimpanzees of course 
only have their own experiences and observations available as exemplars, 
whereas the crucial advantage for humans is our access to culturally 
accumulated experiences and observations through narratives—we can gain 
experience through others’ eyes, as it were.17 A related though more specific 
suggestion regarding the acquisition of exemplar cases through language and 
narratives will be made in Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis, and be integrated in 
the synthesis developed in the Conclusion. 
Two-systems thinkers share with advocates of the narrative-practice 
hypothesis the view that narratives and social schemas are highly important for 
our understanding of the social world and the inner lives of its inhabitants, but 
narratives and schemas have a different place in their model. According to two-
systems theory it is pivotal to recognise that social conventions have a high 
degree of normativity, and that the settings of (in)formal instruction through 
                                                
16 Incidentally, the building of abstractions on the basis of these exemplars is here not being 
excluded by the authors, which definitely blurs the sharp distinction with theory-theory they 
make elsewhere (e.g. Gallagher and Hutto, 2007).  
17 I discuss this view in more detail in Van Duijn (2015, in Dutch). A position that has much in 
common with this view, but does not put as much emphasis on narratives, can be found in 




which children are familiarised with these conventions are aided by the 
practice of telling narratives (Apperly, 2011: chapter 6; see also Warneken and 
Tomasello, 2006). However, where narrative-practice thinkers have a tendency 
to downplay the importance of mindreading altogether, replacing it by non-
representative forms of “bodily” coordination on the one level, and narrative 
competences on the other, the two-systems approach rather uses bodily 
interactions, narratives, social norms, and schemas to explain how mindreading 
at various levels is possible. The basic idea here is that, in order to serve the 
actual practice of social interaction, mindreading has to be quick and flexible at 
the same time (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). If it were the case that for every 
word, gesture, coordinated movement, helping hand, etcetera, a full 
mindreading process had to run, based on the totality of cues, represented 
intentional states, knowledge of folk-psychological rules or simulation of the 
others’ position, and so on, fluent interaction would be impossible. Therefore, 
two-systems theory suggests that part of the burden is taken away by quick, 
deeply-rooted, mostly automatic, bodily interaction routines, and that 
knowledge of social norms, schemas, and narratives can help a great deal in 
constraining the amount of information that has to be processed, and selecting 
what is relevant in a particular context, thus making the mindreading task 
tractable.18 However, all of this may come at the cost of the flexibility needed 
when one is confronted with mindreading tasks that go beyond bodily routines, 
general schemas, and so on. Therefore, according to two-systems theory, there 
is at least one other system available on top of the basic, “quick” system, which 
can deal with non-straightforward cases in a more explicit, flexible, though 
slower and more cognitively demanding way, possibly using elements of both 
theorising and simulation (see Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Apperly, 2011: 
chapter 6 and 7; see also Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).  
 
                                                
18 In fact, Chapter 2 works out this line of thinking for stories that appear to comprise highly 
complex mindreading tasks: I argue that a combination of “expository strategies” makes these 
tasks tractable, so that the audience in principle need not more than basic mindreading skills to 
be able to follow the plot. 
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Blind men and the elephant 
By way of concluding this section, I will discuss a little thought experiment 
adapted from a study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982; also discussed by 
Gallese and Goldman, 1998) leading to a brief summary and synthesis. Imagine 
that two travellers share a taxi on their way to the ferry port. Each of them has 
to take a different ship, however, both ships are scheduled to depart at the same 
time. During the taxi ride they are confronted with unexpectedly heavy traffic 
and, on top of that, when they are nearly there, the driver takes the wrong 
highway junction. As a consequence, they arrive at the port an hour late. 
Traveller A finds out that his ship has left thirty minutes ago, at the scheduled 
time. Traveller B is told that his ship was delayed by twenty-five minutes and 
left only five minutes ago. Who of the two travellers will be more upset? In 
Kahneman and Tversky’s study, nearly all participants agreed that this would 
be traveller B. How did they arrive at this conclusion? A theory-theory 
explanation would stress the role played by abstract (innate or acquired) 
intuitions of how different intentional and behavioural states relevant to this 
scenario are causally related. Given that the desire to catch the ship is equally 
present in both travellers, the difference must be explained from the 
dissimilarity between A’s belief that, given the heavy traffic, he would have 
missed his boat anyway, and B’s belief that he would still have caught his boat if 
only the traffic had been just a little less chaotic, or the driver had not missed 
the junction. Using abstract knowledge of the rules governing folk psychology, 
one can reason from these represented belief states to the expected degree of 
“upsetness” and judge whether the answer is A or B. Simulation theorists, in 
contrast, would suggest that there is no need to apply abstract, folk-
psychological rules, or even to represent desires and beliefs, since one can 
simply compare one’s own degree of imagined upsetness in either situation. 
Defenders of the narrative-practice hypothesis would argue that one’s sense of 
how the projected intentional states in this scenario link together can be 
correlated with similar scenarios one has acquired previously, leading to one 
outcome rather than the other. Two-systems thinkers, finally, would leave 
space for pragmatic combinations of these explanations. 
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When providing a brief overview of research into mindreading, like I 
have done in this section, it is unavoidable that each approach is reduced to a 
simplified sketch giving but an impression of the line of thinking behind it. 
Clearly, all these approaches have long histories (which also became clear 
when discussing Premack and Woodruff’s 1978 paper) and build on substantial 
foundations of philosophical inquiry and empirical evidence. Interestingly, it 
seems that the more papers one reads by (self-)proclaimed defenders of each of 
the camps, the clearer it becomes that much of the contrasts and controversies 
are rooted in conceptual and terminological incompatibility, or in dissent with 
respect to what the relevant questions are, rather than in disagreement over the 
answers to given questions.19 One might be reminded of the well-known Indian 
parable in which six blind men are for the first time confronted with an 
elephant, and report to one another what this magnificent creature must be 
like: the one who feels the trunk says an elephant is like a flexible tree branch, 
the one who feels a leg says it is like a soft pillar, the one who feels the ear says 
it is like a hairy pancake, and so on. The overarching concept which I have here 
been referring to as “mindreading” can be found throughout the field under the 
labels “theory of mind”, “folk psychology”, “(lower-order) mentalising”, 
“cognitive empathy”, “second-order intentionality”, and more, all with slight 
differences in what exactly is meant—not even to mention how this applies to 
the whole range of adjacent concepts and terms, such as “social cognition”, 
“simulation”, “affective empathy”, “emotional empathy”, “folk-psychological 
narratives”, etcetera. And even abstracting from terminology, there is ample 
variation in the phenomena and behaviours which are considered to be of 
interest. In my view, as with the elephant in the parable, real progress will 
require researchers from different backgrounds to “talk to each other” and 
cooperate beyond disciplinary borders. 
To add just one more example to those already discussed (based on 
Apperly, 2011: 114-116): imagine a study in which an experimenter sits behind a 
table that has two boxes on it. A participants sits down at the other end of the 
                                                
19 Apperly makes a similar diagnosis, leading to his pragmatic approach of considering a wide 
variance of existing studies and insights on their merits before laying out his own “two 
systems”-model. For additional reflection on terminological controversies surrounding “theory 
of mind” see Schaafsma et al. (2014). 
Chapter 1
 47 
table. The information is provided that there is a piece of chocolate in one of 
the boxes. Next, the experimenter looks either to the right or the left box, after 
which the participant is asked to judge whether the experimenter thinks there is 
a piece of chocolate in the box he is looking at. In the first condition, the 
instructions are such that the participants have to deduce what the 
experimenter believes and intends in order to locate the chocolate. In the 
second condition, the instructions are the same, except that one piece of 
information is added that makes it possible to skip any reasoning about 
mindstates and simply use the experimenter’s gaze as a cue to infer where the 
piece of chocolate is located. Does this mean that this study is only in the first 
condition about “mindreading” and in the other condition about, say, 
“following eye gaze”, or “using behavioural cues”? This position is problematic, 
since in the second condition participants may use either (or both) mindreading 
and following eye gaze before formulating their answer. Once again this issue 
can be avoided by using Marr’s distinction between the W- and H-levels. On 
the what-level, it is safe to say that the entire experiment is about mindreading: 
subjects are asked about where they think the experimenter believes the 
chocolate is located. However, on the how-level, generalisations must be made 
with great caution: it may well be the case that there are differences from one 
condition to the other, and between subjects, regarding the strategies and 
mechanisms used to complete the task. This is a point that applies already to 
Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) early paper: after all, they suggest that familiar 
problems are more likely to be solved through “association”, while novel ones 
require “theorising”—in other words, they already allow room for the 
possibility that one and the same task involving predictions of others’ 
intentions and behaviours, may or may not require “theory of mind” depending 
on individual factors and context (see also Apperly, 2011: chapter 6 on this 
point). 
The next two sections provide a further introduction to embedded 
mindstates or multiple-order intentionality. The focus will no longer be on the 
H-level of how inferential processes could be carried out when reading minds 
(as was the case in this section), but will shift back to the conceptual W-level of 





1.2 Embedded mindstates 
 
1.2.1 Multiple-order intentionality 
As stated in the Introduction, researchers from various disciplinary back-
grounds and convictions have made a case for the importance of the ability to 
deal with multiple, interrelated intentional states at various levels of 
complexity. The common way to conceptualise this complexity is using orders of 
intentionality. Originally, the scale of orders of intentionality figured in debates 
on primate cognition from the 1960s and 1970s. Dennett, who was himself an 
important contributor to these debates, explained the scale of orders of 
intentionality as follows: 
 
A first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires (etc.) but no 
beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires […] 
x believes that p 
x wants that q 
where “p” and “q” are clauses that themselves contain no 
intentional idioms. A second-order intentional system is more 
sophisticated; it has beliefs and desires (and no doubt other intentional 
states) about beliefs and desires (and other intentional states) – both 
those of others and its own. For instance 
x wants y to believe that x is hungry 
x believes y expects x to jump left 
x fears that y will discover that x has a food cache 
A third-order intentional system is one that is capable of such states as 
x wants y to believe that x believes he is all alone 
A fourth-order system might want you to think it understood you to be 
requesting that it leave. (Dennett, 1983 [1962]: 345) 
 
Although this way of counting orders is not as straightforward as it may seem 
(see Chapter 6), Dennett’s explanation does provide a good impression of the 
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logic of thinking underlying the scale of orders of intentionality.20 This logic 
can be detailed in propositions as follows: 
 
P0 [It is raining outside] 0th-order 
P1 Bill believes that [it is raining outside] 1st-order 
P2 Mary believes that Bill believes that [it is raining outside] 2nd-order 
P3 Peter believes that Mary believes that Bill believes that [it is raining 
outside] 
3rd-order 
P4 John believes that Peter believes that Mary believes that Bill believes that 
[it is raining outside] 
4th-order 
P5 Sally believes that John believes that Peter believes that Mary believes 
that Bill believes that [it is raining outside] 
5th-order 
Pn Namen believes that Pn-1 nth-order 
 
Table 1 – The square brackets indicate that “it is raining outside” is here seen as a fact of the 
world, independent of a subject having an intentional state about it. In P0 there is no such 
subject, in P1 there is a subject (Bill) exhibiting first-order intentionality (by having an 
intentional state about the fact that it is raining), in P2 there is a subject (Mary) exhibiting 
second-order intentionality (by having an intentional state about Bill having an intentional 
state about the fact that it is raining), and so on.  
 
The logic of counting orders of intentionality in this way has inspired a vast 
amount of research in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience, 
ranging from the development of tests to assess individuals’ performance on 
reasoning tasks involving varying orders of intentionality, to a focus on typical 
and atypical development, involved brain areas, and formal models of the 
                                                
20 Incidentally, below I will discuss a problematic side of this logic that seems to some extent 
prompted by the very term “order(s)” of intentionality. The idea of it being “orders” evokes 
questions such as “How many orders can a species/individual process?” or “What is the number 
of orders involved in this task/event/story?” I will argue that intentional states are most of the 
time not “piled up” (as orders), but interlinked in various kinds of ways. In this Section and in 
other parts dealing with or building on the long tradition of research on this topic, I will retain 
the term multiple-order intentionality. In Chapter 3 I will discuss my alternative concept of the 
“thoughtscape” in more detail. 
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mechanisms underlying the ability to deal with embedded mindstates.21 In 
addition, linguists, literary theorists, archaeologists, anthropologists, and 
researchers from a handful of other fields have used the concept of embedded 
orders of intentionality in their frameworks (various examples will be discussed 
in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.3 below). In this thesis, the totality of research that has 
implemented the logic of the orders of intentionality in some form will 
generally be referred to as research within the mentalising paradigm, named 
after the tests used for the assessment of one’s competence to reason with 
embedded intentional states, the so-called “mentalising tests”.  
In mentalising tests, subjects are asked to read or listen to short stories 
describing a particular sequence of social interactions, such as the organisation 
of a surprise party. The story is followed by questions of the form “Did A know 
that B wanted C to come to his party?”, or “Did C know about the party?”, or 
“Did B want A to think that C should know about the party?”. By using three to 
five such stories, each followed by around ten questions of differing orders of 
complexity, a score indicating “mentalising capability” can be calculated for 
each individual participant. In a range of studies, scores from this test have 
been shown to be associated with various sorts of measures of people’s social 
capabilities and real-life social functioning. For example, a number of studies 
have indicated that mentalising scores correlate with estimates of social 
network size, suggesting that those participants who perform better at 
mentalising tests have, on average, more people in their social networks. 
Another study has indicated that participants with higher mentalising scores 
were less likely to attribute causes of negative events to others: they appeared to 
be, as it were, less “distrustful” of others’ intentions in a social context. Other 
studies have investigated the relations between mentalising, empathy, and 
executive functioning, or mentalising skills and language competence. Also, a 
version of the mentalising test adapted for children showed an association 
between test scores and general social aptitude as assessed by their teachers. 
Another perspective was added by various studies in the field of social 
                                                
21 For a discussion of research into typical and atypical development see Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2013); for involved brain areas see, among others, Frith and Frith (2003) and Rushworth, Mars, 
and Sallet (2013) and Mars et al. (2013); for formal models see, for example, Behrens et al. (2009) 
and Yoshida et al. (2008; 2010). See also Note 14 above. 
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neuroscience: higher mentalising scores have been shown to correlate with 
higher amounts of grey matter in cortical areas important for social 
functioning.22 
All these statistical associations may be taken to indicate that mentalising 
tests do tap into at least some skills and properties relevant to actual social life 
and interaction. However, authors presenting mentalising research themselves, 
as well as critical outsiders, have stressed that it is still to a large extent unclear 
why these associations exist, or in other words: little is known about which 
mechanisms are targeted by these tests and how precisely they relate to real-life 
social interaction. In addition, discussions have arisen over ecological relevance 
and methodological soundness of the questionnaires, but the tests have been 
improved over the years and researchers have found ways to control for factors 
such as general memory capacity or language ability.23 Throughout this thesis, 
questions pertaining to the mentalising tests will return in various forms, and a 
detailed analysis will be offered in Chapter 6. 
 
1.2.2 The roles of language 
Earlier in this chapter, the option of formulating explicit mindreads has been 
discussed (Section 1.1.1), along with the possibility to describe and categorise 
different mindstates and their mutual relationships using linguistic 
propositions (Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). With this, however, only one of three roles 
of language in relation to mindreading has been addressed. The current section 
                                                
22 The “mentalising test” (also sometimes referred to as the “Imposing Memory Task” or “IMT”) 
was originally designed by Kindermann, Dunbar, and Bentall (1998), for a study in which they 
investigated the relation between test scores and causal attribution of negative events. 
Afterwards, the test was revised, updated, and adapted several times. Stiller and Dunbar (2007) 
demonstrated a positive correlation of mentalising scores with estimates of social network size, 
which was replicated several times (see Lewis et al., 2011; Powell et al., 2014; Launay et al., 2015). 
All these studies suggest a better performance among women. For research showing 
associations between mentalising performance and volume of the orbital prefrontal cortex see 
Powell et al. (2010), Lewis et al. (2011), and Powell et al. (2014). See Launay et al. (2015) for 
mentalising in relation to empathy and executive functioning. For mentalising in children see 
Liddle and Nettle (2006) and in adolescents see Haddad (under review). An elaborate analysis of 
these studies is offered in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
23 See Launay et al. (2015) for a general discussion, O’Grady et al. (2015) for a critical review of the 
methodology and an alternative testing method using movie clips, and Oesch (2015) for 
mentalising and language competence. 
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distinguishes these roles and points forward to the chapters in which they will 
be discussed in more detail. 
The first role of language is thus the representation of mindstates and 
mindreading tasks. This can itself be subdivided into formal or propositional 
representation, where mindstates and their mutual relationships are made 
explicit for the purposes of investigating them and assessing their complexity 
(as in, for example, Table 1), and natural representation, the way in which 
mindstates and their relationships are rendered and managed in various genres 
of natural discourse, including novels, plays, newspaper texts, radio reports, 
conversations, etcetera. Language in the role of representing mindreading, both 
propositionally and naturally, is important throughout this entire thesis. In 
Chapter 2 and 3, the focus will be on (literary) narrative language, in Chapter 4 
and 5 more everyday forms of language usage (newspapers, conversations) will 
enter the stage, and Chapter 6 will deal with linguistic representations of 
mindreading tasks in the context of psychological experiments.  
The second role concerns the conceptual support, scaffolding, and/or training 
that language can provide for our mindreading skills, even when the actual 
reasoning is performed implicitly and/or non-linguistically. For example, 
various researchers have suggested that children around the age of 3-4, who 
learn to deal with embedded sentences (e.g. “Snoopy thinks that the candy is in 
the box”), not only acquire a way to communicate about mindstates and 
perspectives, but also learn a formula for thinking about them in the first place 
(see e.g. Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Milligan et al., 2007). In other words, 
the matrix structure of such sentences may not only provide a new “label” for 
an existing reasoning process, but also add a new strand of reasoning to a 
child’s thought repertoire. In a similar way, stories can be argued to form a 
natural training environment for one’s mindreading skills. They offer insight in 
the fictional minds of characters, thereby enabling one to experience “what it is 
like” to be inside someone else’s head, and they provide a mode for projecting 
hypothetical social scenarios, thereby avoiding the potential costs of trying 
these out in real life. On top of these ways of support, scaffolding, and training 
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for mindreading, as identified by various authors,24 I suggest an additional one, 
which pertains to the structural properties of narrative language usage. In short, 
as I will argue in Chapter 2, narrative language features all kinds of strategies 
for fleshing out perspectives and mental states, and for mutually coordinating 
them in a natural and comprehensible way. Learning to deal with narrative 
may therefore hone one’s “real-world” capabilities of switching between 
multiple perspectives, understanding situations in terms of the underlying 
perceptions, intentions, motives, etcetera, and mapping behavioural patterns 
on particular mental states. Viewed this way, narrative is not just a way of 
speaking, but also a way of thinking, which is at least partly governed by the 
conventions of narrative language that we acquire in the context of learning to 
understand and tell stories (see Van Duijn, 2015). More details on this idea will 
be worked out in Chapter 2, 4, and 5.25 
Not only does language thus serve to represent mindstates and 
mindreading tasks (first role), nor is it just likely to provide implicit support and 
scaffolding for our mindreading abilities (second role), it is also in important 
ways itself dependent on and building upon mindreading. This third role of 
language makes things complicated: after all, if all three are considered 
together, it is implied that language and mindreading must have a relationship 
of mutual dependency and “cosupport” in developmental terms, and one of 
“coevolution” in evolutionary terms—which is precisely what I will assume 
throughout this thesis, and argue for in various ways. Such arguing is 
necessarily incomplete and to some degree speculative, given the issue’s 
enormous psychological complexity and evolutionary depth of hundreds of 
thousands of years. Nonetheless, I hope to provide convincing arguments and 
evidence at various points that it is the only possible way of construing the 
relationship between language and mindreading. With an eye on that, it is 
important to briefly introduce some concepts from the study of human 
interaction, with which I will round off this section. 
                                                
24 For a variety of views in the broader area of literature and (social) cognition see, among 
others, Zunshine (2006); Boyd (2009); Vermeule (2011); Oatley (2011); Nussbaum (2011); Djikic et 
al. (2013); Carney et al. (2014). 
25 Note that this idea is reminiscent of the “narrative practice hypothesis” (e.g. Gallagher and 
Hutto, 2008), but only partly overlaps with it; see also Section 1.1.4 above. 
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Human interaction is, broadly, the context in which language usage takes 
place. In the default version it happens face-to-face between a S(ignaller) and 
A(ddressee) who reverse roles with every turn taken, using a multimodal 
stream of auditory, visual, and palpable cues—all other interaction forms, such 
as writing, phone calls, text messaging, and so on, are ultimately variants of or 
derivatives from this default setting (Fillmore, 1981). Interaction is by no means 
always linguistic: humans can manage each others’ behaviour, share 
information, make friends, play tricks and jokes, and interact in all kinds of 
other ways without ever saying or writing a word. This is known to anyone who 
has ever been “lost in translation”, trying to get around in a place where no one 
speaks one’s language. Or, another good example of how rich interaction can 
be without the aid of language is provided by the game of charades: players 
often manage strikingly well in getting complex meanings across, even though 
all conventional, mostly linguistic symbols are banned (except for a few ones 
specific to the game). However, any player of charades or anyone being lost in 
translation also realises how strained and impoverished communication 
without language is. To use an amended version of Scott-Phillips’ (2015: 16) 
words: language is not what makes interaction possible, but what makes it 
powerful.26 After all, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the 
conventions of a language can be seen as “supercues”, coagulated local 
solutions (i.e. within one cultural-linguistic community) to the coordination 
problems that arise when interacting. In this view, every lexical item and 
grammatical procedure ultimately is the result of generations of language users 
trying to coordinate their mindstates in interaction with each other and the 
environment, thereby converging on solutions that are communicatively 
effective, physically and cognitively efficient, and learnable for new generations 
of language users (see also Verhagen, 2015; Mesoudi, 2011; Tomasello, 2008: 
chapter 6). 
In his analysis of the distinctive properties of human interaction, 
Levinson (2006) introduces the concept “Schelling mirror world”. Schelling was 
an economist who studied a specific species of coordination problems: the 
ability of subjects to arrive at a solution together in the absence of 
                                                
26 The full version of Scott-Phillips’ quote will be discussed in Chapter 5 (and contested on an 
important part not cited here). 
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communication. For example, if they are told that they have to meet someone 
else in Moscow the next day, but not exactly where and when, and they know 
that the other has had precisely the same instruction, they can perform much 
better than chance would permit by (implicitly or explicitly) asking themselves 
what the other will think, and what the other will think that they will think. A 
“Schelling point” (Schelling, 1960) high above the odds in Moscow is probably 
“12 noon at the Red Square, in front of the clock tower besides the Kremlin”. If 
one has to meet in a theme park, this point would probably be the entrance, or 
in a crowded department store it may be the “lost-and-found” desk. Converging 
on such Schelling points, according to Levinson, requires not only a special way 
of reflexive thinking (about what the other will think one will think, etcetera), 
but also a notion of mutual knowledge or common ground, including a sense of 
mutual salience: “what leaps out of the common ground as a solution likely to 
independently catch our joint attention” (2006: 49, referring also to Clark et al., 
1983, and Clark, 1996). He argues that these same ingredients are also 
requirements for human communication: reflexive thinking and common 
ground, including a mutual sense of salience. After all, as has been described by 
many linguists and philosophers of language, there are thousands of possible 
ways in which a particular meaning can be expressed, while at the same time, 
every expression can have many different meanings.27 Only through the same 
combination of reflexive thinking and common ground, including a sense of 
mutual salience, can humans coordinate their mindstates while interacting, or 
in Levinson’s words: it is through these factors that “meetings of the mind” can 
occur in the “Schelling mirror world” that underlies human interaction (2006: 
49; for an experimental approach see Stolk, Verhagen, and Toni, 2016; Stolk, 
2014). 
Grice (1957) was the first to present a fundamental study of how 
communicative meanings can arise despite the indeterminacy of linguistic 
                                                
27 This can be demonstrated using nearly any utterance, but consider the example of me saying 
to a friend: “hey, there is Ann”. If we are standing outside a music venue, and Ann has our 
tickets, this probably means something to the effect of “all right, we can go inside”. However, if 
Ann is my friend’s ex-girlfriend and we are about to enter a bar for a drink, it can mean “let’s go 
somewhere else”—unless my friend has just told me that he hasn’t seen his ex-girlfriend in a 
while and would be interested in a conversation with her, in which case it probably means 
“what a coincidence, let’s go inside”… etcetera. For a discussion see, among many others, Keller 
(1995), Sperber and Wilson (1995), Clark (1996), and Scott-Phillips (2015). 
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expressions as such. According to his theory of meaning, “a signaller S 
communicates z by behaviour B if S intends to cause an [addressee A] to think 
z, just by getting [A] to recognise that intention” (Levinson, 2006: 49; “recipient” 
in original replaced by “addressee”). Sperber (1994; 2000) and Scott-Phillips 
(2015) have reformulated this insight in terms of a multiple-order mindreading 
problem, suggesting that for any full-blown linguistic interaction event: 
 
S intends 
  that A should recognise 
    that S intends 
      that A should believe 
        that z 
 
The precise nature of this mindreading problem, assumed to be at the heart of 
language usage, will be detailed (and contested) in Chapter 5. The version at 
which I will eventually arrive, building on Clark’s (1996) and Verhagen’s (2015) 
notions of common ground and joint intentionality, suits the lazy mindreader by 
being much more economical in terms of the assumed amount of cognitive 
complexity. In short, it turns the argument upside down: instead of suggesting 
(following Sperber and Scott-Phillips) that interaction works because 
interlocutors (somehow, implicitly) take the steps spelled out above in order to 
“meet” each other at five orders of embedded intentionality, I argue that as a 
rule they start off having already met—and instead of suggesting that it is 
necessary by default, I suggest that it is only in exceptional cases that such steps 
need to be taken (for example, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, in order to 
work out and repair a misunderstanding: “Ah! I thought you intended me to 
think that….etc.”). 
Put differently: in theory it is possible for interlocutors to reflect on the 
communicative situation in the way suggested by Sperber and Scott-Phillips, 
but in practice it is rarely necessary. Normally, a signaller “tosses” a particular 
behaviour (typically a string of sounds, gestures, and facial expressions) into the 
Schelling mirror world, assuming that the addressee will be able to figure out 
what the signaller means by it. In nearly all instances of communicative 
interaction there are several principles and mechanisms at work that save the 
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signaller and addressee from having to apply multiple-order mindreading. 
Summarised in brief: 
- Common ground/joint intentionality: interlocutors always start from a 
set of shared beliefs or “common ground” (Clark, 1996) instead of having 
“join” their individual sets of intentional states each time they interact; 
- Ready-mades/packages: for many expressions, occurring in particular 
contexts, we may have existing meaning associations stored in our 
memory that are either shared between speaker and addressee in 
particular, or among members of the cultural-linguistic community 
more widely. Such associations can be easily retrieved, compared, 
adjusted, and used as ready-made blueprints or frames in interaction, 
without having to establish complex meanings “from zero” (as worked 
out for examples such as “allegedly” and “accidentally” in Chapter 4). 
- Interactive structure/alignment: in interaction we do not have to sort 
everything out by default and right away—in every communicative turn 
we seem to build representations that are “good enough” for the 
interaction to keep going, but no better (cf. Apperly, 2011: 114-119). If 
required, interlocutors can work out a particular point in more detail, 
aiding and steering each other in the desired direction turn by turn. 
Many conversations do not have “signal-response” as their basic 
structure, but rather “testing-adjusting-retesting” (Levinson, 2006). 
- Relevance: driven by the need for communicative efficiency, signaller 
and addressee have both learned from their experience as 
communicators to become geared towards choosing maximally relevant 
solutions. This means that, in most cases, what the signaller has to do is 
pick the first expression that comes to mind, while the addressee has to 
pick the first interpretation that comes to mind. If this does not work, 
they can try the second-most relevant expression or interpretation; thus 
both speaker and addressee in practice work downwards on the gradient 
of relevance (cf. Apperly, 2011: 115-116, referring to Sperber and Wilson, 
2002; and Chapter 5). 
- Ratchet effect of linguistic items: not only are signaller and addressee 
experienced in choosing the most relevant cues and interpretations, the 
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linguistic tools they have available also store a wealth of such 
accumulated “experience”. After all, they have emerged as a result of 
numerous instances where generations of signallers have tried to get 
particular meanings across to addressees, in settings that have for at 
least some important parts not changed (cf. Chapter 4 and 5). 
As I will argue at several places throughout this thesis, in many cases of daily 
interaction these mechanisms work so well, that mindreading in the “full” form 
as suggested above is hardly ever needed in order to communicate—it is only in 
exceptional cases, such as when trying to repair a misunderstanding, playing a 
sophisticated pun, or reflecting on the very act of communication, that 
participants in a communicative setting are incited to go “all the way down” and 
work out what the other intends that they understand that the other 
wants...etcetera. In other words: language is what makes human interaction so 
powerful not just because it can represent mindstates and their relations in 
efficient ways (first role), nor just because it may support mindreading 
implicitly (second role), but also because it can work as a “mindreading-
avoidance tool”. Mindreading is indeed necessary for communicative 
interaction (third role), however, various mechanisms and principles that are 
part of, mediated by, or closely tied to language save interlocutors the trouble of 




1.3 The social brain 
 
1.3.1 Early primate roots 
Up to now this chapter has been concerned with the fundaments of what 
intentional states are like, how mindreading can work, and how both relate to 
language. However, as stated in the first section, there is another basic question: 
why is it that we bother about mindstates of others at all? The context in which 
an answer to this question can be provided (and, indeed, the context in which 
this question itself becomes relevant) is offered by research surrounding the 
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social brain hypothesis. At the core of this hypothesis lies the idea that the 
complex social environments in which primates have lived in their 
evolutionary past were the primary drivers behind the emergence of their 
increasingly large and powerful brains—or rather, our large and powerful 
brains, since humans are of course included in the primate order.28 
The briefest version of the story of primate evolution goes as follows. In 
the geological period known as the Palaeogene or Lower Tertiary, a bit over 50 
million years ago, certain mammals on the African continent started foraging in 
groups (see Shultz, Opie, and Atkinson, 2011, for key evidence supporting this 
scenario). This development was probably driven by a transition from 
nocturnal to diurnal activity, which increased the risk of being attacked by 
predators while moving around in search of food. Although living in groups 
lowered vulnerability to predation, at the same time it posed some very 
particular challenges for the ancestral primates, including finding new ways of 
organising reproduction and care for offspring, resolution of conflicts arising 
over access to resources within groups, avoidance of the costs inflicted by 
freeriders, and coordination involved in moving collectively or protecting the 
group against risks from outside. In response to these challenges, various 
species have evolved different solutions over millions of years of time, as 
reflected in the different forms of social organisation and complexity that can 
be found throughout the primate world today (for references and more detailed 
overviews of the early episodes in primate history see Dunbar, 2014: chapter 2 
and 4; Gamble, Gowlett, and Dunbar, 2014: chapter 3 and 4). 
An important characteristic of social organisation found throughout the 
entire primate world is the tendency to form intense social bonds and coalitions 
                                                
28 The suggestion of the association between brain size and social complexity was originally 
made by Jolly (1966) and Humphrey (1976), before it was addressed in Byrne’s & Whiten’s 
volume The Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis from 1978. Dunbar further developed the social 
brain hypothesis and was the first to test it systematically (1992; 1998), discovering the 
correlation between social group size typically formed by a primate species and its neocortex 
size, and subsequently presenting numerous findings supporting and/or refining the 
hypothesis. He has written a vast amount of publications on the topic, several of which play 
important roles throughout this thesis. For this introductory section, I will to a large extent 
follow the line of his recent overview book Human Evolution (2014), along with the co-authored 
volume Thinking Big. How the Evolution of Social Life Shaped the Human Mind (Gamble, Gowlett, 
and Dunbar, 2014), only at key points referring to the original papers. In the rest of this thesis, 
the original papers will be used. 
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that last over longer periods of time. These bonds and coalitions directly or 
indirectly protect individuals against the challenges and costs of living in 
groups and defuse the stress that comes with it. Primate bonds have an 
emotional and a more cognitive component. The first is primarily mediated 
through endorphins triggered by specific social activities. The latter can be 
defined in terms of having a mutual sense of trust and obligation, and, in some 
cases, willingness to provide help and support, all of which require some form 
of cognitive coordination (cf. Dunbar, 2014: chapter 2). I will return to the 
cognitive demands of social living below, but first focus briefly on the 
emotional, endorphin-mediated component. 
 
1.3.2 The “bonding gap” 
The main activity associated with endorphin release in non-human primates is 
social grooming, the process where one individual sifts through another’s fur to 
remove small bits of debris and inert skin. Besides hygiene benefits, this mildly 
painful treat triggers the release of endorphins in the brain, which alleviate 
stress and pain levels and presumably underpin the feelings of emotional 
closeness that we know from friendship and love. This mechanism is still at 
work in humans, as can be sensed when receiving a massage or engaging in 
light stroking and cuddling. However, in our case, time has seen the addition of 
other mechanisms of maintaining intense social relationships, which have 
taken over much of the heavy lifting (Dunbar, 2014: chapter 1 and 8).  
According to Dunbar the transition from social grooming to other 
bonding activities constitutes one of the main threads in the evolutionary story 
of our lineage. Simply put, when group sizes increased, our ancestors must have 
run up against time limits: since grooming is an inherently time-consuming, 
one-on-one activity, it works fine for smaller groups, but will put high pressures 
on time budgets in larger groups. A partial solution found in some species of 
primates is to invest in a strong relationship with a few core social partners 
(instead of weaker ties with many or all group members), thus breaking up the 
larger group into interlinked and partly overlapping coalitions. This structure 
was most likely found in the groups formed by our hominid ancestors, and 
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arguably is still visible in present-day human social life.29 However, it was 
estimated that if ancestral human societies had relied on strictly one-on-one 
bonding activities such as grooming, their members would have needed to 
spend over forty per cent of their day doing this, which would have conflicted 
severely with the time budgets reserved for foraging and resting (Dunbar, 2014: 
chapter 7; Gamble, Gowlett, and Dunbar, 2014: chapter 5). In other words, it 
seems likely that the amount of free time left for social activities after foraging 
and resting, put a constraint on the maximum number of social ties individuals 
could maintain. Therefore, in order to be able to break through various glass 
ceilings of maximum group sizes, more time-efficient bonding activities had to 
emerge in our lineage, bridging the “bonding gap” (Dunbar, 2008) between the 
groups of 40-60 individuals, in which our early ancestors lived, and the groups 
of around 150, as formed by anatomically modern humans—and this is 
precisely what Dunbar and colleagues have argued: activities involving for 
instance laughter, dance, music, and, of course, language have become our 
alternatives for social grooming. 
Both dance and laughter have the capacity of fairly straightforwardly 
triggering endorphin release, thus supporting emotional social bonding in a 
direct way. A similar case can be made for singing together. Also, importantly, 
dancing, singing, and laughing can be done together with several others at the 
same time, greatly increasing the effectiveness of time spent socially.30 The 
same, of course, holds true for talking. However, the links between language 
and social bonding are more complex. Talking and listening as such do not 
seem to be contributing much to social bonding: rather, language contributes 
indirectly through such activities as gossiping and sharing jokes, myths, 
                                                
29 For this social group structure, referred to as the “fission/fusion-model” see Dunbar (2003).  
30 For an overview see Dunbar (2014: chapter 2, 3, and 8). For social bonding in relation to dance 
and moving “in synchrony” more widely see Tarr, Launay, and Dunbar (2014); for laughter and 
social bonding see Dunbar et al. (2011); for singing see Pearce et al. (forthcoming). Research 
shows that laughing, even today, is typically done in intimate cliques of two to four individuals, 
rather than in larger groupings. Interestingly, these cliques are similar in size to the groups 
people tend to form in natural conversations (see Dunbar, 2015). 
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religious stories, and fiction.31 However, with the possible exception of telling 
(some sorts of) jokes, these activities all require a highly sophisticated form of 
language to be in place, capable of representing at least some abstract concepts, 
referring to events outside the here-and-now, and coordinating multiple 
referents and possibly their mindstates (cf. also Tomasello, 2008: chapter 6). 
The emergence of such sophisticated language forms is typically assumed to be 
of a relatively recent date in our evolutionary history (possibly only with the 
arrival of Homo sapiens around 200,000 years ago or even later; see e.g. Fitch 
2010; Perreault and Mathew, 2012), whereas our social group sizes, and thus our 
need for efficient social bonding mechanisms, have shown important increases 
much earlier, going back probably around 2 million years (Gamble, Gowlett, 
and Dunbar, 2014: chapter 5). This would suggest that other factors (such as 
dance, music, and laughter) were at first more important in bridging the 
bonding gap, while various forms of gossiping and storytelling came in later. In 
addition and related to this, as discussed in Section 1.2.2 above, it is argued by 
some researchers that mastering a language “as we know it” requires powerful 
mindreading capacities, which is also considered to be a reason for why the 
emergence of such sophisticated language must be dated to our more recent 
history. 
The first of two main ways in which social group size can be linked to 
cognition, and to mindreading in particular, can thus be summarised as follows: 
bonding larger groups may require language and storytelling skills, which rely 
on mindreading capacities, which again rely on large and powerful brains. 
However, one of the objectives of this thesis is to rethink the way in which 
mindreading and language are related, so this topic will be continued (and the 
argument partly challenged) at various places, especially in Chapter 5 and in 
the Conclusion. 
 
                                                
31 Besides contributing to endorphin-mediated bonding indirectly, language clearly has other 
important advantages in the context of keeping increasingly large communities together: 
talking can “time share” on other activities (such as walking, eating, and cooking) and it can be 
used to share information about the social network (gossip) in a much more efficient way than 
by personal observation (see Dunbar, 2014: 227). 
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1.3.3 Cognition and primate social life  
Besides the emergence of new bonding activities, a second main thread in the 
story of human evolution identified by Dunbar is brain size. The social brain 
hypothesis projects that if an animal’s social life is more complex (and thus 
demands more sophisticated social behaviour), it will have more grey matter in 
the brain areas associated with social cognition. Support for this relationship 
has been found throughout the entire animal kingdom, both at the level of one 
species compared to another species and at the level of individuals within the 
same species. Dunbar (2014) discusses research showing that it holds even in 
social insects: species with more complicated social structures show increased 
“brain” volume (or relevant neural network size), compared to species of social 
insects with less complex social structures. In a similar vein, queen bees have a 
significantly more sophisticated social life than their worker sisters, and also 
show more relevant brain volume. Species of birds forming pairbonds, hence 
needing to be able to maintain intense, long-term relationships with their 
partners, have larger brains compared to birds who have more flexible mating 
systems. Primates with more diverse repertoires of social behaviour, for 
example involving deception or alarm calls, tend to have relatively larger 
neocortices. The same is true for primates living in larger social groups, where 
they have to maintain higher numbers of social relationships and/or exhibit 
more diverse repertoires of social behaviour. This is reflected in the correlation 
between mean group size and neocortex size as plotted in Figure 3:32 
                                                
32 Note that the social brain hypothesis is thus essentially about social complexity, and not 
about the number of relationships an individual can deal with per se. “Qualitative” factors are 
equally important: for example, mating strategies, deception rates, or coalition complexity all 
correlate with relative brain size irrespective of total group size (Shultz and Dunbar, 2014: 49-50; 






Figure 3 – The filled dots represent species of prosimians and monkeys, showing a robust 
correlation between mean group size and neocortex ratio, the size of the neocortex divided by 
the total brain size. The open dots represent the three species of great apes, from left to right 
orangutans, gorillas, and chimpanzees. The red arrows indicate the predicted mean group size 
for modern humans, based on their neocortex ratio factored into the ape equation: ±150 
individuals, known as “Dunbar’s number” (Dunbar, 2003).  
 
Group sizes in our primate ancestors were not only constrained by the 
availability of social time for grooming and/or alternative bonding activities 
(which may or may not have involved mindreading, as discussed in the 
previous section), but also by cognitive limits in a more direct way. This is the 
second of the two main ways in which cognition, and mindreading in 
particular, can be linked to social group size. In order for a group not to break 
down into chaos, individuals need to coordinate their behaviour with respect to 
one another: from the very basic capacity to move in accordance with others’ 
movements, a skill apparent in for example bird flocks or ungulate herds, to 
sophisticated empathic, cooperative and strategic behaviours, as in for example 
targeted helping, conflict resolution, group hunting, deception, or consolation. 
Mindreading competence at various levels of complexity has been argued to 
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underpin different aspects of such coordination of individuals within groups, 
each of which will be discussed in the subsections below. 
 
1.3.4 Mindreading, coordination, and group size 
In the case of birds flying in a flock, coordination of behaviour from an 
individual’s perspective comes down to adjusting to a few others that happen to 
fly near. The apparently sophisticated movements emerging on the level of the 
flock thus do not require birds to bother about anything beyond the 
movements of a handful random neighbours: there is no need to distinguish 
between them individually, and relationships with them do not have to persist 




Figure 4 – Individual birds in a flock only coordinate with a handful of neighbours, but do not 
need to have a representation of the behaviour of the flock as a whole (David-Barrett, 2014). 
 
As a consequence, little cognitive investment has to be made for successful 
group membership and the cognitive costs do not add up when group size 
increases. This stands in stark contrast to the situation in primates, where 
individuals in principle maintain a constant relationship with every other 
individual in their social group. When interactions of some form occur, this 
existing relationship functions as the basis, instead of the interaction being the 
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basis for an ad hoc relationship (as in flocks and herds). Therefore, primates 
have to be (and, indeed, are, Parr and De Waal, 1999) able to distinguish 
between individual group members and, to a certain extent, they have to keep 
track of previous interactions they have had with them. This is an important 
reason why primate group life causes cognitive load: when groups grow larger, 
their members have to tell apart more individuals and remember the current 
status of their relationship with each of them. 
Moreover, there is an even more weighty reason why primate sociality is 
cognitively demanding. In order to fit into a primate group, it is not sufficient to 
know one’s own relationship to all other group members: one has to keep track 
of “third-party relationships” between all of the other group members as well. 
For this reason, the number of relationships primates have to be able to 
distinguish and keep track of, in theory, can be shown to increase exponentially 
with every extra group member added (David-Barrett and Dunbar, 2013). 
Evidence from observations of social structures in many different primate 
species, in relation to their relative brain sizes, supports this idea (Shultz and 
Dunbar, 2014).  
However, all of this does not yet warrant the importance of the capability 
to deal with some form of mindreading: a primate individual can in principle 
monitor social relationships within its group without having to deal with 
intentional states. Mindreading seems to come in as soon as prediction of others’ 
behaviour and intentions enters the stage—yet in this case it is a possibility, not 
a necessity. For example, when making decisions about whether or not to act 
cooperatively towards another individual, one will have to predict whether the 
other will reciprocate this approach, or exploit it. The scenario of deciding 
whether to cooperate or not has therefore been linked to the ability to deal with 
multiple orders of intentionality. Yoshida et al. claim that such a decision is 
necessarily based on “recursive representations of another’s intentions, since if 
I decide to [cooperate], I must believe that you believe that I will cooperate with 
you” (2010: 10744). There seems to be ground here for an arms race inflicting a 
constant pressure on individuals to stay ahead of their peers. Advantage can be 
gained if one can from time to time make the other believe that one intends to 
cooperate, while in fact one is about to exploit him. At the same time, it is 
important to be able to detect when the other intends one to believe that he will 
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cooperate while in fact he will not… (Byrne and Whiten, 1988, have emphasised 
the importance of such “Machiavellian” cheating and cheater detection in the 
evolution of primate social intelligence; see also Tomasello, 2014: 37-38).33  
Note that I wrote purposefully that it can be the case that mindreading is 
needed when prediction of others’ behaviour and intentions enters the stage, 
but that it is not a necessity. A point that often seems to be overlooked in studies 
that link mindreading to cooperation is that calculating whether the other 
believes that one intends to cooperate is one way of predicting the other’s 
reliability as a cooperation partner, but surely not the only way. Another option 
would be to make this prediction on the basis of past behaviour of the other, 
either towards oneself or towards others. All that is needed is the ability to tell 
individuals apart and a memory for previous interactions, but no mindreading 
(see Wilkinson, 1984, for an example in vampire bats). A third way of predicting 
another’s intention to cooperate would be using emotional or situational cues: 
is he nervous, are there more group members around to watch his behaviour, 
etcetera. A fourth way would be to make an assessment of the “rationality” of 
the task: what can the other gain from cooperating, and what does he have to 
invest? In fact, it would make most sense to use combinations of these ways 
(and potentially even additional strategies), and it may well be that this is what 
individuals do in practice. In short, deciding whether or not to cooperate with 
others may involve mindreading, but not necessarily so.34 
                                                
33 Another way in which cooperation and mindreading can be linked is by factoring in third-
party opinions: the question for X whether or not to cooperate with Y can also depend on 
predictions of what Z would think of this alliance. This adds complexity in terms of the number 
of intentional states involved in making a decision for X, without these intentional states 
necessarily being embedded (Y thinks… and Z thinks...). The issue of interlinked (but not 
embedded) intentional states will also return in various forms throughout the following 
chapters. 
34 In some way this comes down to saying, more generally, that not all mindreading tasks are 
solved through mindreading; or more precisely: some tasks generally considered to involve 
mindreading (such as decisions about cooperation) can be solved both in ways generally 
considered to be mindreading (e.g. placing oneself in the other’s shoes, reasoning about the 
other’s possible motivations) and in ways generally not considered to be mindreading (e.g. 
extrapolating from the other’s previous behaviour). Note that this is the same point as made at 
the end of Section 1.1.4., and that this again highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
different levels of explanation. Sometimes it can be said on the W(hat)-level that “X decided to 
cooperate because he thought that Y intended to cooperate as well”, whereas on the H(ow)-level 
this decision came down to (for example) mere extrapolation of X’s experience that Y always 
cooperated on previous occasions. Is this a case of mindreading? Yes on the W-level, no on the 
H-level. (Cf. also Kümmerli et al. 2010). 
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Apart from the issue of deciding whether or not to cooperate, does 
cooperation itself involve mindreading? For example, chimpanzees seem to 
hunt cooperatively (e.g. Boesch, 2005), which could be argued to require A to 
understand that B wants to move around the tree, so that B intends A to 
understand he should take the other side, and so on, implying mindreading at 
multiple levels of complexity. However, it has been pointed out that a more 
likely scenario is that all chimpanzees participating in a hunt try to maximise 
their own chances of catching the prey, which results in a situation that only 
seems to be coordinated intentionally from the perspective of an outside 
observer (similar hunting is found in hyenas, lions, and wolves; see Tomasello, 
2008: 173-175; Dunbar, 2014: 244). Such hunting “alone together” does not seem 
to require much mindreading, apart from again the possible Machavellian 
twists of misleading others or anticipating potential misleading by others. In 
that sense, this form of cooperation may on the level of its underlying 
mechanisms well come closer to the bird flock than it seems at face value. 
  
1.3.5 Mindreading and social learning 
It has further been claimed that mindreading underpins living in social groups 
through facilitating effective learning mechanisms. Whereas some theorists 
have suggested that most of the important learning takes place through 
imitation, and therefore does not rely on taking others’ perspectives (see Heyes, 
1993; 2012a), Tomasello and others have suggested that it is precisely because 
we, humans, are able to picture ourselves in someone else’s shoes, that we can 
learn “through” them (Tomasello 1999; 2008; 2014). In this way, thanks to our 
mindreading competences, cultural conventions can reliably spread through a 
group at a fast pace, since learning not only takes place from parents and 
caretakers to a new generation (“vertically”), but also “horizontally” between 
peers: 
 
The form of social learning required here is not just imitation, but role 
reversal imitation, in which each initiate to the convention understands 
that she can use the convention toward others as they have used it 
toward her, and vice versa—so that both producer and comprehender 
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roles are implicitly present in both production and comprehension. 
(Tomasello, 2008: 221-222, referring to Tomasello, 1999) 
 
Groups of humans (and potentially some of our hominid ancestors and ape 
relatives)35 having such a mechanism in place through which conventions 
spread, turn into cultural communities where coordination between group 
members works in a highly effective way: when conventions are mutually 
shared, there is (as it were) a supra-individual order capable of orchestrating 
behaviours and interactions in all kinds of domains. This saves huge amounts 
of negotiation and trial-and-error costs—time, risk, energy, cognitive power, 
and so on—otherwise borne by individual group members. This will be 
elaborated further in Chapter 5, where the notions of “joint intentionality” and 
“common ground” are introduced (following Clark, 1996, and Verhagen, 2015) 
and where linguistic items will be viewed as coagulated solutions to 
coordination problems occurring when interlocutors try to update a set of 
shared beliefs. 
 
1.3.6 Mindreading, language, and narrative 
Apart from (but clearly related to) cultural learning, the ability to deal with 
multiple orders of intentionality has been argued to enable and support 
language (“third role” in terms of Section 1.2.2 above), and thereby activities 
important for living in social groups, such as gossiping and storytelling, as 
discussed above. Dunbar (2014) and others consider the latter activities highly 
important factors in how our hominid ancestors could break through glass 
ceilings of group size and brain capacity. The final section of this chapter will 
be concerned with Dunbar’s view on the role of language and stories in the 
context of the social brain hypothesis. This brings the discussion back to the 
                                                
35 There is evidence that chimpanzee groups also have some form of cultural conventions that 
spread both horizontally and vertically. However, compared to the human situation, there 
clearly is an enormous difference in the amount to which these conventions modify and 
enhance the chimpanzee ways of living. See Whiten et al. (1999) and Whiten (2011).  
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core issue of this thesis: the relation between mindreading, language, and 
narrative.36 
As stated earlier, the basic idea advocated by Dunbar is that our lineage, 
over time, exhibited increasingly better mindreading competences. In brief, it is 
assumed that our current capacity comprises five “levels” of intentionality 
(Kinderman et al, 1998; Stiller and Dunbar, 2007) and that the last ancestor we 
shared with our closest relatives in nature, chimpanzees and bonobos, could, 
like them, achieve at most two of such levels. Smaller-brained monkeys are 
assumed to be capable of only one level. Combined with the mentioned 
neuroimaging experiments suggesting that, in human subjects, mindreading 
competence is correlated with brain mass in areas relevant to social cognition, a 
function can be hypothesised expressing brain size in terms of achievable level 
of intentionality (Powell et al., 2011; Dunbar, 2014: chapter 7). When brain sizes 
of our ancestral hominids, estimated on the basis of fossil skull bones, are 
factored into this function, this yields the following graph:  
                                                
36 This thesis will not explicitly address religion, but it is clear that religious traditions rely for 
an important part on the exchange of stories. Therefore, much of what will be said in this thesis 
about stories in relation to mindreading is also relevant to building and maintaining religious 
communities. For a discussion of religion in relation the orders of intentionality, see Gamble 







Figure 5 – AMH stands for “Anatomically Modern Humans”; BP for “Before Present” (source: 
Dunbar, 2003). Note that more recent insights suggest that Neanderthals could achieve four 
orders rather than five as indicated here (see Dunbar, 2014: 241-244). 
 
Dunbar’s fundamental assumption, then, is that brain size was the factor 
limiting how many levels of intentionality could be processed. Given that the 
archaeological record shows an increase in cranial volume in our lineage over 
the past 3-4 million years, this leads to the claim that our ancestors were able to 
handle increasingly more levels of intentionality across this period. Next, 
Dunbar argues that the maximum achievable level of intentionality put a limit 
on the sophistication of the language that could be developed at any particular 
stage, and thus the complexity of the activities that this language could support. 
For example, imagine that an early form of language existed in Homo erectus 
that was useful for coordination purposes in the here-and-now, but not 
sophisticated enough to support social bonding through gossip or telling 
stories. In that case, our ancestors at that time would not have been able to use 
this language for bonding (much) larger communities, as is assumed to have 
been the case in later stages (see Section 1.3.2 above). In this way, according to 
Dunbar’s model, brain size limits achievable level of intentionality, which then 
limits sophistication of the language that can be developed, which in turn limits 
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the number of individuals that can be bonded in a coherent social group. Or 
phrased differently: increases in brain size over time “released” additional 
mindreading capabilities, which enabled more sophisticated forms of language, 
which in turn allowed for larger communities to be maintained in a coherent 
way. 
As discussed in relation to the “third role” of language (Section 1.2.2 
above), some researchers claim that it involves the capability to work at a 
handful of levels of intentionality to entertain human language “as we now 
know it”, even when producing the most basic utterances (e.g. Sperber, 2000; 
Scott-Phillips, 2015). Combined with Dunbar’s model set out above, this 
position necessarily entails that such language arrived late in our evolutionary 
history. After all, according to this model, the required ability to operate at such 
higher orders of intentionality was only available in anatomically modern 
humans. Earlier hominids may have had language, but this must then be 
assumed to have been of a lower degree of sophistication, given their limit at 
second- or third-order intentionality (for a discussion see Dunbar, 2014: chapter 
7).  
As said, in the chapters that follow I will first develop a perspective of 
economy, not so much looking at the limits of our mindreading capacity, but 
rather focussing on the minimal amount of mindreading needed for using 
language and dealing with stories. Chapter 6 then addresses the implications of 
this perspective for the practice of assessing mindreading experimentally. 
Finally, in the Conclusion I will return to the bigger picture set out in this first 
chapter and sketch the contours of how it should be updated in the light of the 
points developed throughout this thesis: after all, if the relationship between 
mindreading, language, and narrative is construed differently, this has potential 
consequences for the chronology of events assumed in the story of human 








When narrative takes over: the representation of embedded 
mindstates in Shakespeare’s Othello* 
 
In recent times, researchers across a variety of disciplines in the humanities and 
social sciences have been interested in the human ability to process embedded 
mindstates, also known as ‘multiple-order intentionality’ (MOI): A believes that 
B thinks that C intends (etc.). This task is considered increasingly cognitively 
demanding with every order of embedding added. However, we argue that the 
way in which the information relevant to the task is represented in language (in 
particular, using a narrative) greatly influences how well people are able to deal 
with MOI cognitively. This effect can be illustrated by paraphrasing situations 
presented by a play such as Shakespeare’s Othello: by the end of Act II the 
audience has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that 
Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the 
peace. Formulated this way, using sentence embedding to express the 
intentional relationships, this is highly opaque. At the same time, we know that 
Othello has been understood and appreciated by innumerable different 
audiences for ages. What is it that the play’s text does to make the audience 
understand all these embedded mindstates without undue cognitive strain? In 
this article we discuss six ‘expository strategies’ relevant to the representation 
of MOI and illustrate their working with examples from Shakespeare’s Othello. 
                                                
* This chapter was published as a separate article in Language and Literature (see Van Duijn, 
Sluiter, and Verhagen, 2015) and is inserted here without modification (with the only exception 
of a reference to this thesis on page 80, which is replaced by a footnote indicated with an 
asterisk). Since the article is co-authored, instead of “I” the first person plural is being used. 




Normally developed human adults are indubitably nature’s mindreading 
champions: even when provided with only limited cues, we are often able to 
form strikingly elaborate understandings of what others think, believe, intend, 
desire, and so on. This capability is often referred to as ‘Theory of Mind’ or 
‘mindreading’. When multiple mindstates are embedded, the term ‘multiple-
order intentionality’ (MOI) is used: A knows that B believes that C intends (etc.). 
In recent years, scientists and scholars from various disciplinary 
backgrounds have made connections between MOI and literature. It is argued 
that readers of fiction not only have to keep track of what characters think 
(believe, intend, desire, etc.), but also of what they think these characters think 
that other characters think. Dunbar suggests that, in this way, an audience 
reading or watching Shakespeare’s Othello has to work at higher orders of 
intentionality: ‘they have to believe that Iago intends that Othello imagines that 
Desdemona is in love with Cassio’ (2008: 414, italics added).37 
This seems to pose a paradox: on the one hand, working at higher orders 
of intentionality is considered cognitively taxing (Kinderman et al., 1998; Stiller 
and Dunbar, 2007). On the other hand, it is clear that a play such as Othello has 
been understood and appreciated for ages, indicating that a normally gifted 
reader/watcher can follow it without undue cognitive strain. This suggests that 
some aspects of the exposition of information in Othello and comparable texts 
must alleviate the cognitive burden of processing MOI. 
Using examples from Othello, we will discuss six strategies characteristic 
of (literary) narrative discourse that support the ability of readers to keep track 
of the mindstates of characters, even when these mindstates are mutually 
related and embedded in complicated ways. But before doing so, we will 
address MOI in some more detail, and discuss several possibilities to express 
embedded mindstates in language. We will conclude by discussing how our 
findings fit into a more general debate about the human ability to read minds. 
 
                                                
37 Similar examples drawn from different plays, popular culture, and novels can be found in, 
among others, Dennett (1987), Zunshine (2006) and Corballis (2011). 
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2.2 Mindreading, Theory of Mind, and Multiple-Order 
Intentionality 
 
During the 1970s, several academic fields intensified their interest in how, and 
to what extent, humans and other primates can engage in taking the 
perspectives of others. Dennett (1971, 1987) introduced his concept of the 
‘intentional stance’ and Premack and Woodruff (1978) made the term ‘theory of 
mind’ famous. Their work initiated a tradition of experimental and social 
research and raised fundamental debates among philosophers, psychologists, 
ethologists, neuroscientists, and contributors from other fields. A rich and 
insightful overview is given by Apperly in his recent monograph Mindreaders 
(2011). In this article we will follow Apperly’s suggestion to drop the term 
‘theory of mind’ (to avoid the implication that attributing mindstates is like 
having a theory) and refer to the set of mechanisms, routines, and tricks that 
humans apply to form understandings of other’s mindstates as ‘mindreading’. 
In the past decade, several links have been pointed out between 
mindreading and literature. Some scholars have suggested that, when forming 
an understanding of the inner lives of fictional characters, we use the same 
mental capacities as when reading other people’s minds in everyday social 
interaction (see e.g. Budelmann and Easterling, 2010; Cefalu, 2013; Palmer, 2004; 
Zunshine, 2006). Others have argued that reading fiction may train our 
mindreading abilities (e.g. Djikic et al., 2013; Kidd and Castano, 2013; Vermeule, 
2010). This fits the broader idea that stories function as cognitive play: they may 
form a ‘playground’ where readers can develop various socio-cognitive skills 
without risking real-life social costs (Boyd, 2009). While the central focus of this 
article will be on embedded mindstates and the narrative expressed by 
Shakespeare’s Othello, we will get back to these more general connections 
between mindreading and literature in our concluding section. 
In various articles and books, Dennett (e.g. 1971, 1987) systematically works 
out the idea that mindreading has recursive potential: it can be self-embedded. In 
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P1 [I know that] Will is a sailor.   first order intentionality 
P2 [I know that] Bill believes that Will is a sailor.  second order intentionality 
P3  [I know that] Mary believes that Bill believes that Will is a sailor.  third order intentionality 
P4 
[I know that] Peter believes that Mary believes that Bill believes that Will is 
a sailor.  fourth order intentionality 
P5 
[I know that] John believes that Peter believes that Mary believes that Bill 
believes that Will is a sailor.  fifth order intentionality 
P6 
[I know that] Sally believes that John believes that Peter believes that Mary 
believes that Bill believes that Will is a sailor.  sixth order intentionality 
Pn [I know that] Namen believes that Pn-1   n-th order intentionality 
 
The propositions in Table 1 show that the recursive procedure of embedding 
one proposition expressing a subject’s mindstate into another, can produce 
propositions of any length and complexity. However, these propositions clearly 
become more opaque and their contents harder to grasp as the number of 
embeddings increases. This is presumably what led to the idea that there is a 
general upper limit to the number of orders of intentionality that humans can 
handle, as suggested by Dennett (1971) and tested experimentally by 
Kindermann et al. (1998) and Stiller and Dunbar (2007). They argue that the 
maximum for contemporary humans lies at around fifth order. In their 
experiments participants were presented with short narratives describing social 
situations that included several characters: 
  
Emma worked in a greengrocer’s. She wanted to persuade her boss to 
give her an increase in wages. So she asked her friend Jenny, who was 
still at school, what she should say to the boss. “Tell him that the 
                                                
38 In this article we count orders of intentionality following Stiller and Dunbar (2007), who 
suggest that one should start from a first-person perspective by default (= first order). If this 
first-person perspective is not made explicit, it is added between brackets, as can be witnessed 
in Table 1. Note that fifth order in this article is the equivalent of fourth-order intentionality in 
Kinderman et al. (1998), who argue, accordingly, that the limit for contemporary humans lies at 
around fourth order. 
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chemist near where you live wants you to work in his shop,” Jenny 
suggested. “The boss won’t want to lose you, so he will give you more 
money” she said. So when Emma went to see her boss that is what she 
told him. Her boss thought that Emma might be telling a lie, so he said 
he would think about it. Later, he went to the chemist’s shop near 
Emma’s house and asked the chemist whether he had offered a job to 
Emma. The chemist said he hadn’t offered Emma a job. The next day 
the boss told Emma that he wouldn’t give her an increase in wages, and 
she could take the job at the chemist’s instead. (Stiller and Dunbar, 
2007: 101-102) 
 
After the narratives were read out to the participants, they were asked 
questions of increasing complexity, measured by the number of orders of 
intentionality as expressed through linguistic embeddings. They had to choose, 
for example, between ‘Emma thought the boss believed that the chemist 
wanted her to work for him’ or ‘Emma thought the boss knew that the chemist 
had not offered her a job’ (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007: 102). The level at which 
participants first failed answering such questions correctly was normally 
distributed with a peak around fifth order. However, it is not clear what exactly 
this means: the factor limiting performance at the higher levels was perhaps not 
so much the participants’ ability to cognitively handle the situation presented by 
the narrative, nor was it the understanding of the narrative itself, but rather the 
participants’ ability to process the multiply-embedded sentences of the 
questions. We suggest that the way mindreading tasks involving MOI are 
represented is crucial to the actual performance of the subjects facing these 
tasks.39 In the next section we will take a closer look at the possible ways to 
represent MOI in language and narrative. 
 
 
                                                
39 This is also indicated by the fact that implicit mindreading tests, in which both the 
descriptions of the situations and the questions are presented in the form of ‘narrative’ movie 
clips, lead to increased success rates (see O’Grady et al., 2015). In addition, recent experimental 
findings by Carney, Wlodarski, and Dunbar (2014) indicate that genre impacts on people’s 
understanding of MOI when reading narratives. 
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2.3 Representing embedded mindstates: from sentence to 
narrative 
 
Within sentences, several linguistic devices are available for coordinating 
different perspectives (see, for example, Dancygier and Sweetser, 2012; 
Verhagen, 2005). At least in middle- and western-European languages, a central 
device is complementation, where a verb of cognition (think, know, intend, etc.) is 
specified by a complement clause, as in Table 1. However, if the representation 
of a MOI situation relies on such complex sentences only, it very soon becomes 
hard or even impossible for a reader or hearer to make the right inferences 
about the involved mindstates. Consider P4 and P5 in Table 1: these propositions 
are hard to link correctly to the situations referred to. This is in line with the 
fact that in corpora of narrative fiction and natural spoken discourse, sentences 
containing three or more embedded mindstates are very infrequent.* 
At the same time it is widely accepted that we do regularly deal with 
higher-order mindreading in daily social life (Dunbar, 2003; Sperber, 1994), 
which suggests that there must be ways to communicate about this 
linguistically. In our example of Shakespeare’s Othello, situations that require 
higher-order mindreading only emerge gradually in the course of the plot, after 
several characters have been introduced and several events have been narrated. 
Nowhere in the text does any single sentence express the embedding of more 
than three mindstates: only after a while does the situation give occasion to 
consider forming such sentences, summarising the state of affairs in terms of 
embedded mindstates. Dunbar provides such a sentence when he states that 
audiences watching a performance of Othello in a theatre have to work at 
fourth-order intentionality when ‘they have to believe that Iago intends that 
Othello imagines that Desdemona is in love with Cassio’ (Dunbar, 2008: 414; 
                                                
* The Corpus of Spoken Dutch (CGN) features 10 million words, 1 million of which are fiction 
(mostly novels and short stories) read out aloud. Neither in the 9 million words recorded from 
spontaneous spoken discourse, business negotiations, radio reports, lectures, and so on, nor in 
the part recorded from fiction, can sentences be found containing four or more embedded 
clauses featuring a verb of cognition (think, know, believe, suspect, etc.) and/or communication 
(say, state, utter, bring forward, etc.). There is a handful (<5) examples of sentences containing 
three such clauses, which forms a stark contrast with the thousands of sentences containing one 
or two clauses featuring verbs of cognition and/or communication. 
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italics added). Since ‘is in love with Cassio’ describes a mindstate without adding 
another embedding, for reasons of compatibility let us rephrase Dunbar’s 
sentence as follows: 
 
(1) [The audience believe] that Iago intends that Othello imagines that 
 Desdemona thinks that Cassio is adorable.40 
 
This fourth-order proposition does indeed summarise a crucial part of Othello’s 
plot: Iago, ensign to general Othello, determines on revenge after Cassio is 
appointed lieutenant over his head. He sets up an evil scheme in order to 
execute his revenge, which involves persuading the freshly married Othello 
that his bride, Desdemona, is unfaithful to him with the new lieutenant, Cassio. 
However, we agree with Dunbar that it becomes more complicated than 
that. As Iago’s scheming plan progresses, keeping track of ‘who knows what’ 
(including what they know that others know, etc.) involves reasoning up to at 
least sixth-order intentionality, following the same logic of counting. In the 
second act, Iago stage-manages a little riot. As a result, Cassio is discredited 
with Othello and suspended as a lieutenant. Next, Iago urges Cassio to ask 
Desdemona to plead with Othello for his (Cassio’s) rehabilitation. In the 
meantime, Iago fills Othello with suspicion about what Desdemona’s friendly 
stance towards Cassio means. The resulting situation is advantageous to Iago’s 
plan: the more ‘helpful’ Desdemona is by pleading for Cassio, the more 
suspicious and jealous Othello becomes. With this situation on stage the 
audience would have to work at sixth order: 
 
(2) [The audience believe] that Iago intends that Cassio believes that 
 Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend 
 to disturb the  peace. 
 
This demonstrates that in the case of Othello it is possible to form sentences that 
in some respect offer faithful summaries of the contents of the plot, and at the 
same time contain up to six embedded mindstates. The text thus somehow 
                                                
40 The first order, ‘the audience believe’, is added between brackets to indicate that counting 
starts from that perspective, following Stiller and Dunbar (2007); see also our earlier Note 2. 
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represents (or prompts its readers to deal with) at least sixth-order 
intentionality. However, as stated earlier: nowhere does the text contain any 
sentences describing more than three mindstates at a time. This is where 
narrative takes over. 
Dancygier’s (2012) cognitive approach provides an insightful general 
framework for investigating how narrative texts produce meaning. In her view, 
texts provide cues that invite readers or hearers to make certain inferences. The 
elements that make up the story (events, character actions or traits, landscape’s 
qualities, etc.) are ‘compressed’ (Dancygier, 2012: 59); that is: only some of the 
actual story’s elements are represented by the text. For this representation, 
choices on several levels of language usage and narrative structure are made, 
that subsequently influence how readers or hearers ‘unpack’ the elements and 
construct the story in their minds. 
In order to create what has been termed a ‘fictional mind’, a text provides 
cues that invite readers or watchers to imagine a (human) agent and attribute 
mindstates to him/her, using mostly the same mindreading abilities as they also 
use in actual social interaction.41 Both lower-level linguistic choices (such as the 
use of a first-person versus a third-person pronoun in a sentence) and larger-
scale choices on the level of narrative structure (such as telling in retrospect 
versus following the action as it unfolds) greatly influence the inferences made 
by readers, and thus the stories these readers construct in their minds (see 
Dancygier, 2012: 31–40). 
In this way, using well-chosen cues, texts can prompt an audience to 
imagine a fictional social network of characters. As in real life, the audience can 
apply their mindreading skills to access intentional relationships between 
characters within this network if the context so requires. In cases such as Othello 
we argue that the process of imagining the right intentional relationships 
within the fictional social network of characters is orchestrated by structural 
properties of the text. These structural properties orchestrating the audience’s 
                                                
41 This point is also made by Palmer (2004) and worked out for tragedy in Budelmann and 
Easterling (2010): inner lives and personalities of characters often remain largely unformulated 
in a direct sense, but the text ‘model[s] the dynamics’ of the reader’s ‘propensity to read minds’ 
(Budelmann and Easterling, 2010: 290–292). For case studies dealing with mindreading and 
tragedy see Helms (2012); Sluiter, Corthals, Van Duijn et al. (2012). 
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mindreading process are what we will call expository strategies in the next 
section. 
To summarise: anyone who knows the content of Othello would, upon 
consideration, admit that the propositions (1) and (2) in a certain way faithfully 
describe the intentional relationships between the audience and some of the 
characters. However, the text does not contain such complicated sentences. We 
argue that with the unfolding of the play’s narrative, readers or hearers are 
invited to construct a fictional social network and approach it using mainly the 
same socio-cognitive skills as in real-life interaction. Narrative supports this 
process through several expository strategies. In the next section we distinguish 
six such strategies and discuss how they help the audience to construct the 




2.4 The Expository Strategies of Narrative 
 
The strategies we distinguish are: characterisation, focalisation/viewpoint 
alternation, framing, episodic structuring, time management, and redundancy. 
Their borders are not sharp: some overlap partly, others make use of related 
underlying mechanisms. None of them can, however, be fully reduced to any 
one of the others. 
Before we discuss the strategies one by one, a few remarks have to be 
made about the fact that Othello is a play. The question of whether it is watched 
as a performance or read as a text is obviously important to the question of how 
the audience or readers are being supported in constructing mindstates of 
characters. Performances provide visual cues such as acted gestures, facial 
expressions, and proxemics (symbolic use of space; Hall, 1966) that probably 
trigger immediate responses in spectators. However, in what follows we will 
refrain from elaborating on the multi-modal experience of watching drama on 
stage, and restrict ourselves to analysing textual cues, given that Othello can be 
(and widely has been) understood and appreciated perfectly well by accessing 
its narrative through the reading of the text. 
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Some of our strategies build on established narratological theory, 
primarily intended for ‘pure’ narrative texts, such as novels or epic texts. Drama 
is different in that the interactions of the characters give the impression that 
they are unmediated. However, there is no doubt that the reader will come 
away with a clear sense of a story and a plot, of characters, setting, time, and 
place. Even though there is no overt narrator in drama, there still is a guiding 
hand, the theoretical instance situated between the actual author and the story 
told by the text, who is responsible for the textual choices that provide the 
reader with the cues to make the right inferences, and who directs their 
sympathies and antipathies.42 All of this warrants the application of various 
narratological concepts in our following discussion of the strategies.43 In 
addition, we will build on concepts and insights from cognitively oriented 
linguistics and literary studies, exploiting also their relevance to the processing 
of characters’ mental states. 
 
2.4.1 Characterisation 
Clearly, before a reader can begin to read minds, agents have to be called into 
being to whom mindstates can be attributed. Only a few cues are needed to get 
this process started, after which numerous details can be added to adjust and 
deepen the picture drawn of a character and his or her inner life. 
Characterisation takes place at two separate though related levels: the textual 
level of the linguistic realisation and referencing of characters, and the narrative 
level at which the construction of characters as meaningful, ‘human-like 
entities’ (see Herman, 2009) is situated. Both are relevant to processing of 
mindstates. 
At the textual level, in the case of a play (abbreviations of) the proper 
names of characters are commonly provided in the left hand margin to indicate 
who is speaking. Within character text, however, the range of linguistic options 
                                                
42 We will not go into those passages in which a character becomes a narrator of sorts, as in 
various soliloquies by Iago in which he comments on past or future events (an example is cited 
in Section 2.4.6), or in Othello’s last lines, in which he instructs everyone on stage (and thereby 
also the audience) how to ‘relate’ the tragic events of the past hours to others (v. ii. 339–357); see 
also Maguire (2014: 1–4; 19–20). 
43 For narratology and drama in the context of our approach see Dancygier (2012: 146–164), and 
for a more general discussion see Hühn and Sommer (2009). 
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available for referencing other characters is endless: it includes proper names 
(e.g. ‘Othello’), nicknames (‘the Moor’), definite or indefinite descriptions (‘the 
general’, ‘a man’), pronouns (‘he’), and more. For the purpose of this article two 
aspects are especially relevant. Firstly, and rather obviously, proper names (or 
nicknames) can form unique labels that support the readers’ memories in 
keeping different agents and their mindstates apart: ‘A person intends that 
another person believes that again another person loves yet another person’, is 
(even) harder to grasp than the statement that ‘Iago intends that Othello 
believes that Cassio loves Desdemona’, whether or not these names had been 
introduced before. Secondly, and more importantly, proper names can activate 
so-called ‘rich frames’ (Dancygier, 2011). A rich frame is a bundle of rather 
specific background knowledge present in readers, structured such that if one 
aspect is mentioned, a set of other relevant aspects are also activated. Anyone 
mentioning ‘Mozart’ refers to a particular historical person, but also implicitly 
activates aspects such as ‘composer’, ‘genius’, ‘fame’, ‘18th-century classical 
music’, ‘early death’, ‘man’, and so on. In the case of fictional characters created 
by a text (rather than ‘reincarnated’ from history or existing stories and myths), 
the background knowledge contained in the frame associated with their name 
will clearly be much more rudimentary initially (cueing only, for instance, 
‘man’ or ‘foreign’), but as the narrative develops the frame can be enriched very 
quickly (see also Framing in Section 2.4.3). 
This is where the second level of characterisation comes in, the narrative 
construction of characters. As soon as the involved minds are ‘labeled’, 
attributes can accumulate. For example, the readers’ pictures of Othello and 
Desdemona will be modified and enriched as they learn in the course of the 
first act that these two are a respected general with an ‘exotic’ background and 
the daughter of a Venetian aristocrat, who got married in secret. With every 
detail added, each new mention of Othello or Desdemona will activate a richer 
background knowledge, which in turn enables more profound understanding 
of the way they think, what their plans are, how they will react, and so on.44 
                                                
44 In prints (both ancient and modern), the text is often preceded by a list summing up the 
dramatis personae, followed by a brief description, such as ‘Roderigo, a Venetian Gentleman’ (cf. 
Ridley, 1965: 2). In this way, this form of characterisation can sometimes even begin before the 
play itself begins. 
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Both narrative characterisation and referencing of characters at the 
textual level are crucial in enhancing accessibility, the ease (or difficulty) with 
which information relevant to successful processing of meaning can be 
retrieved from memory. In line with Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) ‘Relevance’ 
principle, Ariel (1990: 165–168) points out that the amount of processing power 
needed to interpret a linguistic utterance is inversely proportional to the 
availability of a context in which this utterance makes good sense. Lower 
accessibility means thus that more processing power will be invested in the 
search for such a context. Ariel argues that some patterns of referential 
expression usage focus this search process, so that the reader will need to invest 
less processing power in order to come to a relevant interpretation. In the 
example of ‘A person intends that another person believes that again another 
person loves yet another person’, and also in the sentences (1) and (2) from 
Section 2.3, a handful of agents are prompted, as it were, out of the blue. By 
contrast, in a concisely constructed piece such as Shakespeare’s Othello this 
prompting is both more gradual and more redundant: characters appear on 
stage and interact, they leave, come back again in other scenes, are addressed 
by other characters when present, or referenced when absent, etcetera. As a 
consequence, the core set of characters will attain an increasing degree of 
presence in the short-term and working memory of the readers, or in Ariel’s 
words: their accessibility increases, hence the amount of processing power 
needed for interpretation when they figure in a linguistic expression goes down 
(1990: 11–31; see also Vandelanotte, 2012: 203–207, and our Section 2.3.6 on 
Redundancy). 
Finally, some details of character construction are provided by another 
character, and may therefore be as illuminating about the speaker as about the 
object of his speech. Consider, for instance, the introduction of Cassio: he is first 
presented as an ‘arithmetician’, a ‘Florentine’, but also as a ‘bookish theoretic’ 
whose soldiership is ‘mere prattle without practice’ (I. i. 19–26).45 Although 
especially the first attributes may seem objective facts, one must be watchful: 
everything the readers learn here comes from the mouth of Iago, and must thus 
be considered in the light of his specific interests (see also Focalisation/ 
                                                
45 The used edition of Othello is Ridley (1965), also known as ‘Arden 2’. References are to act, 
scene, and lines (act. scene. line) of this edition. 
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viewpoint alternation in the next section). The clearly negative valuation of the 
details he provides reveal Iago’s distaste for Cassio, and thereby provide the 
reader with another basis for following Iago’s wily plans. 
In this way, with characters talking to and about each other, readers 
acquire knowledge of their relationships and stances towards one another; in 
other words, the readers gain increasing insight in the fictional social network. 
As in real life, they may start off with only some stereotypical expectations, 
which are then reinforced, readjusted, or weakened with every new detail 
mentioned. Against this crucial background of characterisation, more specific 
character mindstates can eventually be constructed and understood. 
 
2.4.2 Focalisation and viewpoint alternation 
Characters are not just fictional agents allowing the attribution of mindstates, 
but they also perceive the events that constitute the narrative’s plot from their 
point of view. The text orchestrates the reader’s inclination to align with the 
perspective of different characters, and to perceive these events ‘through their 
eyes’. In narratology this is referred to as focalisation (Bal, 2009; De Jong, 1997: 
313–319), but we take the concept more broadly in this article and extend our 
interest to the more general usage of all kinds of linguistic cues that mark 
viewpoint shifts. Elaborating further on Cassio’s introduction as an 
‘arithmetician’ and a ‘bookish theoretic’, it is clear that Iago, who presents this 
information, is spinning it: his character text prompts the readers at least 
temporarily to look at a part of the narrated world (in this case, the character 
Cassio) from his (Iago’s) particular viewpoint. This viewpoint is tinged by his 
jealousy rooted in having been passed over for the military promotion which 
Cassio received in his place. Through such details provided from Iago’s 
viewpoint, the readers gradually become familiar with his anger. This puts 
them in the ideal position to correctly interpret his performance when he is 
asked to explain to Othello the very messy situation in which an inebriated 
Cassio stabbed Montano. The reader knows that the whole riot leading to this 
unfortunate event had been set up by Iago himself, but Othello is of course 
unaware of this when he turns to Iago for enlightenment: 
 
When narrative takes over
 88 
 
    Iago      Touch me not so near, 
  I had rather ha’ this tongue cut from my mouth, 
  Than it should do harm to Michael Cassio: 
  Yet I persuade myself, to speak the truth     
    215  Shall nothing wrong him. Thus it is, general:     
  Montano and myself being in speech, 
  There comes a fellow, crying out for help, 
  And Cassio following him with determin’d sword, 
  To execute upon him . . .                is with Cassi   
  (ii. iii. 211–219) 
 
Iago’s wily first three lines make him out to be a steadfast friend of Cassio’s, one 
who would rather suffer himself than see his friend come to harm through his 
words. But surely, Iago puts forward, if he keeps to the ‘truth’ he will not harm 
his friend. At this point the readers are in a perfect position to grasp Iago’s true 
attitude and evil intentions: they can take both his point of view and that of the 
guileless Othello to judge the effect of the lines that follow. Iago’s version of the 
events is ‘correct’, yet it leads to an exaggerated (as the reader knows) picture of 
reprehensible guilt of Cassio. 
Note that Iago’s words include a representation of Cassio’s viewpoint 
(who is ‘following [Roderigo] with determin’d sword’) – a case of ‘embedded 
focalisation’. Here the text urges readers to do a ‘double take’ on the event 
witnessed earlier, but then through the eyes of Iago, and via him again through 
the eyes of Cassio. Through these viewpoint shifts the readers can conclude 
that Othello, Montano, and Cassio, who were not present when Iago discussed 
the set-up for the riot with Roderigo, now have a false impression of what just 
happened, shaped by Iago’s sly account (see also Maguire, 2014: 35–38). 
In this way, throughout the play the readers take a whole carousel of 
different viewpoints: they do not have to consider mindstates from the ‘outside’, 
starting from one fixed perspective, as is the case in multiple-order propositions 
such as (1) and (2) given earlier, but the text makes them experience these 





Specific details can have a great influence on the impression a reader has of the 
characters and their mutual relationships. Such details can activate knowledge 
already present in readers, both general knowledge about the world (for 
example the scenario of ‘adulterous lady provokes jealous husband’) and more 
specific background knowledge about elements of a story (for example: ‘Othello 
is a Moor, so the Venetian aristocrats probably consider him an outsider’). Here, 
the concept of framing is relevant (Coulson, 2001; Fillmore, 1976). Frames bring 
along a certain topology, detailing how informational cues in the new context 
should be connected and interpreted. Knowledge of particular frames is 
cultural common ground in readers’ minds. If a frame concerns the behaviour 
of humans, its topology usually contains ‘stereotypical roles’, information about 
what characters are likely to do, think, believe, intend, etcetera. 
In the course of Shakespeare’s play, the reader is provided with the 
information that Iago, out of revenge, sets up a wily plot by making Othello think 
that his wife, Desdemona, is adulterous. These terms all link to well-known 
frames that come with stereotypical roles, including particular mindstates. For 
example, in the case of adultery: ‘A and B are married’; ‘A and C are in love’; 
and ‘A and C do not want B to know that A and C are in love’. By mapping the 
characters on stage onto the structure of this topology, the reader can make the 
relevant inferences about intentional relationships without having to process 
all mindstates from scratch. 
Given the benefits of spectator-sight, readers can also witness how one 
character uses framing to influence another character’s mindstate. Consider 
again the step in Iago’s scheme where he intends Othello to believe that Cassio is 
in love with Desdemona and that this love is reciprocated (cf. (1) above). The 
readers witness how Iago attempts to reframe the friendship between 
Desdemona and Cassio as adultery in Othello’s mind (cf. ‘frame-shifting’: 
Coulson, 2001). As a result, Othello ascribes different (and false) intentions to 
Desdemona and Cassio when he watches their contacts and actions. Again, 
readers do not face the task of processing step by step a completely novel 
situation: using existing knowledge of the adultery and friendship frames, they 
can grasp in a more holistic way what is going on in Othello’s mind. 
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2.4.4 Episodic structuring 
When reading the play, it is clear that it is divided into several more or less 
bounded episodes. Within such an episode, a relationship between characters 
can be elaborated, a character can be struck by an idea, change his mind, or 
acquire an insight. Typically, one episode includes only a limited number of 
characters: it is mostly either a monologue (such as those given by Iago), a 
dialogue, or a discussion between a few characters (see also Stiller et al., 2003). 
The crucial point is that the information provided in any episode can, as it 
were, be ‘collapsed’ and conveniently taken to subsequent parts of the play. 
Here it can be referred to, and embedded into a new structure. 
Stories routinely embed earlier episodes by circumscribing them 
pragmatically, using a key feature of their content or presentation. For example, 
in the first act Roderigo and Iago spend quite some time discussing why they 
hate Othello. Later, when Iago needs to convince Roderigo to cooperate (again) 
in one of the steps of his scheming plan, he only needs to refer to this discussion 
to reactivate the chain of shared and individual negative experiences with 
Othello in both Roderigo’s and the readers’ minds. In this way, the play can 
carefully build up a complex plot by first presenting several episodes that are 
easy to understand, and then embedding these episodes into one another by 
calling them up later.46 
To summarise: the fact that the story develops episodically, with each 
episode updating the mindstates of only a limited subset of the total number of 
characters, makes it possible that a complex structure emerges in a manageable 
way. 
 
2.4.5 Time management 
Story time can be managed flexibly through flashbacks or anticipations. 
Information need not be presented in the actual order of events ‘in the world’: 
this is the narratological distinction between the order in which events ‘really’ 
happened (known as the fabula) and the order in which they are being told 
                                                
46 See also Dancygier’s (2012) concept of narrative anchors. 
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(story). In the fabula of Shakespeare’s play, for example, Othello and 
Desdemona get married before the dispute between Iago and Roderigo with 
which the play opens. However, in the play’s story it takes about 200 lines 
starting from the dispute before the marriage is narrated as a past event. This 
principle not only opens a possibility for redundant narration (as will be 
discussed later) but also for calling in past events for clarification or further 
elaboration. 
Events that take years may take only seconds to narrate, and an 
instantaneous event may be described at extravagant length (see e.g. Schneider, 
2003). In this connection some scholars have proposed that Othello contains a 
‘double time scheme’ (Ridley, 1965: lxvii–lxx). On the one hand, the main action 
moves fast: there is a night, a day, another night, and another day on the 
evening of which the play ends with the killing of Desdemona. This high pace 
greatly adds to the overall suspense, as well as to the credibility of Iago’s 
scheme. After all, had there been plenty of time between all of his cunning 
moves, Othello, Cassio, Desdemona, and Roderigo would have been able to 
speak to each other, and figure out Iago’s evil intentions. At the same time, 
however, the rapid movement of the action ‘makes nonsense of the whole 
business’, as Ridley (1965: lxix) puts it, leaving no time during which the 
supposed adultery of Cassio and Desdemona could have occurred. Ridley 
concludes by noting that ‘what Shakespeare is doing is to present, before our 
eyes, an unbroken series of events happening in “short time”, but to present 
them against a background of events not presented but implied, which gives the 
needed impression of “long time” … He knew to a fraction of an inch how far he 
could go in playing a trick on his audience’ (1965: lxx). What Ridley calls a 
‘trick’, may also be regarded as managing the story time in such a way that the 
reader is supported in making the right inferences about who-knows-what for 
the plot to work. 
 
2.4.6 Redundancy 
Finally, there is the aspect of redundancy. Some information is simply provided 
more than once in the course of the play. Mostly, the repeated information is 
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incorporated somewhat differently, using stylistic variations, shifting points of 
view, or flashbacks and flash-forwards. 
In Othello, examples of this can be found in the various soliloquies 
delivered by Iago. Here he ruminates on what has just occurred and on what is 
about to occur next. In effect, he rehearses important pieces of information 
from past and future events for the audience. In fact, this also effects the 
emergence of a form of drama-internal ‘narrating voice’, offering reflection on 
the ongoing action (see also Dancygier, 2012: 147–148; Maguire, 2014: 1–4). An 
example can be found at the end of Act II (II. iii. 305–353): because of the riot 
that Iago has set up with the help of Roderigo, Cassio has just been suspended 
as a lieutenant. However, he has no idea that Iago is in fact the evil genius 
behind his suspension. In a dialogue between the two men, Iago expresses his 
faked compassion with Cassio, and provides him with a piece of advice on how 
to regain his position: he should seek the intercession of Desdemona. It starts as 
follows: 
 
    Iago    
  305  I’ll tell you what you shall do… Our general’s 
  Wife is now the general . . . 
 
  309  Confess yourself freely to her, importune 
    Her she’ll help to put you in your place again . . . 
 
   Cassio   
  317  You advise me well. 
 
After this devious advice has been given, Cassio repeats it to himself: 
 
   Cassio   
320  I bethink it freely, and betimes in the morning will I 
Beseech the virtuous Desdemona, to undertake for 
Me; I am desperate for my fortunes, if they check me  
 here. 
    
Then Cassio leaves and Iago remains on stage alone. He begins a monologue, in 




    Iago    
  And what’s he then, that says I play the villain, 
  When this advice is free I give, and honest, 
  Probal to thinking*, and indeed the course   * “a wise advise’ 
  330  To win the Moor* again?     * i.e. Othello 
    
How could his advice be considered evil? It is obviously a good way to placate 
Othello. Of course both he and the reader know better. Iago predicts that 
Desdemona will be easy to convince: 
 
  330    For ‘tis most easy    
  The inclining* Desdemona to subdue**,  * “compliant’ **convince’ 
  
Next, Iago predicts that Othello will be susceptible to Desdemona’s pleas: in 
fact, she could get him to do anything at all: 
 
     and then for her    
  To win the Moor, were ‘t to renounce his baptism, 
  335  All seals and symbols of redeemed sin, 
  His soul is so infetter’d* to her love,   * from “fetter”, i.e.  
         “chain’ 
  That she may make, unmake, do what she list*,  * “as she thinks fit” 
  Even as her appetite* shall play the god   * “his desire for her” (“her is 
objective, not possessive”, 
Ridley, 1965: 87) 
  With his weak function.  
 
Then Iago looks ahead to what the next step in his own scheming plan is going 
to be: he will fill Othello with suspicion about the relationship between Cassio 
and Desdemona. Meanwhile, he again mentions both the advice he gave to 
Cassio and Desdemona’s presumed willingness to go and plead with Othello. 
And this time it is clear that he is entirely and overtly conscious of the evil 
nature of his scheme: 
 
    How am I then a villain,    
  340  To counsel Cassio to this parallel course, 
  Directly to his good? Divinity of hell!  
  When devils will their blackest sins put on, 
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  They do suggest* at first with heavenly shows  * “seduce” 
  As I do now: for while this honest fool 
  345  Plies Desdemona to repair his fortunes, 
  And she for him pleads strongly to the Moor, 
  I’ll pour this pestilence* into his ear   * the “pest” of suspicion     
  
Finally, Iago tells the reader what he thinks the result will be: the more 
Desdemona argues in Cassio’s favour, the more suspicious Othello will get. 
This is, obviously, good from the perspective of Iago’s true interests and 
intentions, as it brings him closer to his revenge: 
 
  And by how much she strives to do him good, 
  She shall undo her credit with the Moor; 
  350  So will I turn her virtue into pitch*   * “tar” 
  And out of her own goodness make the net 
  That shall enmesh* ‘em all.    * “trap” 
   
This is where Iago’s monologue ends. In what follows, Cassio acts upon Iago’s 
advice and asks Desdemona to plead in his favor. Othello turns out to be 
amenable to this, and Iago indeed manages to fill him with suspicion about why 
Desdemona is so eager to plead for Cassio’s rehabilitation. 
Notice that the first of these steps (Cassio asking Desdemona to plead 
with Othello for his rehabilitation) is presented to the reader as much as five 
times: once when Iago first gives the advice to Cassio, once when Cassio 
rephrases the advice for himself, twice in Iago’s monologue, and once again 
when Cassio actually asks Desdemona to go and plead.47 
It is clear that repetition of cues from which readers can construct the 
intentional relationships important for the development of the play’s plot, 
increases the ease with which these relationships can be processed cognitively. 
 
  
                                                
47 An acute observer may even find a sixth time in ii. iii. 376–377. 
Chapter 2
 95 
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
 
2.5.1 Viewpoint all the way down 
We suggested that sentence embedding is well suited for handling two, perhaps 
three orders of intentionality at a time, but usually not more. For higher orders, 
narrative takes over. Indeed, Shakespeare’s Othello uses lower-order sentences 
to build a narrative that represents the higher-order situations constituting the 
plot. We argued that narratives such as the one presented in Othello provide 
support and scaffolding for readers’ abilities to process multiple-order 
intentionality by providing cues that prompt them to construct a fictional social 
network using mainly the same socio-cognitive skills as in real-life interaction. 
Structural properties of the narrative, here termed expository strategies, 
orchestrate step by step how the network of intentional relations relevant to 
understanding the plot should be constructed. We distinguished six such 
expository strategies: characterisation, focalisation/viewpoint alternation, 
framing, episodic structuring, time management, and redundancy. All of these 
can serve the purpose of viewpoint management: they impact the text’s capability 
to orchestrate how the reader should navigate through a complex network of 
embedded and interlinked viewpoints. Whereas this is obvious and well 
established throughout the literature for the strategy of focalisation/viewpoint 
alternation, the other strategies have not so far been systematically linked to 
viewpoint management. Our approach shows how the issue of managing 
viewpoints pervades in virtually all levels of the text and cuts through the 
borders of traditionally distinguished categories in narrative theory. This 
observation also reflects recent developments in the study of language and 
literature: throughout the past decade scholars coming from various angles and 
backgrounds have arrived at approaches in which viewpoint (including its 
cognitive pendant: the mindstate) is the central issue (for a recent overview see 
Dancygier and Sweetser, 2012; see also Bernaerts et al., 2013; Hühn, Schmid and 
Schönert, 2009; McConachie and Hart, 2006; Palmer, 2004; Vandelanotte, 
2009). 
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2.5.2 Context and directions 
Our analysis fits into several broader debates. There is increasing evidence that 
the human mindreading capability has (at least) two layers that function and 
develop to a certain extent independently: the first layer is mostly in place from 
birth and is shared with other species in nature; on top of that there are one or 
more layers that are uniquely human and develop over a longer period of time 
(Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). The first layer is mostly associated with ‘sensing’ 
feelings, directedness, and intentions of others in an immediate, automatic, and 
irresistible fashion. The second layer is associated with developing a more 
sophisticated understanding of thoughts and motives, and with appreciating 
such communicative leaps as irony and sarcasm. It can take up to the age of 12 
or 14 before an adult level of understanding other minds has been achieved 
(Papp, 2006). It has been suggested that the development of the second layer is 
to a great extent influenced by social interaction and increasing experience 
with communicative situations, but also by language acquisition as such. Evans 
and Levinson (2009), for example, conclude that by learning to master the 
grammatical practice of sentence embedding, children implicitly improve their 
cognitive skills for interpreting daily-life situations, particularly those involving 
embedded mindstates. Experiments by Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) further 
support this: children who are trained in perspective-shifting discourse 
containing embedded sentences, perform better at mindreading tests than their 
peers who have been trained in different forms of language use (see also De 
Villiers and De Villiers, 2003; Milligan et al., 2007). Just as the acquisition of 
grammar supports the development of social cognitive skills, it is perfectly 
thinkable that learning to understand and produce narratives also improves a 
child’s advanced mindreading abilities. This is a promising direction for future 
research (see also Gallagher and Hutto, 2008). 
In addition, the working of our six strategies can be tested experimentally 
by composing several versions of narrative excerpts, manipulating one strategy 
at a time, and measuring how well readers are able to process the multiply-
embedded mindstates. We also suggest that an empirical approach focused on 
development and language acquisition would be highly viable, investigating 
the potential link between the acquisition of the linguistic and narrative 
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features comprised in the six expository strategies and the development of 
mindreading abilities in children and adolescents. Whereas existing research in 
this domain has focused on the developmental step from no or very basic 
understanding of intentionality at age 1–2, to the full appreciation of (false) 
belief-states at age 4–5 (Milligan et al., 2007), it would be of particular interest to 
trace the steps beyond that point: those involving higher-order mindreading. 
In this article, we focused on the possibility of employing insights from 
rich traditions in the humanities, such as narratology and the study of grammar 
and semantics, to contribute to current debates concerning human cognition. 
This demonstrates how research on such multifaceted topics as mindreading 
can benefit from the integration of insights and methods from different 
academic disciplines across both the sciences and the humanities – an example 
of how EO Wilson’s idea of consilience (1998) can be brought into practice. 
 









Cognitive literary scholar Lisa Zunshine argues in her foundational 2006 book 
Why we read fiction that a certain class of literary novels push readers to the 
limits of their cognitive abilities. She suggests that this might be why some of us 
“are afraid of Virginia Woolf”: when reading for example Mrs Dalloway, 
according to Zunshine we have to process complexly embedded mindstates of 
the type “A suspects that B knows that C wants (etc.)”. I agree that Woolf’s fiction 
(and Mrs Dalloway in particular) is a great object of study for anyone interested 
in the complexity posed by representing a wealth of different mindstates in one 
story. However, in this chapter I question whether this complexity is adequately 
conceptualised as a series of embedded layers. I revisit the excerpt from Woolf’s 
Mrs Dalloway used by Zunshine to support her claim and analyse the linguistic 
and narrative “cues” that prompt the reader to imagine a rich “thoughtscape” of 
character mindstates, which are shown to be mutually related and interlinked 
in a variety of ways rather than being just embedded. This leads not only to a 
different view on the excerpt from Woolf’s novel, but also has important 
implications for how the general relationship between discourse structure and 
cognitive processing should be formulated. 
 
                                                
* Chapters 2, 3, and 4 were written as independent articles; see also the Reading Guide above. 




Humans have the capability to form beliefs about the mind-states of others; this 
is generally referred to as “mindreading”, “mentalising”, or having a “theory of 
mind”. Since others have such beliefs too, in social contexts involving several 
human actors, it has been claimed that beliefs about mind-states can become 
embedded into one another: A thinks that B intends that C believes [etc.] that X. 
This is referred to as “multiple-order intentionality”. This chapter focuses on 
the representation of multiple, interconnected mindstates in novels, addressing 
in particular the example used by cognitive literary scholar Lisa Zunshine 
(2006; 2012): a passage from Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925). 
The capability to take others’ perspectives is found in some form in 
various species of mammals and birds.48 Especially our close relatives in nature, 
most notably chimpanzees and bonobos, seem to be capable of assessing what 
others around them can see and know, and to some extent even what their 
goals and intentions are. However, when it comes to mindreading, humans are 
indubitably nature’s champions. Not only are we the only species that can 
reliably handle so-called “false beliefs”, a landmark passed by any normally 
developing human individual from around four years of age, but we are also 
the only ones capable of dealing with tasks that feature multiple, mutually 
related mindstates at the same time (Dennett, 1987; Dunbar, 2003). Imagine, for 
example, someone organising a surprise party for her brother. She calls him, 
pretending that she needs his help with something only he can do next Friday 
evening, which happens to be his birthday. She has to make sure that he does 
not understand that she intends to invite all his friends to her house. Also, she has 
to make her brother’s friends understand that her brother does not know about 
the party, and she might have to anticipate that he may ask his friends whether 
they know that he will not be available on the night of his birthday, and so on.  
This shows that mindreading complexity easily adds up even in quite 
ordinary situations of everyday social life. Researchers have proposed to 
                                                
48 For an overview see Apperly (2011: 46-56). See e.g. Call & Tomasello (2008) and Yamamoto et 
al. (2012) for perspective-taking in great apes, De Waal (2013) for a broader view on this skill in 
mammals, and Clayton et al. (2007) for perspective-taking in crows. See also Heyes (2012) for a 
critical review of some of the evidence. 
Chapter 3
 101 
measure such complexity in terms of the number of “layers” or “orders of 
intentionality” involved. Reasoning about what someone else is thinking 
comprises two orders, reasoning about, for example, what someone else wants 
you to understand involves three, reasoning about what someone else wants 
you to think about another’s thoughts involves four, and so on (for a discussion 
see Chapter 1, Section 1.2; Dennett, 1987: chapter 7). It has been argued that all 
forms of mindreading observed in non-human animals can be characterised in 
terms of two such orders at the maximum—their limit is situated at or below 
“second-order intentionality”. In contrast, humans are capable of handling 
tasks involving three or more orders, at least from a certain age onwards (see 
Henzi et al., 2007). Yet human mindreading sophistication is also not unlimited: 
experiments suggest that the majority of normally developed adults lose track 
after around five orders of intentionality (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2; Kinderman, 
Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007; Launay et al., 2015). 
Dunbar (2005; 2008) has suggested that this limit on the number of orders 
of intentionality we can typically deal with, in turn constrains the cultural 
practice of producing narratives: stories are likely to involve up to around fifth 
order, but not more, due to the cognitive limits on readers’ and writers’ abilities 
to understand and write such stories. Dunbar also argues that people take a 
certain delight in being pushed to the boundaries of their cognitive limits, and 
that it may be a hallmark of literature to do so. Literary scholars, as well as 
philosophers, psychologists and other cognitive scientists, have indeed used 
excerpts from literary texts to demonstrate how complex and multi-layered 
mindreading can get. Arguably the most famous example is Zunshine’s analysis 
of the passage from Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway in which Hugh Whitbread, with the 
aid of Richard Dalloway, writes a letter to the Times on behalf of Lady Bruton. 
According to Zunshine’s analysis, readers of the novel at this point have to 
understand that “Woolf intends us to recognize [...] that Richard is aware that 
Hugh wants Lady Bruton and Richard to think that because the makers of the 
pen believe that it will never wear out the editors of the Times will respect and 
publish the ideas recorded by this pen” (2012: 207, italics in original). Zunshine 
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labels this task as “sixth-level” intentionality (see also Section 3.3 below).49 On 
this basis she suggests that “certain aspects of Woolf’s prose do place 
extraordinarily high demands on our mind-reading ability” (203-204), which, on 
the one hand, could explain why some of us are “afraid of Mrs. Dalloway” (202), 
while, on the other hand, she suggests that it may explain why we read such 
demanding fiction at all: we take a certain delight in pushing our mindreading 
abilities to their limits and putting them to the test. 
In this chapter I suggest to turn the issue around: instead of asking how 
many orders humans can maximally handle and how this may affect or 
constrain the stories that can be produced and understood, I ask what readers 
minimally need in order to deal with a passage such as the one from Woolf’s 
novel that has been claimed to require such a high degree of mindreading 
sophistication. The focus is thus not on the presumed limits of readers’ 
capability to cognitively process mindreading, but rather on the economy and 
expediency of this capability. Using and extending concepts from cognitive 
linguistics/stylistics and narratology (building especially on Dancygier, 2012), I 
will argue that the structure and language of Woolf’s novel prompt a rich 
thoughtscape, a network of interlinked and/or embedded mindstates, and at the 
same time support the reader in processing this thoughtscape in a natural way. 
On the basis of this I will reconsider the way in which the relationship between 
discourse structure and cognitive processing should be conceptualised. 
 
 
3.2 Mindstates in literature 
 
3.2.1 An early cognitive literary scholar 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925) features a day in the life of Clarissa 
Dalloway, a woman from the London high society in the years after the First 
World War. The story begins with her walking through the city to buy flowers, 
                                                
49 Zunshine’s analysis was originally published in her 2006 book Why we read fiction and then 
reused in 2012. Other examples of such analyses can be found in Dunbar (2008), Corballis (2011), 
both citing Shakespeare (Othello and Twelfth Night, respectively), Palmer (2012), and Dennett 
(1987), all in similar ways. See Chapter 2 above for more examples and for a discussion. 
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in preparation of one of her regular, fashionable parties taking place that 
evening. Much of the day is spent thinking about choices she has made in her 
life and people she has met. She encounters some of these people while 
wandering around or preparing the house and eventually sees most of them at 
the party. For an important part, thoughts of the past are triggered by a 
remarkable encounter between Clarissa Dalloway and Peter Walsh, a lover 
from her youth, who disappeared to India decades ago after she had declined 
his wedding proposal. From his letters she knew he was planning to come back 
to England one of these days, but his sudden visit greatly surprises her.  
As Peter Walsh leaves the house, point of view stays with him for a while, 
after which it shifts to various other settings and events somehow related to 
Clarissa and her party. Narration in the novel is thus also “wandering”, in the 
sense that the story is related by an omniscient narrator who constantly shifts 
from the perspective of one character to another, across different settings in 
time and place as well as within one setting. As a result, readers benefit from 
what could be called a “360-degree view” of the represented situations and 
events. In this way, we are enabled to build an increasingly profound 
understanding of all kinds of relationships between the characters, including 
shared knowledge of the past (and possibly different perspectives on things that 
happened), aspects of personalities (and different perspectives on these 
aspects), affections, intrigues, worries about what others may think of oneself, 
worries about what others may think that one thinks about them, and so on. 
All of this warrants that the novel is an excellent choice for an analysis of 
mindreading and mindstates in fiction. This has not gone unnoticed by scholars 
interested in cognitive literary analysis: Mrs Dalloway is a popular guest at their 
parties (see, for example, Dancygier, 2012; Oatley, 2011; Vermeule, 2010; 
Vandelanotte, 2009). However, these scholars are not the first to unveil the 
relation between Woolf’s work (or literature more widely) and the 
representation of the workings and states of the human mind. It is a 
characteristic of modernist fiction more generally to be fascinated by people’s 
inner lives (Korsten, 2005: 227-249) and when reading what Virginia Woolf had 
to say about this herself one is easily tempted to call her an early cognitive 
literary scholar. Consider the following passage from an essay, which she 
originally read as a lecture in Cambridge in 1924: 
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My first assertion is one that I think you will grant—that every one in 
this room is a judge of character. Indeed it would be impossible to live 
for a year without disaster unless one practised character-reading and 
had some skill in the art. Our marriages, our friendships depend on it; 
our business largely depends on it; every day questions arise which can 
only be solved by its help. 
[…] But it is the art of the young. In middle age and in old age the 
art is practised mostly for its uses, and friendships and other 
adventures and experiments in the art of reading character are seldom 
made. But novelists differ from the rest of the world because they do 
not cease to be interested in character when they have learnt enough 
about it for practical purposes. They go a step further; they feel that 
there is something permanently interesting in character in itself. When 
all the practical business of life has been discharged, there is something 
about people which continues to seem to them of overwhelming 
importance […] And this I find is very difficult to explain: […] what the 
impulse is that urges them so powerfully every now and then to 
embody their view in writing. 
[…] I believe that all novels, that is to say, deal with character, 
and that it is to express character—not to preach doctrines, sing songs, 
or celebrate the glories of the British Empire, that the form of the novel, 
so clumsy, verbose, and undramatic, so rich, elastic, and alive, has been 
evolved. (Woolf, 1924: 2-11) 
 
By just replacing a few instances of the term “character” by the terms “mind” or 
“mindreading”, one can read a doctrine fitting seamlessly in the theories of 
various present-day cognitive scientists and scholars. Woolf would be taking a 
position close to Hutto’s “narrative practice hypothesis”, stating that every 
human being is in fact a teller of folk-psychological tales in the practice of daily 
social interaction, whereas some individuals take this skill beyond routine and 
make a living out of it (Hutto, 2008; see also Chapter 1, Section 1.1.4). She would 
line up with cognitive literary scholars such as Palmer (2004) and Herman 
(2009), whose work gives expression to the idea that the construction of human 
“minds” is the central feature of fiction. Virginia Woolf would probably agree 
that literature can be seen as an environment for experimenting, or even as a 
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training ground for practicing how to assess other’s inner lives, as argued by 
Zunshine (2006), Boyd (2009); Vermeule (2010), and Oatley (2011, who also cites 
parts of Woolf’s 1924 lecture). And she would be fascinated, but not in the least 
part surprised, by the results from controlled experiments showing that reading 
fiction can enhance performance on various sorts of mindreading tests (e.g. 
Kidd and Castano, 2014; Djikic et al., 2013). 
 
3.2.2 Zunshine’s “sociocognitive complexity” 
Considering all this, I argue with Zunshine that the passage from Mrs Dalloway 
about the writing of a letter to the Times suits an analysis in terms of 
mindreading well. However, in what follows I will question three assumptions 
Zunshine makes in her approach: (i) that this passage (or the novel more 
generally) confronts readers with a form of complexity adequately 
conceptualised by counting layers of embedded mindstates; (ii) that these 
embedded layers pose a highly demanding cognitive processing task at the limit 
of these readers’ abilities; and (iii) that their appreciation of the literary work is 
somehow affected by this layered complexity.  With regard to the targeted 
passage (cited at the beginning of this chapter) she writes: 
 
To grasp the full meaning of this passage . . . we first have to process 
several sequences that embed at least five levels of intentionality. 
Moreover, we have to do it on the spot, unaided by pen and paper and 
not forewarned that the number of levels of intentionality that we are 
about to encounter is considered by cognitive scientists to create “a 
very significant load on most people’s cognitive abilities” (Zunshine, 
2012: 207) 
 
The analysis of Mrs Dalloway was first published in Zunshine’s 2006 
monograph Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel and repeated in 
the 2012 Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies of which she is the editor (2012: 
193-213). She builds on it in more recent work, in which she introduces the term 
“sociocognitive complexity” to refer to “patterns of embedment of mental states 
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within mental states in fiction” (2012a: 13).50 She suggests that different genres 
may implicitly expect different levels of “sociocognitive literacy” (i.e. aptitude to 
deal with embedded mental states) from their readers: for example, Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice may in its original form expect readers to deal with 
fourth- or fifth-order intentionality, whereas the same story in a comic-book 
adaptation or study-guide synopsis might be “downgraded” to second order, 
thus anticipating lower sociocognitive literacy as appropriate in these genres 
(2012a: 17). In addition, in several publications Zunshine links the levels of 
intentionality to perceived literary quality, arguing that there may be a “literary 
sweetspot” at which the number of embedded layers is optimal: given a 
particular reader’s sociocognitive literacy there can be too few embeddings, 
taking the challenge away, or too many, posing too high a cognitive load, both 
leading to lower appreciation of a text (for an experimental approach see 
Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, 2012; for more discussion see Zunshine 2012; 
2012a; 2011; see also Dunbar, 2005). 
Zunshine’s approach of analysing literary texts in terms of levels of 
embedded intentionality has found its way into the work of other scholars 
across both the humanities and sciences. To mention just a few examples: 
Vermeule integrates it in her argument on “why we care about literary 
characters” (2010: 62-71) and Palmer builds on it in his 2012 analysis of 
“storyworlds and groups” (181-186). Carney, Wlodarski, and Dunbar (2014) 
report experimental evidence partly supporting Zunshine’s claims, but add that 
according to their findings readers seem to value higher levels of embedded 
intentionality more in “familiar” contexts, such as love stories, compared to 
                                                
50 Zunshine emphasises that high sociocognitive complexity does not necessarily involve 
multiple characters, but can easily occur within the realm of just one character’s thoughts, for 
which she gives the example of Robinson Crusoe imagining what God would think of him 
thinking about…etcetera (2012: 13). She seems to leave aside that “God” could be seen as another 
character here. Of course, “God” in this passage only seems to “exist” within the realm of 
Crusoe’s mind, so on the level of the story’s here-and-now there might indeed be only one 
character. However, it should be noted that it is a crucial aspect of embedded mindstates in any 
context that they are projected within the scope of the first one (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2). So 
if we are told that A intends that B thinks C wants to get married, and nothing else, all we know 
is something about A’s mindstate, regardless of whether B and C are present in the here-and-
now of the story—after all, we are told neither what B thinks nor what C wants, we only know 
what A thinks that B thinks that C wants. This may seem a straightforward issue, but as I will 




contexts where they need to process lots of specific, “unfamiliar” information, 
as in for example espionage stories. 
In what follows I will offer an alternative analysis of the passage of Mrs 
Dalloway targeted by Zunshine. The concepts from narratological theory and 
cognitive linguistics on which I build will first be introduced briefly in the next 
section. 
 
3.2.3 The broader picture: coordination of embedded viewpoints 
Both linguists and literary scholars have taken an interest in the issue of how 
mindstates, which they often refer to as “viewpoints” or “perspectives”, can be 
represented in discourse. Literary scholars, mostly within the fields of 
narratology and (its more recently emerged branch) cognitive poetics, make use 
of typologies of several forms of “speech and thought representation” (STR), 
distinguishing for example between direct discourse, indirect discourse, and 
free indirect discourse (see e.g. Dancygier, 2012; Vandelanotte, 2009; Bal, 2009; 
Fludernik, 1993). Linguists have rather been concerned with studying the 
grammatical and semantic means used to realise such forms of STR (see e.g. 
Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012; Evans, 2010: ch. 4; Tomasello, 2008: ch. 6; 
Verhagen, 2005).  
In recent years, attention has been drawn to structurally different roles 
played by different linguistic instruments for coordinating viewpoints, across 
languages and modes of communication as well as within languages and 
modes. In English, as well as in most other Middle- and Western-European 
languages, sentence embedding is one of the common ways of attributing 
propositional content to a subject’s point of view.51 In prototypical cases, a verb 
of cognition or communication (boldface below) is specified by an embedded 
clause, for example: 
 
(1) Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself. 
(Mrs Dalloway, Woolf, 1925: 3) 
                                                
51 In Chapter 4 I distinguish complementation constructions from several other (though related) 
patterns that involve sentence embedding. Here, however, I will simply refer to the broad 
category as “embedded sentences”. 
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(2) She imagined the party would be crowded. 
(Mrs Dalloway, Woolf, 1925: 47) 
 
(3) I think I can imagine how stunned you must have been. 
(Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and his years of pilgrimage, Murakami,  
2014: 51) 
 
As can be observed in ((3), an important feature of the grammatical operation of 
sentence embedding is that it can be performed recursively. Using this form of 
viewpoint coordination one can thus stack up large numbers of viewpoints in a 
single sentence, as is done in Zunshine’s paraphrase cited in 3.1 above: “Woolf 
intends us to recognize [...] that Richard is aware that Hugh wants Lady Bruton and 
Richard to think […etc.]”. However, it is important to note that sentence 
embedding is only one of many ways of coordinating multiple viewpoints in 
language, and that it creates a very one-dimensional relationship between these 
mindstates that easily gets opaque. This relationship will be the topic of 
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.4 below. 
In the practice of representing multiple mindstates in discourse, sentence 
embedding is generally used in combination with an array of other linguistic 
elements capable of viewpoint coordination (see also Chapters 4 and 5 below). 
Sweetser (2012: 4-6) provides a classification that includes deictic expressions of 
place and time, usage of determiners, pronouns and address forms, connectives 
and evidential markers, presuppositions, and markers of emotion and affection. 
These elements all differ in how they prompt readers to construe the 
relationships between the represented mindstates. In the next sections and 
throughout Chapter 4, I will demonstrate how a polyphonic thoughtscape of 
interlinked (but not necessarily embedded) mindstates is in the actual text 
represented using a mix of different elements of viewpoint coordination—or 
reversely: how the text uses a clever mix of such elements to prompt readers to 
imagine a polyphonic thoughtscape, rather than a string of embedded layers. 
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3.2.4 A first example: embedding of perspectives in a novel  
Complex mindreading situations tend to emerge gradually in the course of a 
story rather than being packed into one sentence. Narrative discourse is 
characterised by, what I have in the previous chapter termed, “expository 
strategies” capable of conveying highly complicated “thoughtscapes” in a 
natural and manageable way. An example from Murakami’s recent novel 
Colorless Tsukuru Tazaki and his years of pilgrimage (2014) illustrates this nicely, 
and arguably even provides meta-fictional reflection on the paradoxical nature 
of the construction of viewpoints in novels: such viewpoints can in some sense 
be related in very complicated ways, whereas their construction proceeds 
almost unnoticed most of the time. In Murakami’s novel, the main character 
Tsukuru and his friend Haida regularly have long conversations in the 
evenings. One night, Haida starts telling a story that his father always used to 
tell. Throughout the novel, narrating is done in retrospect by a narrator who 
provides insight in Tsukuru’s inner life. The events of the novel are thus seen 
through Tsukuru’s eyes—or in other words: Tsukuru acts as the primary 
focaliser. Normally the narrator does not directly access mind-states of other 
characters, but lets the reader construe them where necessary through what 
Tsukuru thinks or what he hears that others say, which is indicated by 
quotation marks. However, the quite long story Haida tells about his father is 
first related through a few sentences between quotation marks, but then 
continues in unquoted form: 
 
(4) ‘When my father was young, he spent a year wandering around Japan,’ 
Haida began. ‘This was at the end of the 1960s […] I guess people need that 
sort of stage in their lives.’ 
 That winter Haida’s father worked as general handyman at a small hot 
springs resort in Southern Japan. He really liked the place and decided to 
stay for a while. 
(60-61; quotation marks and tab space in original) 
 
The structure of the story at this point can in some sense be analysed as follows: 
the narrator provides insight in what Tsukuru hears his friend Haida say. 
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Haida, in turn, tells what his father said in the past. Haida’s father, at that time, 
was telling what he experienced during an episode earlier in his life, which 
comprises dialogues occurring at that time and memories of yet earlier times. 
All in all, five to six layers are in some way active at the same time, while the 
text simply presents first- and second-order thoughts and feelings of the form 
“He really liked the place and decided to stay for a while”.  
 The embedding of all these viewpoint layers has gradually taken place in 
the course of the story’s unfolding. Even though it is possible to pinpoint the 
emerged scaffolding in an analysis, to the average reader only a few details 
about the entire configuration are relevant to make sense of the presented 
events. In principle, a cue prompting these details every now and then is 
enough to keep the configuration sufficiently active in the reader’s minds to let 
the story move on (e.g. “Another person with a color, Tsukuru thought, but said 
nothing and listened to the rest of the story”, 62). However, the layers can still 
get mixed up despite such cues, as Murakami lets his readers realise when he at 
some point no longer writes “Haida’s father”, but “Haida”, at places where he is 
clearly referring to the character of Haida’s father in the story Haida is telling to 
Tsukuru. Just when attentive readers start asking themselves whether this is an 
inelegant mistake or perhaps something they should try to interpret, the 
narratological bushfire is smothered: 
 
(5) Haida stopped and glanced at the clock on the wall. […] He was, of course, 
Haida the son, but Haida the father had been his same age in this story, and 
so the two of them began to overlap in Tsukuru’s mind. It was an odd 
sensation, as if the two distinct temporalities had blended into one. (65) 
 
Murakami clearly takes his place next to Woolf in the category of writers who 
are at the same time acute literary scholars: he first makes his readers go 
through the same “odd sensation” that Tsukuru undergoes, thereby blending 
all the different layers even further, and then he inserts a remark that prompts 
reflection on what has just happened on a narratological level, even using the 
technical term “blending” (see Section 3.3.3 below). 
The bottom-line of the brief analysis of this first narrative example is that 
layers of embedding can stack up easily and sometimes go almost unnoticed in 
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the course of the unfolding of a novel’s plot, and that they are usually cued by a 
mix of quite different linguistic and narrative elements in the text. In order to 
follow the story, readers have to keep some details in mind of the layered 
configuration that has emerged, but at least in this case they do not seem to be 
required to go to extreme lengths in terms of cognitive effort. All they need to 
know here comes down to questions of the type: “Are we speaking about Haida-
the-father or Haida-the-son here?”, and would be quite misrepresented by 
questions of the form: “Does Murakami intend that we think that Haida-the-son 
intends Tsukuru to understand that Haida-the-father thinks…(etc.)?” It seems to 
follow that embedding of viewpoints per se in this case is not the factor 
responsible for complexity or, for that matter, warranting literary quality: it 
would hardly be problematic, nor would it be a guaranteed literary master 
move, if the story about Haida-the-father would gradually develop into another 
story told by his father (who would be Haida-the-grandfather), even though the 
number of embedded layers at that point would theoretically reach seven or 
eight. 
In the next section I will analyse the passage from Mrs Dalloway, and 
propose a different conceptualisation of the complexity involved in 
representing multiple mindstates in the discourse of this novel. 
 
3.3 Viewpoint layers in Mrs Dalloway 
 
In this section I will contrast Zunshine’s paraphrase (as cited earlier in the 
Introduction) to the corresponding excerpt from Woolf’s novel itself:  
 
    (6)   
Hugh produced his fountain pen; his silver fountain pen, which had 
done twenty years’ service, he said, unscrewing the cap.  It was still in 
perfect order; he had shown it to the makers; there was no reason, they 
said, why it should ever wear out; which was somehow to Hugh’s 
credit, and to the credit of the sentiments which his pen expressed (so 
Richard Dalloway felt) as Hugh began carefully writing capital letters 
with rings round them in the margin, and thus marvellously reduced 
Not afraid of Virginia Woolf
 112 
Lady Bruton’s tangles to sense, to grammar such as the editor of the 
Times, Lady Bruton felt, watching the marvellous transformation, 
must respect.  
(Woolf, 1925; boldface added) 
 
    (7)  
(i) Woolf intends 
   (ii) us to recognize […] 
      (iii) that Richard is aware  
         (iv) that Hugh wants  
 (v) Lady Bruton and Richard to think  
    (vi) that because the makers of the pen believe  
  that it will never wear out  
       (vii) the editors of the Times will respect and   
      publish the ideas recorded by this pen.  
(Zunshine, 2012: 206-207; italics in original, numbering and indents 
added) 
 
Whereas the narrative in ((6) is perfectly readable, also when seeing it for the 
first time, the paraphrase in ((7) is highly opaque. As argued in Chapter 2, 
sentence grammar is well capable of handling up to two or three orders of 
intentionality, but if more orders are involved, “narrative takes over”. Here, 
however, I am interested in the lower-level linguistic and narratological 
phenomena that realise viewpoint construction and management, rather than 
in these broader expository strategies. To that effect, I will compare the 
narrative passage cited in ((6) and the paraphrase cited in ((7), looking at 
differences in their construction of (what is supposed to be, in some respect) the 
same situation by applying Dancygier’s (2012) framework of “narrative spaces”. 
Choices made on the level of these linguistic and narratological phenomena 
influence the way in which several viewpoint layers become mutually 
embedded and interlinked. As will turn out, this affects not only meaning, but 
also the ease (or difficulty) with which the emerging network of perspectives 




3.3.1 The first three layers 
The paraphrase, which Zunshine forms to analyse the passage from the novel 
in terms of orders of intentionality, comprises seven viewpoint layers.52 The first 
two concern the relationship between the author and the reader: they refer to 
the basic communicative situation of reading a novel. However, rather than 
being coordinated by linguistic cues in the text, these viewpoint layers come 
implicitly with the genre. Although readers who open a novel may in a very 
abstract sense be “aware” that the text written on the pages contains a story that 
the author intends them to believe, in the actual practice of reading these layers 
are not as much activated as is suggested by Zunshine’s paraphrase. For a 
reader (or a literary critic setting aside for a moment all axioms that come with 
the “death of the author”; Barthes, 1967), it is at any point in the text possible to 
stop reading and consider explicitly what the author may have intended one to 
believe by writing, for example, that someone carries a bunch of flowers “like a 
weapon” (Mrs Dalloway: 102). But this does not mean that the minds of readers 
are burdened with the cognitive load of this task during the average reading 
process. Thanks to their experience with the basic communicative situation of 
the novel, they can, as it were, start processing from beyond the levels (i) and (ii) 
in ((7) (see also Dancygier, 2012a, for the idea of the basic communicative 
situation as a frame). 
Layer three of ((7) brings one of the novel’s characters into play: Richard 
Dalloway. Abstracting from the positions of the author and reader, Zunshine 
thus reconstructs the scene from his point of view: after all, the nature of 
embedding clauses as is done in (7) is such that every next clause falls under the 
scope of the former. To some extent, the text does indeed give rise to this 
choice: the remark between parentheses “so Richard Dalloway felt” (boldface in 
(6)) invites readers to see Hugh writing the letter from Richard’s perspective. 
Or, in narratological terms: it is true that Richard acts as the focaliser of a part 
of the scene. However, note that in the original passage, this is only the case for 
a short moment. Focalisation was with Lady Bruton before, and is passed back 
                                                
52 Zunshine herself suggests that this paraphrase is sixth-level intentionality; her italics suggest 
that she takes (i) and (ii) as one level. However, this is not consistent with counting in other 
paraphrases she provides (2012: 207-207). Since “intends us to recognize” contains an extra 
embedding, I decided to count this as two orders, which brings us at a total of seven. 
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to her immediately after Richard has briefly taken the floor, witness the clause 
“Lady Bruton felt, watching the marvellous transformation” in (6).  
This is an important observation: whereas the nature of sentence 
embedding makes all subsequent layers dependent on Richard’s perspective, in 
the original novel’s text, as perspectives shift, these layers become interlinked 
in various ways without necessarily being embedded into one another. 
 
3.3.2 Shifting perspectives 
In Mrs Dalloway an omniscient narrator thus provides a wealth of insight into 
the inner lives of various characters, resulting in a “360-degree view” of the 
novel’s thoughtscape. In order to fully understand and, for that matter, enjoy 
the passage cited in ((6), in the novel on page 96, some knowledge of the 
previous 95 pages is needed. After all, lots of details about the characters, 
including their sympathies and antipathies towards one another, will by this 
time have been established. For example, if we limit ourselves to the excerpt as 
cited in (6) only, it appears that narration starts from a “neutral” position, as if 
there were a camera recording from above: 
 
(8) Hugh produced his fountain pen 
 
Indeed, in narratological terms one would say that it is the omniscient narrator 
“witnessing” Hugh’s action and reporting it to the reader. However, for readers 
who have just read what happened before this point, everything Hugh does and 
says here is already viewed in a specific way by Lady Bruton and Richard 
Dalloway. Earlier that afternoon, Richard and Hugh had arrived for lunch at 
Lady Bruton’s house, where they were in some sense invited on false pretences: 
in fact Lady Bruton wanted their help with the writing of a letter to the Times to 
publicly express her thoughts on a political matter. Before lunch is eventually 
served, readers already share in Lady Bruton’s thoughts about Hugh and 
Richard, including her opinion that Hugh “had been remarkably kind” (yet she 
forgot on which occasion) but that she preferred Richard, who was “made of 
much finer material” (91). This information, combined with knowledge that the 
readers have acquired before of who these characters are and how they think 
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about each other, clearly invites the attribution of more sophisticated thoughts 
than can be explained from analysing only the textual cues within the 
boundaries of (7). In the current and following sections I will nevertheless look 
at the cited passage in relative isolation, concentrating on the linguistic 
phenomena coordinating the different viewpoints involved in the depicted 
scene. Eventually, in Section 3.4, a wider view on the text will be taken into 
account. 
After the narrator has told us how Hugh produced his pen, a form of 
indirect discourse is used to relate a comment on this pen made by Hugh.53 
Linguistic cues signalling viewpoint management (in narrative space theory 
referred to as space builders, see below) are printed in boldface: 
 
(9) his silver fountain pen, which had done twenty years’ service, he said, 
unscrewing the cap 
(boldface added here and in 10-12 below) 
 
It should be noted how the transition from the narrator’s voice to Hugh’s voice 
and back is ingeniously cued here. First it is clear that the narrator is speaking, 
describing Hugh’s action from a third-person perspective: “Hugh produced his 
fountain pen”. The sentence then continues with a further specification of this 
pen, “his silver fountain pen, which had done twenty years’ service”, which 
could in principle still be a comment added by the narrator. However, when the 
inquit-formula “he said” follows next, it becomes clear that the narrator only 
now takes over again. As a consequence, readers have to do a “double take” on 
what they have just read, realising that it must have been Hugh saying that his 
silver fountain pen had done twenty years’ service while unscrewing the cap (in 
fact, the reader may well realise by the end of the sentence that the addition of 
“silver” should already have been a cue of the perspective of the slightly 
pompous Hugh). In a way, this is a “special effect” highlighting the wandering 
                                                
53 More precisely, (9) is an example of what I will term an “inquit-construction” in Chapter 4, 
named after the inquit-formula (in this case “he said”) that attributes the propositional content 
(in this case “twenty years’ service” or “silver fountain pen, which had done twenty years’ 
service”, depending on interpretation) to the perspective of a particular discourse participant (in 
this case Hugh). 
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nature of narration here: the need of doing a double take may remind readers 
that perspectives are constantly shifting.54 
Next, the text continues as free indirect discourse, within which Hugh 
reports, in turn using indirect discourse, what the makers of the pen have said: 
   
(10)  It was still in perfect order; he had shown it to the makers; there was no    
 reason, they said, why it should ever wear out; 
 
From here perspective seems to shift back to the narrator, but in the same way 
as with Hugh’s voice in (9), readers have to do a double take as soon as they 
reach the comment between parentheses, which makes it clear that they had 
been reading about Richard’s thoughts: 
 
(11) which was somehow to Hugh’s credit, and to the credit of the sentiments 
which his pen expressed (so Richard Dalloway felt) as Hugh began 
carefully writing capital letters with rings round them in the margin, and 
thus marvellously reduced Lady Bruton’s tangles to sense, 
 
Finally, this is seamlessly followed by the shift towards Lady Bruton’s 
viewpoint: 
 
(12) to grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady Bruton felt, watching the 
marvellous transformation, must respect. 
 
To summarise, the excerpt from the text in (6) in fact describes three “scenes”: 
(a) the present in Lady Bruton’s house: Hugh composing a letter to the 
New York Times, based on a series of opinions (the “tangles”) produced by 
Lady Bruton;  
                                                
54 See in this context also Coulson’s discussion of “frame shifting” (2001). Moreover, note that in 
narratology the phenomenon of blending different levels of narration is known as metalepsis 
(De Jong, 2009; Genette 1972). In its classic form, it involves a narrator becoming a participant in 
the world of the characters, or one of the characters interfering with the narrator’s business of 
telling the story. The “double take” that readers are cued to do in (9) is arguably a clever 
variation on this form. 
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(b) the past of the fountain pen: it having been in service for twenty years 
and Hugh showing it to the makers; and  
(c) the imagined future: the editors of the Times receiving and reading the 
letter. 
Various means of viewpoint coordination are used to let the readers 
“experience” aspects of these scenes from different perspectives: indirect 
discourse and free indirect discourse serve to represent speech by Hugh and by 
the makers of the pen; indirect thought, supported by inquit-formulas using the 
verb “to feel”, attribute observations to the viewpoints of Richard Dalloway and 
Lady Bruton; and indirect thought is used to include the presumed opinion of 
the Times editors. As will be detailed in the next section: rather than evoking a 
series of embedded perspectives viewed from one single vantage point, the text 
prompts readers to imagine what I have termed a thoughtscape, a network of 
different perspectives that are interlinked and partly embedded in a variety of 
ways. 
 
3.3.3 Narrative spaces and blending 
The three scenes distinguished at the end of the previous section differ in their 
setting in space and time, participants, and the viewpoints from which they are 
perceived and narrated. The writing of the letter (a) is the “actual” setting at that 
point in the novel’s plot, within which the other two scenes are evoked by 
character’s words and thoughts. The twenty years’ service of the pen and the 
event of showing it to its makers (b) are referred to by Hugh. The editors 
receiving and reading the letter (c) can be seen as a hypothesised future event 
within Lady Bruton’s thoughts.  
The configuration of these scenes as prompted by the text must somehow 
imply the embedding of mental states: after all, there are characters (Hugh; 
Richard; Lady Bruton) thinking of persons (the makers of the pen; the editors of 
the Times) having a particular thought or opinion (that the pen will not wear 
out; that the letter is respectable). However, focussing on embedding per se does 
not provide an adequate picture of how all the mindstates involved in the 
passage cited in (6) are mutually related and interlinked. For a detailed analysis 
supporting this claim I will rely on Dancygier’s narrative-spaces framework (2012; 
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2008). This framework offers a version of mental space theory (Fauconnier, 
1997; 1985) tailored for narrative texts. Like a mental space, a narrative space is a 
hypothetical subdivision in a language user’s mental activities, prompted by 
linguistic expressions, and used in the process of meaning construction. 
However, whereas mental spaces typically form “ad hoc”-structures that are 
constantly modified or replaced in the course of interaction, configurations of 
narrative spaces can persist throughout an entire story once they have been 
prompted. Each narrative space is characterised by a particular set of features 
such as time, space, cultural norms, language spoken, or participants involved 
in either narration (narrators/focalisers), action (characters), or both 
(Dancygier, 2012: 35-37). These features are open to further elaboration by all 
kinds of local linguistic choices, such as use of sentence embedding, 
grammatical features such as tense or modality, use of pronouns, typographical 
cues (e.g. quotation marks), etcetera.   
For an important part, construction and elaboration of narrative spaces 
has been argued to take place through blending (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995; 
Coulson, 2001). The general idea of blending is that two inputs with an 
established conceptual structure and content are integrated into an emergent 
blended space or blend. The blend has properties inherited from the inputs, as 
well as new structure and content of its own. Once a narrative space has been 
prompted and possibly further structured and enriched, it can as a whole be 
blended with another narrative space. The result of all the construction and 
blending processes is what Dancygier refers to as the emerging story: this is what 
the reader understands after having read and processed the text up until a 
particular point. The emerging story is thus a “moving end result”.  
As an example, consider this excerpt from the very beginning of 
Murakami’s novel Norwegian Wood: 
 
    (13)  
I was 37 then, strapped in my seat as the huge 747 plunged through 
dense cloud cover on approach to Hamburg airport. 
[…] Once the plane was on the ground, soft music began to flow 
from the ceiling speakers: a sweet orchestral cover version of the 
Beatles’ “Norwegian Wood”. The melody […] hit me harder than ever. 
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I bent forward, my face in my hands to keep my skull from 
splitting open. Before long one of the German stewardesses 
approached and asked in English whether I were sick. 
“No,” I said, “just dizzy.” 
[…] She smiled and left. 
[…] The plane reached the gate. People began unfastening their 
seatbelts and pulling luggage from the overhead lockers, and all the 
while I was in the meadow. I could smell the grass, feel the wind on my 
face, hear the cries of the birds. Autumn 1969, and soon I would be 20. 
 (Murakami, Norwegian Wood, 2000) 
  
This story excerpt stages an “I”-narrator describing a past event: landing at 
Hamburg airport when he was 37 years old, and within that event being 
reminded of a moment even further back, from when he was almost 20. In 
Dancygier’s terms this can be described as a structure with three narrative 
spaces, where the first space includes the second and the second includes the 
third. Through the first words (“I was 37 then”) a narrative space is prompted 
comprising the “I” at the moment of telling the story. No other details about this 
first space are mentioned. Subsequently, a second narrative space is prompted 
within the first one, comprising two participants (the “I” and the stewardess), a 
particular spatio-temporal setting (some day 18 years after 1969 in a plane 
landing at Hamburg airport), first-person narration, and past tense. A few 
sentences later, the episode from further back (a day in a meadow in 1969) is 
inserted in the form of a memory (in conventional narratological terms this 
would be referred to as a flashback or analepsis). This means that another space 
is prompted within the two existing ones. The result on the level of the 
emerging story is a blend of the three narrative spaces: while the remembered 
episode from 1969 comes into focus, the setting of being in the plane at 
Hamburg airport also persists in some form, as does the here-and-now of the “I” 
telling the story of when he was 37. The reader understands the text as having a 
layered structure, where each part is set against the background of the other. 
Schematically: 
 




Figure 1 – Schematic depiction of the narrative-spaces configuration prompted by excerpt (13). 
Following Dancygier, I assume a separate space for the narrator, called the story-viewpoint 
space (SV-space; 2012: 64-75). It can be seen as an “overarching” narrative space, housing the 
vantage point that has all the other spaces in its scope. The solid line indicates identity: the 
narrator in the SV-space is identical to the primary focaliser (“I”) in the MN-space. The dashed 
lines between the narrator in the SV-space and “I-37-years-old” and “I-19-years-old” indicate 
that focalisation at some point shifts to these perspectives. 
 
Note that usage of the blending framework is especially adequate here, because 
the story at the end of the excerpt in ((13) has neither just the content and 
structure of the initial “now” of telling the story, nor just that of the situation in 
the plane or that of the day in the meadow, nor is it simply the sum of the 
three—it has elements of all three spaces, as well as newly emerged properties 
of its own: “Norwegian Wood” is now no longer just a Beatles song, but it is 
charged with aspects from the main character’s personal history.  
This example captures an important feature of stories in general: at any 
point between their beginning and ending they exhibit a unique emerging 
story, a particular structure and content unique to this point in the narrative. At 
the same time, this emerging story results from all the elements that 
contributed to its construction and development so far. In other words: any 
point in a story is somehow dependent on the set of preceding points in it. Still, 
it is clear that the complexity at any particular point does not equal the sum of 
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all the complexities of the earlier points. Some aspects are introduced and 
remain a clearly visible part of the emerging story until the ending, others 
modify the emerging story in some persisting way without remaining visible in 
their initial form, and yet others affect the emerging story only temporarily or 
fade away as the story progresses (in blending theory, the process in which 
some aspects of the input spaces are transferred to the blended space while 
others are, sometimes temporarily, dropped, is referred to as compression—see 
Dancygier, 2012; this concept will be used more extensively in Chapter 4). 
  
 
3.3.4 Back to Mrs Dalloway 
With this introduction to the narrative-spaces framework in mind it is time to 
return to Mrs Dalloway. Following the logic explained above, the following 
schema can be drawn: 
 
 




Figure 2 - Schematic depiction of the narrative-spaces configuration prompted by excerpt (6). 
 
As in Figure 1, the solid line indicates identity: the omniscient narrator in the 
SV-space is identical to the primary focaliser in the MN-space. The dashed lines 
between the narrator in the SV-space and the characters participating in the 
MNS indicate that focalisation sometimes shifts to their perspective, with their 
thoughts and inner lives being accessed by the narrator and presented to the 
reader. This is what distinguishes them from the makers of the pen and the 
editors of the Times, who are also characters, but hold only thoughts and 
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opinions that are attributed to them; that is: their inner lives are presented 
under the scope of the viewpoints of Hugh and Lady Bruton instead of being 
directly accessed by the narrator.  
 From this schematic analysis of the Woolf-passage, four conclusions can 
be drawn. First, it can be seen that linguistic choices made on the micro-level 
either structure an existing narrative space or prompt a new one. For example, 
NS1 is prompted by the inquit-formula “he said” (boldface in (9)) and NS4 is 
prompted by the comment between parenthesis “(so Richard Dallow felt)” 
(boldface in (10)). Secondly, it can be noticed that the narrative spaces have 
features (spatio-temporal setting, participating characters, point of view) that 
are partly different and partly overlapping or identical. Thirdly, they can 
naturally be grouped in what could be called “intermediate-level blends” or 
“scenes”, which in turn combine into the “highest-level blend” of the emerging 
story. For example: NS1, NS2, and NS3 together form the scene of Hugh telling 
about his pen, whereas NS5 and NS6 combine naturally into the scene of Lady 
Bruton watching Hugh write and consequently imaging what the editors of the 
Times may think. Fourthly, and related to this third point, Figure 2 depicts how 
some of the spaces are embedded into one another, while others are linked in 
different ways, and others again are independent of one another. NS1 and NS2 
are embedded in the MNS; NS4 is triggered by and provides a perspective on 
NS1, NS2, and NS3; and NS6 is embedded in NS5, which is embedded in the 
MNS. Richard’s thoughts in NS4 might be triggered by Hugh’s words in NS2 
and NS3, but they are not part of Hugh’s perspective. Also, Lady Bruton’s 
thoughts and expectations in NS5 and NS6 are particular to her and not shared 
by anyone of the other characters.  
The result on the highest level of the emerging story is indeed an 
increasingly rich “360-degree view” of the situation in Lady Bruton’s house, 
with a “camera” that seems to turn smoothly from one position to another. The 
readers first find Hugh in a focalising and speaking role, and the other two 
participants in the background. Next, or perhaps rather simultaneously, they 
see Richard in a more active role, being the focaliser, watching and evaluating 
Hugh while writing. Finally they see Lady Bruton take the floor, having 
thoughts about the Times editors’ opinion, while the setting of Hugh writing the 
letter also remains in focus, but Richard’s thoughts are dropped. Once again: all 
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these viewpoints are interlinked in several ways, but this does not mean that they 
are embedded into one another.  
Whereas Figure 2 depicts the narrative space configuration as prompted 
by the original passage, Figure 3 below depicts the paraphrase as formed by 
Zunshine in her analysis of this passage: 
 
Figure 3 - Schematic depiction of the narrative-spaces configuration prompted by excerpt (7). 
 
Since the narrator nowhere narrates or focalises independently, and is thus 
completely off-stage, a “0”-label is given in the SV- and MN-spaces (cf. 
Dancygier, 2012: 66-68). Furthermore, each of the embedded clauses 
(abstracting from the author and reader) prompt a new space: “…that Richard is 
aware that Hugh wants Lady Bruton and Richard to think that because the 
makers of the pen believe that it will never wear out the editors of the Times 
will respect and publish the ideas recorded by this pen”. The causal link 
construed through the connective “because” in the paraphrase is indicated in 
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the figure by an arrow between NS4/NS5 and NS6/NS7. Except for these 
causally linked spaces, all others are set up within the previous space, as a 
consequence of which all spaces fall under the scope of Richard’s viewpoint. 
This is indicated by the dashed line between him and the SV-space, showing 
that he is the only agent to which focalisation is “passed” from the narrator. The 
resulting narrative-spaces configuration in Figure 3 reflects the one-
dimensional, opaque “stack” of perspectives as construed by the recursively 
applied sentence embedding in Zunshine’s paraphrase. 
 
 
 3.4 Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, Zunshine suggests that Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
exhibits a high degree of, what she refers to as, sociocognitive complexity. She 
starts from what I have labelled as assumption (i) in Section 3.2.2: that this 
complexity must be conceptualised as a series of embedded layers. Next, she 
selects a passage in order to “map [it] out in terms of the nested levels of 
intentionality” (2012: 206). After having discussed a few smaller “irreducible 
units” of embedded intentionality (such as “Hugh says that the makers of the 
pen think it will never wear out”) she sets out to “move up to those that capture 
as much of the whole narrative gestalt [of the cited passage] as possible” (2012: 
206). This is the context in which she forms the paraphrase cited in (7) above. 
Clearly, this paraphrase was not intended to replace the original text: she 
acknowledges that it is only one way of mapping out the targeted passage. 
However, and that leads to her assumption (ii), she argues that in order to grasp 
the full meaning of the passage, readers first have to accomplish the highly 
cognitively demanding task of processing “several sequences that embed at 
least five levels of intentionality” (2012: 207). 
In fact, the paraphrase does cover a quite subtle aspect of what happens in 
the cited passage of the novel. By mentioning the age and expensive material of 
his pen and the opinion of its manufacturers when they saw it, Hugh does more 
than only sharing information with Richard and Lady Bruton. We can safely 
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ascribe to him the intention of persuading his interlocutors that he is a pro at 
writing, satisfied only with the best tools to support this profession (or 
something to that effect). If we do so, we add extra complexity to our 
understanding of the text while reading: instead of only seeing that Hugh 
possesses a great pen, we also attribute (what we presume to be) his implied 
motives for drawing attention to this fact. The text hints that Richard in any 
case is sensitive to this implication, since his feeling that the quality of the pen 
somehow adds to Hugh’s and the letter’s credit is put on stage by the lines 
“which was somehow to Hugh’s credit, and to the credit of the sentiments 
which his pen expressed (so Richard Dalloway felt)”. This observation seems to 
be what Zunshine has woven into the paraphrase: it covers Richard’s sensitivity 
to Hugh’s presumed intention to imply his expertise (layer iii-vi in (7)).55 
However, if we stay close to the text, we cannot say whether Lady Bruton has 
this sensitivity too; we are only informed about her positive feelings concerning 
Hugh’s mastery of grammar and her expectation that it will gladden the editors 
of the Times too. Also, the text does not mention (or strongly imply) any of 
Richard’s expectations of what the editors will think. This is where my 
conceptualisation of the text providing a “360-degree view of the thoughtscape” 
works better than that of the layered structure as suggested by the paraphrase: 
the latter misrepresents Lady Bruton’s idea of the editors’ opinion (layer vii in 
(7)) as following directly from her (and Richard’s) understanding of Hugh’s 
presumed intentions behind his remarks about the pen. In the same vein, the 
text does not mention (or strongly imply) Richard’s expectations of what the 
editors will think, which is thus also misrepresented by the paraphrase. This 
leads to similar conclusions as drawn earlier: by embedding into one another 
all the viewpoints held by or ascribed to the characters, the paraphrase does not 
seem to connect the scenes presented by the text in the right way: it distorts the 
interlinked though mostly independent nature of the viewpoints. 
A perspective on the analysis offered in this chapter that is worth working 
out in more detail in the future, follows from the work of Bakhtin. One of his 
                                                
55 Incidentally, there is still a difference between Richard seeing through Hugh’s intention to 
brag and Richard being affected and truly impressed by Hugh’s bragging—deciding between 
these two nuances is not possible on the basis of the fragment or the paraphrase. This is 
different, though, for readers of the entire novel, who will know enough about the two 
characters to see that the first of the two options is the more likely… 
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central points is that characters and their perspectives in a novel should be seen 
as “dialogising voices”, interacting also beyond what is literally written down in 
the text (see e.g. Mey, 1999: 153-154 and his references to Bakhtin, 1992). They 
“populate” a text, and even though an author or narrator can give her best 
attempt to “orchestrate” their voices, she will never be able to fully control them 
(cf. the concept of “heteroglossia”; Bakhtin, 1992). One important reason for this, 
according to Bakhtin and his adherents, is that readers will always, consciously 
or unconsciously, attribute all kinds of thoughts and intentions to characters. It 
is for sure thinkable that a text can bring a reader in a position where it is both 
hard to access a particular character’s thoughts and necessary to do so in order 
to be able to understand the story—in that case, it is also thinkable that reading 
would be cognitively demanding. However, as far as the literary excerpts 
analysed in this chapter are concerned, quite the opposite situation seems to 
obtain: texts are full of elements that make the contents of different mindstates 
and their mutual relations accessible instead of opaque, and, thinking in the way 
proposed by Bakhtin, readers seem prone to (over)attributing intentional 
relationships when interacting with the text easily rather than by virtue of hard 
cognitive effort. 
This finally takes us back to assumption (iii) defined in Section 3.2.2 
above: that readers’ appreciation of a literary work is affected by the amount of 
mindreading complexity it contains. Rather than being drawn to fictional texts 
because it is so hard to figure out what all the characters are thinking that this 
pushes us to the limits of our abilities, we might just as well conclude that 
fiction attract us because it takes us relatively little effort to get access to rich 
representation of others’ inner lives, compared to real-life settings where we 
usually do not get such “360-degree spectator sight”. Like in our daily social 
environments, in a novel such as Mrs Dalloway we are confronted with a rich 
thoughtscape, constituted by a polyphony of different voices, that underlies all 
events and interactions. However, unlike in our daily lives, in Mrs Dalloway the 
text provides us with a full panoramic tour of all the mental space we normally 
don’t get to access so easily. Put differently: as readers of fiction such as Woolf’s, 
we can sit back in our chairs lazily and enjoy the thoughtscape, while the 
narrator does most of the mindreading for us. 





Viewpoint Packages: linguistic tools for communicating and 
processing complex “thoughtscapes” 
 
 
A famous athlete shoots dead his girlfriend at night in his house. The next 
morning, readers of newspapers all over the world find out that a spokesperson 
states that police officials declare that the athlete claims that he thought that he 
was shooting at a burglar, while the responsible police detective claims that he 
knew it was his girlfriend. Clearly, this complex “thoughtscape” is not 
represented in the news media in this way, using multiply-embedded 
sentences. I demonstrate that the representation of the involved mindstates 
relies substantially on lexical units implying viewpoint layers, such as allegedly, 
accidentally, mistake, and to confirm. I introduce and discuss the concept 
“viewpoint package”, building on an existing framework that deals with 
meaning construction more generally (Dancygier’s narrative spaces) and on 
one relevant account focussing on a particular part of speech (Vandelanotte’s 
framing adjectives). Viewpoint packages allow for efficient coordination of 
multiple interrelated viewpoints in discourse, while regulating (audience’s 
perception of) the commitment various discourse participants make to parts of 
the presented contents. I end by tentatively suggesting that viewpoint packages 
qualify as “tools for thinking”: knowing their use in language may serve not 








On Valentine’s Day 2013 a dramatic event made headlines all over the world: 
early that morning, a famous Olympic athlete shot dead his girlfriend through 
the bathroom door. The question that immediately perturbed everyone was 
whether it was murder, or a fatal accident: the athlete claimed that he had 
mistaken her for a burglar, while the police arrested him on the charge of 
having killed her wittingly and on purpose.56 The crucial point of debate in this 
case was thus not whether he shot her or not, but whether he knew he would be 
doing so when he pulled the trigger. 
This means that the choice between accident or murder coincides 
completely with the construal of the athlete’s mindstate at a particular moment 
during the night of the shooting. Ultimately, this construal was made by a judge 
in court, based on information from forensic research, interrogations, witness 
reports, and so on. But besides that, and from the very first day after the 
incident, thousands of people have made such construals for themselves, 
mostly relying on cues presented by the news media. Although the main focus 
is clearly on what Pistorius thought, knew, and intended during the night of the 
shooting, most of these cues do not directly concern the athlete’s mindstates. 
Rather, they add up to a complex “thoughtscape”, a network of mutually 
embedded and interlinked viewpoints that are in some way relevant to the case: 
news media suggest that various sources report that the athlete claimed that he 
thought that his girlfriend was still in bed and not behind the bathroom door 
when he fired his gun. At the same time they report that a spokesperson declared 
that police officials considered it to be likely (or at least to a high degree possible) 
that the athlete did know that his girlfriend was behind the bathroom door, and 
that he thus intended to kill her. The news media also report what witnesses claim 
to have heard or seen, or what various sources report that family members have 
declared. 
                                                
56 Background to the case: South-African athlete Oscar Pistorius shot and killed his girlfriend 
Reeva Steenkamp on February 14th, 2013. Pistorius is a sports icon also known as “the Blade 
Runner”; his legs were amputated and yet he became a sprinter using carbon-blade prosthetic 
legs. In the aftermath of the killing, news media have frequently reported details of the court 
case, police investigations, personal life of Pistorius and Steenkamp, etcetera. 
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This entire thoughtscape is somehow represented in the headlines and 
articles about the case. Partly this is done using means of viewpoint 
coordination that are well-accounted for in the literature on speech and 
thought representation, such as indirect speech or free indirect speech. 
Consider, for example, the following passage from a press release on the 
morning after the shooting: 
 
(1) Athlete Oscar Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot dead his girlfriend at his 
house in Pretoria on Thursday morning, Beeld.com reported. 
(SAPA, ‘Oscar Pistorius shoots girlfriend: report’, 14 February 2013)57 
 
Using a form of indirect speech, the propositional content of the reported 
clause “Athlete Oscar Pistorius…Thursday morning” is attributed to the 
perspective of Beeld.com. Yet there are more viewpoints coordinated in this 
sentence: through the adverbs “allegedly” and “accidentally”, readers of (1) also 
learn that a source other than Beeld.com claimed that Pistorius killed his 
girlfriend without intending to. The information that Pistorius shot his 
girlfriend is clearly the critical bit, but it comes embedded in a complex of 
viewpoints that could be depicted as follows: 
 
      
Beeld.com reports that… 
 (It is claimed that…)   “allegedly” 
  (Pistorius did not intend to…) “accidentally” 








                                                





In this chapter I will contrast the two ways in which viewpoint layers are 
introduced into discourse as exemplified here: through a form of indirect 
discourse on the one hand, and through the use of single words (or lexical 
units) implying one or more viewpoint layers, such as alleged(ly), accident(ally), 
mistake(n), to confirm, on the other hand. Various aspects of the working of such 
words have been studied in Vandelanotte’s research on “framing adjectives” 
(2002; 2007) and in approaches dealing with meaning construction more 
generally (framing, blending, mental space theory).58 Fauconnier (1997) makes 
the case that newspaper articles most of the time rely heavily on background 
knowledge pre-existent in readers. Given that this knowledge is for a large part 
structured in frames, journalists can activate a whole network of relevant 
information in readers by mentioning only a few well-chosen cues. This 
information is then available for interpreting the news details given in the 
article. The processes of meaning construction focussed on in this chapter 
could be considered a viewpoint-specific subcategory of framing in this sense. I 
propose to distinguish a set of words, across part-of-speech boundaries, capable 
of what I will refer to as “holistic” viewpoint coordination. The label that I 
propose for this set is viewpoint packages. Viewpoint packages, such as alleged(ly) 
and accident(ally), activate readers’ background knowledge related to viewpoint, 
which can then be assimilated with contextual details. 
In addition, in my final section I will address the relation between 
linguistic discourse and cognitive processing by suggesting that viewpoint 
packages can be seen as instantiations of what Dennett calls “tools for thinking” 
(2000; 2013): knowing their use in language may alleviate the burden of 
handling multiple perspectives cognitively. 
 
 
                                                
58 It should be noted that “framing” in “framing adjective” goes back to a different tradition of 
using this term: see McGregor (1997: esp. 66-67). 
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4.2 Viewpoint, mindstates, and the human ability to read 
minds 
 
“Viewpoint” forms an object of study situated on a busy crossroads of 
disciplines. Whereas concepts such as “mindstate” and “intentionality” go back 
a long way in philosophy of mind, “viewpoint” and “perspective” have been 
traditional topics in the study of language and literature. During the past 
decades, psychologists and cognitive scientists have taken up the subject, and in 
recent years there has been an increasing number of attempts to bring insights 
from different angles together. The approach proposed in this chapter can be 
seen as an attempt to pursue this line. 
In what follows, by a “mindstate” or “intentional state” I mean a particular 
belief, intention, desire (etc.) held by an animate individual with respect to a 
state of affairs in the outside world (much in the fashion of Dennett’s 
intentionality; 1987). I use “viewpoint” and (in this chapter synonymously) 
“perspective” as indicating the broader, overall take a person, group, or 
institution (e.g. a newspaper) has on a certain part of that world. Intentional 
states or mindstates are thus, as it were, atomic “snapshots” of a subject’s 
relation to an object; a perspective or viewpoint comprises the broader total of 
an actor’s subjectivity of which intentional states are isolated parts. 
By definition, neither mindstates nor viewpoints/perspectives held by 
others can be accessed directly, but they can be appraised through an 
inferential process based on behavioural cues (including linguistic utterances) 
and immediate circumstances. This latter process is often referred to as “theory 
of mind” or “mindreading” (for an overview see Apperly, 2011). Several 
cognitively-oriented linguists and literary scholars have pointed out that the 
process by which language users form an understanding of the viewpoints and 
mindstates of people or characters referred to in discourse, can be seen as a 
special case of theory of mind or mindreading.59 In the physical presence of an 
interlocutor (say, when speaking with John), we have direct access to verbal and 
                                                
59 See e.g. Verhagen (2005). For fiction see Palmer (2004); Budelmann and Easterling (2010); 
Dancygier (2012); Sluiter, Corthals, Van Duijn, and Verheij (2013); Cefalu (2014); see also 
Chapter 2 and 3. 
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non-verbal cues that may guide our inferential process regarding John’s 
mindstates. However, when John is not physically present but referred to by 
Mary in a conversation we have with her (or a story narrated by her), a similar 
inferential process can be triggered through cues in Mary’s speech that enable 
us to construe John’s mindstates or viewpoint. Applied to our object of study in 
this chapter, understanding a thoughtscape on the basis of news reports is thus 
seen as a form of mindreading in which textual cues guide the inferential 
processes within readers.  
In the next section I will investigate this process more closely, while 
bringing elements from a variety of frameworks together. As a first step in my  
analysis I will distinguish between two ways of introducing viewpoint 
complexity into discourse: compositionally versus holistically. 
 
 
4.3 Constructing complexity* 
 
4.3.1 Compositional complexity: a literary example 
Regarding relevant approaches to meaning construction, in particular mental-
space theory, framing, and blending, we will mostly rely on Dancygier’s 
narrative-centred synthesis offered in her 2012 book The Language of Stories. Her 
narrative-spaces framework forms a useful tool for analysing how texts can 
represent a complex thoughtscape. The central issue in this framework is how 
cues at the micro-level of a text ultimately yield an increasingly rich and 
complexly structured story at the macro-level. Dancygier builds on mental 
space theory and offers a related though newly devised core concept: the 
narrative space (see Dancygier, 2012: esp. chapter 2; for mental space theory see 
Fauconnier, 1997; 1985). Like a mental space, a narrative space is a hypothetical 
subdivision in a language user’s mental activities, prompted by linguistic 
expressions, and used in the process of online meaning construction. Narrative 
                                                
* Just a reminder of what is explained in the Reading Guide at the beginning of this thesis: the 
basics of the narrative-spaces framework are also discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, though with 
slightly different emphases. This is due to the fact that the chapters are written as separate 
papers, aiming at slightly different audiences. 
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spaces are each characterised by a particular set of features such as time, space, 
cultural norms, language spoken, or participants involved in either narration 
(narrators/focalisers), action (characters), or both (Dancygier, 2012: 35-37). These 
features are open to further elaboration by all kinds of local linguistic choices, 
such as usage of elements that coordinate viewpoints (for example 
complementation constructions or, as I argue, lexical units such as allegedly and 
mistaken), grammatical features such as tense or modality, usage of pronouns, 
typographical cues (such as quotation marks), etcetera. 
Construction and elaboration of narrative spaces take mostly place 
through processes generally known as framing (Fillmore, 1985; for an overview 
see Cienki, 2007) and blending (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995; Coulson, 2001). 
The basic idea is that the background knowledge used by readers to interpret a 
text is structured in frames. Particular linguistic items used in the text activate a 
frame in its entirety, even if they relate to it only indirectly and in an 
unpredictable manner (cf. also the notion of “frame metonymy” as discussed in 
Fauconnier, 1997). Using this principle, writers of news articles can evoke rich 
meanings while providing only a few cues. For example, if a headline provides 
the information that a neighbour heard “non-stop shouting” coming from the 
Pistorius home during the hours before the shooting, nothing more needs to be 
said to evoke the frame of a fight between lovers, the sort of context in which 
one can imagine that things went out of hand, leading to a directed attack and 
hence a case of murder rather than a tragic accident (see also Section 4.3.6 
below). In the current chapter I focus on a subcategory of this more general 
phenomenon, specific for viewpoint coordination and linked to a category of 
lexical items I refer to as viewpoint packages. 
The general idea of blending is that two inputs with an established 
conceptual structure and content are integrated into an emergent blended space 
or blend. The blend has properties inherited from the inputs, as well as new 
structure and content of its own. Once a narrative space has been prompted 
and possibly further structured and enriched, it can as a whole be blended with 
another narrative space. The result of all the construction and blending 
processes is what Dancygier refers to as the emerging story: this is what a reader 
understands after having read and processed the text up until a particular 
point. The emerging story is thus a “moving end result”. 
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Although Dancygier’s framework is primarily designed to analyse 
narrative fiction, it fits our object of study in this chapter well. The ultimate 
question in the Pistorius case clearly is: was it an accident or murder? News 
reports provide a variety of micro-level cues that enable readers to put together 
a version (or rather, multiple competing versions) of the story covering the 
hours, days, or even weeks before the shooting took place. Clearly, the genesis 
of the story is different: instead of an author inventing it and “feeding” it 
gradually to the readers, the journalists themselves build their understanding 
of the case on various sources of facts and opinions. My focus here is on the 
linguistic choices these journalists make when subsequently feeding what they 
have understood to the readers of the newspapers. The narrative-spaces 
framework can be used to analyse how the journalists’ linguistic choices at the 
micro-level of news reports relate to the formation of an increasingly rich and 
complex emerging story understood by the readers of the news. 
One of the fictional examples Dancygier uses to introduce the concept of 
narrative spaces comes from Eggers’ novel A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius (2000). The main character Dave worries about having left his little 
brother Toph at home with a baby-sitter. While he is driving in his car, anxious 
thoughts cross his mind: 
 
(2) I will come home and the door will be open, wide. The baby-sitter will be 
gone [...] Blood on the walls [...] a note to me [...] There will be a hearing, a 
trial, a show trial – 
 How did you come to meet this man, this baby-sitter? 
 We found a posting, on a bulletin board. 
 And how long did your interview of him take? 
 Ten, twenty minutes. 
(based on Dancygier, 2012: 38, citing Eggers 2000: 126; italics in Eggers’ 
original) 
 
The main narrative space here is a period in Dave’s life. Within this main 
narrative space, particular micro-level language phenomena prompt the 
construction and structuring of additional narrative spaces. Examples of such 
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phenomena are the choice of pronouns (“I”, “you”, “we”), choice of verb tense 
and modality (“will come”, “will be”, “did”, “found”), and the use of italics (“How 
did you…babysitter”). The result is an emerging story that contains an 
increasingly rich and complex structure. Within the basic setting of Dave’s life, 
the moment captured by the passage in (2) is a car ride to San Francisco. Within 
the setting of that car ride Dave imagines the scenario of coming home to where 
he left his little brother and finding blood on the walls, followed by an 
imagined trial in which he is being interrogated about the babysitter, realising 
(but this is not spelled out) that he did not find him through very reliable 
channels and did not take much effort to check on him either. 
The emerging story at the end of (2) is indeed a blend of several narrative 
spaces. At the point of the interrogation, the story has parts of the structure of 
all these spaces: Dave is still in his car driving to San Francisco, and at the same 
time, through the layers of imagined events, there are his empty house with 
blood on the walls and the interrogation in court. However, readers will clearly 
not conclude that little brother Toph is “really” dead and Dave is “really” facing 
a trial. This is because they have sequentially read through the process in which 
the structure was built up one layer after the other, prompted by language 
phenomena that not only added content and structure, but also provided 
information about how this content and structure had to be integrated in the 
emerging story. The modal verbs at the beginning of (2) (“I will come home”, 
“the door will be open”, etc.) and other formal choices (such as the use of 
ellipses and enumerations, comma’s, italics, etc.), along with the absence of any 
direct evidence of a crime (such as a phone call from the police that Toph was 
found dead), signal to the readers the status of the presented content: the blood, 
the note, the trial, etcetera, must be products of Dave’s imagination. But what 
the readers do conclude from the fact that Dave is imagining doom scenarios, is 
something about Dave’s overall mental condition: he probably has hysteric or 
paranoid tendencies, in particular when it comes to his little brother. However, 
overarching terms such as “hysteria” or “paranoia” are nowhere mentioned in 
the text. In other words: the constituents (imagined terrifying scenarios) are 
given, but the “whole” (hysteria) is omitted and left for the reader to construe. 
This is an instantiation of what I refer to as compositional complexity: the 
components that constitute the structure of the emerging story are all spelled 
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out in the text and each adds a single part of the total complexity, while the 
construction of an overall diagnosis of what is going on is left to the reader. 
 
4.3.2 Compositional complexity: an example from the news 
Similar to this, viewpoint layers are spelled out explicitly, hence complexity is 
construed compositionally, when a form of sentence embedding is used to 
coordinate perspectives. Consider again the sentence cited in the introduction, 
here repeated for convenience: 
 
(3) Athlete Oscar Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot dead his girlfriend at 
his house in Pretoria on Thursday morning, Beeld.com reported. 
(SAPA, ‘Oscar Pistorius shoots girlfriend: report’, 14 February 2013). 
 
In the introduction I have stated provisionally that the first layer (Beeld.com) is 
related to the three others using “a form of indirect speech”. However, in the 
literature there is no consensus on the question whether this should be 
considered a case of Indirect Speech (IS) or Free Indirect Speech (FIS). The 
expression in (3) as a whole is a specific syntactic pattern consisting of a 
reported clause followed by a reporting clause (underlined) on which the 
former is grammatically dependent. The clauses are not paratactically related, 
and the reporting clause is not grammatically complete without the reported 
clause (*“Beeld.com reported.”). Consequently, the construction is one in which 
the reported situation is embedded in the point of view indicated in the 
reporting clause, and in this respect it is comparable to complementation 
constructions (although the different syntax also suggests semantic differences). 
Jeffries and McIntyre (2010: 89) would categorise it as IS, arguing that a 
sentence such as “The weather was nice, John said” only differs from “John said 
the weather was nice” in the order of the clauses, and the latter is clearly IS. 
Leech and Short (2007: 276) also mention “inversion”, but at the same time have 
more of an eye for the differences when calling this pattern “Janus-like”, 
“somewhere in between IS and FIS”. Toolan (2006: 703) observes that the 
complementiser “that” cannot be inserted in preposed reported clauses and 
that they sometimes clearly require independent clause syntax (“Could he 
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accompany her home, he asked”; not *“He could accompany her home, he 
asked”). He therefore concludes that preposed reported clauses are more like 
prototypical FIS, and might even be considered FIS if it were not for the inquit-
formula (for more discussion and examples see also Vandelanotte, 2009; 2012). 
Given the presence of the inquit-formula (indicating a construal of the 
reported clause as in some way dependent), while at the same time agreeing 
with Toolan that this is clearly not a complementation construction, I propose 
to consider (3) as a relatively autonomous embedding construction, which I will 
refer to as inquit-construction. The important similarity between an inquit-
construction and “classic” indirect speech using complementation, is that both 
coordinate two viewpoint layers that are spelled out in the text separately. 
Readers are cued to interpret one part of the sentence’s content as being part of 
one layer (or narrative space), and another part as belonging to a different one. 
This is what makes it a form of compositional complexity: as in the Eggers-
example, the constituting layers are spelled out in the text, whereas the 
overarching “whole” is not referred to explicitly. The grammar of English thus 
contains a family of constructions, including complementation and the inquit-
construction, for cuing this kind of compositional complexity. 
  
4.3.3 Holistic complexity: viewpoint packages 
By contrast with compositional complexity, viewpoint packages introduce 
complexity holistically: the wholes are given in the text, while the underlying 
constituents remain for the reader to construe or unpack – if the context so 
requires. I argue that words such as allegedly and accidentally (bold in (3)) are 
holistic prompts to readers to imagine viewpoint layers that are not spelled out 
in the text. Vandelanotte discusses alleged as what he calls a “framing adjective”, 
capable of “set[ting] something apart as belonging to a ‘second-order’ reality, 
viz. the reality of another’s discourse” (2007: 360; referring also to McGregor, 
1997: chapter 6). Other examples of framing adjectives are so-called, pretended, 
purported, or supposed. Vandelanotte suggests that “their shared reportative-
evidential meaning can tentatively be glossed” as follows: “[framing adjective] X 
= stated by someone, but not the speaker, to be X” (2007: 368). Developing this 
line further, I suggest that Vandelanotte’s “tentative gloss” reflects a topology, a 
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piece of conceptual structure evoked by the adjective. In the case of allegedly 
this conceptual structure looks in some respects similar to the one set up by a 
complementation construction or inquit-construction: one part of the related 
content must be attributed to the speaker and another to a third party. I will 
argue that such topologies implying coordination of viewpoints are not 
exclusive to framing adjectives; words that can function in this way can be 
found across several parts of speech. As said, the label that I propose for this 
type of words is viewpoint packages. 
Looking at accidentally in this way, the following topology can be 
postulated: there is a particular outcome of an action, which differs from the 
one intended by an involved agent. In the actual discourse concerning the 
Pistorius case this topology is mapped onto situation-specific details, such as 
the athlete being in his house with his girlfriend at night and shooting her. 
When processing sentence (3) above, the reader will assimilate (through 
blending) the topology of accidentally with these details and take it that the 
athlete shot dead his girlfriend, but had not intended to do so. 
In the case of allegedly it is given in the topology that a source different 
from the speaker asserts the information under the scope of this adverb. The 
details provided by the context in (3) only partly elaborate the topology and 
leave the identity of this other source open: it could be the police detectives or 
someone else who is in a position to make the claim that Pistorius (claims that 
he) shot dead his girlfriend accidentally. What content exactly is affected by 
allegedly depends on the interpretation of its scope: if only accidentally comes 
under the scope of allegedly, the result is “he shot her and it is said that this 
happened accidentally”; if the whole predicate of the reported clause comes 
under its scope, the result is “it is said that he shot her dead and that this 
happened accidentally”. 
What allegedly and accidentally have in common is that they entail an extra 
perspective layer from which the content they relate to is viewed, thereby 
modifying the way in which this content should be integrated into the emerging 
story. In the narrative spaces framework (as in general mental space theory), 
they would have the role of space builders. More precisely, they are linguistic 
cues that not just prompt any new space, but they prompt a structured space or 
frame, a space with a characteristic conceptual structure or topology. In Section 
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4.3.6 I will discuss this further, focussing on how readers assimilate the topology 
with local contextual details and integrate the result into the emerging story. 
Before that, two other issues will be looked at: potential context-specificity of 
alleged(ly) and ways in which compositional and holistic constructions of 
complexity are used in tandem to represent the entire thoughtscape underlying 
the Pistorius case in a press release published on the day after the shooting. 
 
4.3.4 Alleged(ly): hedging or coordination of viewpoints? 
It should be noted that alleged(ly) is commonly added in journalistic discourse 
related to juridical issues and criminal offence: news media can use it as a way 
of avoiding responsibility for anything that is still under consideration in court, 
where they would otherwise be liable to charges of slander or libel. This 
prompts the question whether allegedly is a conventionalised “hedge” 
associated with criminal and juridical reporting, rather than a more flexibly 
applicable way of coordinating viewpoints.  
It seems possible that a viewpoint package becomes specialised for a 
particular context, thereby gradually losing the option of being “upacked” and 
worked out in terms of viewpoint layers, hence of coordinating viewpoints in a 
more flexible way. Vandelanotte’s (2007) corpus research indeed suggests that 
the adjective alleged shows a degree of specialisation, reflected in frequent 
collocations with words referring to criminal offences and police investigations. 
In such contexts it normally “transfers” responsibility for a particular (phrasing 
of a) claim to an authority advancing the charge or dealing with the 
investigations in a legal case. The example given in Vandelanotte’s discussion 
(2007: 363) illustrates this particular use: 
 
(4) In New Jersey today, a jury will hear closing arguments in the trial of four 
young men accused of raping a mentally retarded woman. The alleged 
rape took place in the suburban town of Glen Ridge, New Jersey, four years 
ago this week. 
 
Assessment of 100 randomly chosen instances from the British National Corpus 
(BNC) showed that the adverb allegedly is also commonly used in this way, but 
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by no means exclusively.60 Ample instances (in the current sample at least 20) 
can be found where the external source of viewpoint referred to by allegedly is 
not some sort of legal authority, but, for example, a particular tradition or 
history (e.g. “Simon Peter […] on whom Jesus allegedly founds his church”; 
BNC, EDY), a source of unconfirmed or even questionable authority (e.g. “one 
tries to sell […] smear in a bottle allegedly from the great Madonna herself”; 
BNC, CBC), or an entity specified in the direct context (e.g. the protesters in “the 
protesters’ vociferously expressed and allegedly ‘sincere’ ideals”; BNC, HTP); it 
is unclear from my sample whether the use of quotation marks is indicative of 
this type of use).  
Although an important effect of the insertion of allegedly in the press 
release cited in (3) is the relegation of responsibility for the content under its 
scope to an external party, I suggest to see this viewpoint package here not 
primarily as a conventionalised hedge bound to a particular context. Rather, I 
argue that it is a lexical item cuing the coordination of two viewpoint layers in a 
way not very different from the working of complementation and inquit-
constructions. There are differences in what is in general left implicit or 
realised “on stage”. I expect that this reflects a more general pattern: in the case 
of complementation or inquit-constructions the party responsible for the 
external viewpoint appears to be given by default (although impersonal 
constructions are possible: “It is claimed that…”); in the case of viewpoint 
packages this party can more easily be left implicit or “off stage” (although it 
can be elaborated in the context: see the BNC examples cited above). Future 
(corpus) research will have to shed more light on such differences in emphasis, 
focussing in particular on how responsibility is distributed over the speaker and 
the external source of viewpoint, and the degree to which both are on or off 
stage (see also Langacker, 1990; Wierzbicka, 2006; Vandelanotte, 2009, 2012; 
Dancygier, 2012a). 
                                                
60 Using SketchEngine (http://www.sketchengine.co.uk; see Killgarif et al., 2014) a random 
sample of 100 instances was drawn from the 1039 instances of allegedly in the British National 
Corpus (BNC; 112,181,015 tokens in total). The BNC is distributed by Oxford University 
Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium. All rights in the texts cited are reserved. 
For information, licensing conditions, and use of the text identifiers (the three-letter codes EDY, 




4.3.5 Representing the thoughtscape 
When a larger excerpt of the press release starting with sentence (3) is 
considered, it becomes clear that multiple means of viewpoint coordination are 
being combined and mutually embedded to allow readers to form an 
understanding of the full complexity. Consider the second sentence of the press 
release: 
 
(5) He had mistaken her for a robber, the Afrikaans daily reported on its 
website. 
(SAPA, ‘Oscar Pistorius shoots girlfriend: report’, 14 February 2013) 
 
In this sentence, mistaken functions as a viewpoint package picking up on the 
earlier accidentally: it entails an extra viewpoint layer by implying that at a 
certain point the athlete believed that something was the case, whereas in 
actuality it was not. Another inquit-construction can be found: “the Afrikaans 
daily reported […]” has scope over the clause containing mistaken. The past 
perfect “had mistaken” (as opposed to simple past “mistook”) is also involved in 
viewpoint coordination and has an effect similar to that of allegedly in (3): the 
responsibility for the reported mindstate of the athlete is not (fully) attributed 
to the Afrikaans daily but relegated to a third party. So, example (5) contains a 
combination of three different means of viewpoint coordination: sentence 
embedding (here an inquit-construction), usage of the tense system (here past 
perfect), and usage of a viewpoint package (mistaken). However, as announced 
at the beginning of this chapter, here I focus on a comparison of viewpoint 
coordination effected by viewpoint packages (holistic) on the one hand and 
grammatical patterns such as complementation or inquit-constructions 
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(compositional) on the other, and refrain from detailed analysis of the 
viewpoint effects of tense, modality, passive voice, or negation.61 
The next sentence of the press release exhibits not only a combination of 
viewpoint packaging and embedding, but a form that may be called a hybrid of 
the two: 
 
(6) Police spokeswoman Captain Sarah Mcira confirmed she [Reeva 
Steenkamp, MvD] was shot in the arm and head. 
(SAPA, ‘Oscar Pistorius shoots girlfriend: report’, 14 February 2013) 
 
As a whole, (6) has a form not very different from (3) and (5): it features a 
reported clause, this time in a complementation construction, attributed to the 
viewpoint of a specified source. However, a different verb is used: to confirm 
rather than to report. Whereas to report does not automatically imply 
information about perspectives other than that of its subject, to confirm entails 
the assumption that the content of the reported clause it introduces was already 
claimed to be true by someone else; or possibly: that this content is common 
knowledge. More precisely: for a speaker A to confirm proposition p for 
addressee B, means that A states p and implies that p has been claimed before, 
and that it is accessible to B that p has been claimed before. In terms of Clark’s 
(1996) view that will be detailed in Chapter 5: p must be part of the common 
ground of A and B. Viewed this way, to confirm can be said to be a lexical unit 
with a topology containing an extra viewpoint layer from which the related 
content is viewed, and therefore qualifies as a viewpoint package. As a result, 
the complex of viewpoints involved in (6) can be depicted as follows:  
 
 
                                                
61 Throughout various traditions of linguistic research, attention has been drawn to the way in 
which a range of linguistic phenomena are involved in managing viewpoint. For a volume 
discussing a wide variety of linguistic means for viewpoint coordination, see Dancygier and 
Sweetser (2012). More examples, among many others, are the description of the disjunctive 
function of particular adverbs (allegedly would come under this category) in Functional 
Grammar (see Pinkster, 1990: 4, 32ff; Greenbaum, 1969). Wierzbicka (2006, esp. chapter 7 and 8) 
usefully analyses semantic distinctions between a number of reporting verbs and “epistemic 
adverbs” (also including allegedly), in the context of the supposed English rationalist cultural 
norm of epistemic caution rather than that of the construction of complex thoughtscapes. For 




Police spokeswoman Captain Sarah Mcira (claims…)  “confirms” 
 (It has been claimed before that…)  “confirms” 






To round off this part, I will take the discussion of how complexity is 
constructed in the news reports back to Dancygier’s narrative spaces 
framework. 
 
4.3.6. Viewpoint packages, the emerging story, and (de)compression 
In the Eggers example cited in (2) there were various linguistic cues signalling 
to the reader that the empty house, the blood on the walls, the trial, etcetera, 
were not as such to be integrated into the emerging story. All these crime-
related details were embedded in viewpoint layers of Dave’s imagination. 
Instead of concluding that Dave’s brother is in severe danger, or perhaps even 
already dead, readers integrate into the emerging story a more general 
conclusion: that Dave has hysterical tendencies. This hysteria could be 
considered a holistic (or compressed; see Dancygier, 2012: 100-102) version of the 
viewpoint layers spelled out in the text, which is not mentioned as such but left 
implicit for the reader to construe. As we have seen, in some parts of the 
Pistorius reports we find the precise opposite: here, several of the constituent 
viewpoint layers are not spelled out in the texts, whereas their holistic 
counterparts are mentioned: the viewpoint packages allegedly, accidentally, and 
mistaken. This gives rise to the question whether readers at any point “unpack” 
(or decompress) the packaged structure in their minds; or in other words: 
whether they in some way construe the separate viewpoint layers contained in 
the packages. 
Part of this question can be answered by looking at the extent to which 
news items following up on the first headlines build on the packaged viewpoint 
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layers. Consider the following two excerpts from a news article that was 
published one week after the shooting: 
 
(7) Mr. Pistorius told the court […] he heard a strange noise coming from 
inside his bathroom, climbed out of bed, grabbed his 9-millimeter pistol, 
hobbled on his stumps to the door and fired four shots.  
(International Herald Tribune, ‘Testosterone reported at home of 
Pistorius’, 21 February 2013) 
 
(8) Prosecutors said […] that Mr. Pistorius was calm and had the presence of 
mind to strap on his prosthetic legs, walk to the bathroom door and open 
fire as Ms. Steenkamp cowered behind it.  
(idem) 
  
These two possible versions of what could have happened before Pistorius fired 
his gun present details that are intended to take up either on the scenario of an 
accident, in which the athlete thinks he is shooting at a burglar (“strange noise”, 
“hobbled on his stumps”), or on that of murder, in which he knows he is shooting 
at his girlfriend (“presence of mind to strap on his prosthetic legs”, “walk”, 
Steenkamp “cowered” behind the door). Unless readers have some 
representation in their minds of these two competing scenarios and the 
mindstates appropriate to each, it hardly makes sense for newspapers to 
provide such details without elaborating on their relevance. It may be noted 
that there is indeed no need for newspapers to do this: details as cited in (8) and 
(9) can be (and are indeed widely) published without explicit attempts to place 
them in the story as a whole.62  
More examples can be found; for instance: by presenting evidence that an 
argument took place just before the shooting, the prosecutors imply that the 
                                                
62 Note that the reports are highly redundant across various newspapers and other media. A 
week after the shooting, several pieces of information had been added to the “canon” 
represented in virtually all reports, including witnesses who claimed to have seen light or heard 
voices in the Pistorius home, small fragments of Pistorius’ account of the events to the court, 
and small fragments of what the police detective leading the investigations has reported (e.g. 
that he saw a substance which could have been testosterone in the athlete’s bedroom). They are 
often followed by a brief summary of news coverage of the case so far, but no explicit 
explanations of how they fit together are provided. 
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athlete could have known that Reeva was inside the bathroom when firing the 
gun: 
 
(9) A witness heard “non-stop shouting” in the home of South African 
athletics star Oscar Pistorius shortly before his girlfriend was shot dead, the 
detective leading the murder investigation said on Wednesday.  
(Reuters News, ‘Witness heard ‘non-stop shouting’ before Pistorius 
shooting’, 20 February 2013) 
 
(10) While Mr. Pistorius had said the house was dark, the prosecution cited a 
witness as saying a light had been switched on when the first of four shots 
was fired. The witness heard a gunshot, then the sound of a woman 
screaming, then more shots. 
(International Herald Tribune, ‘Testosterone reported at home of 
Pistorius’, 21 February 2013) 
 
These details are then again challenged by the athlete and his lawyer: the 
untrustworthiness of these testimonies makes it impossible for the prosecutors 
to know whether or not Pistorius could have known that Reeva was in the 
bathroom: 
 
(11) But the defense disputed that testimony, saying the neighbor who claimed 
to have overheard an argument in Mr. Pistorius’ home in fact lived 600 
yards, or about 550 meters, away. 
(idem) 
 
In order to be able to integrate such details as presented in (7)-(11) into the 
emerging story in a meaningful way, readers must already have a particularly 
structured representation of the thoughtscape in mind. At the very minimum, 
this representation must comprise the distinction between the two competing 
scenarios (accident or murder) and several of the viewpoint layers mediating 
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between the reader and the “actual past event” of the shooting.63 A schematic 
depiction can be drawn as follows: 
  
  
News sources [Beeld.com etc.] report that … 
     
  possible scenario: accident      possible scenario: murder 
    
        
        (It is claimed [by spokespeople, police officials, etc.] that…)  
 
     
  (Pistorius did not intend…)        (Pistorius did intend…) 
  (Pistorius thought it was a burglar…)       (Pistorius knew it was her…) 
   
Pistorius shot dead his girfriend        Pistorius shot dead his girlfriend
    




Figure 3 illustrates once more that the claim that Pistorius killed his girlfriend is 
embedded in an array of viewpoint layers. As stated above, these layers can 
partly be understood as the result of newspapers relegating responsibility to 
external sources, such as authorities and other media (see Section 4.3.3 and 
4.3.4). However, another reason for their presence in this particular case is that 
the actual past event cannot be retrieved: no one, except Pistorius, knows what 
“really” happened. As a consequence, reports appearing on the first day after 
the incident are confined to presenting possible views on what has led to the 
known outcome: that Reeva Steenkamp was shot dead. This is precisely what 
accidentally and mistaken do in (3) and (5): they prompt the viewpoint layers of 
                                                
63 Cf. Dancygier’s (2012) analysis of the opening passage of Margaret Atwood’s The Blind Assassin 
and her Figure 4.1 in particular (89-91). There is an important parallel (besides several 
differences) between the Pistorius case and Dancygier’s example: both start out with two 
alternative scenarios of “what happened”, expressed in various viewpoint layers which provide 
the basis for the elaborations that follow. 
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Pistorius thinking it was a burglar and hence not intending to shoot Steenkamp, 
and arguably at the same time their alternatives of him knowing she was in the 
bathroom and hence intending to shoot her—after all, it is widely accepted that 
a negated proposition also entails its positive counterpart (see Fauconnier, 1997; 
Sweetser, 2006; Dancygier, 2012a).64 In this way, the reports and press releases 
appearing on the first day after the shooting provide what Dancygier calls a 
“proleptic ‘summary’” (2012: 90): they prompt a particular configuration of 
narrative spaces that persists as a fundament as further elaborations follow.  
Regarding the linguistic cues involved in building up this configuration it 
can be observed in (3), (5), and (6) that sentence embedding is used to 
coordinate the viewpoints of various sources reporting on the incident. These 
are the “outer” layers of the schema in Figure 3: the viewpoints of news media 
and the authorities and their spokespeople. As a result of this choice of 
linguistic form of viewpoint coordination, the constituting viewpoint layers are 
presented explicitly in the text (complexity is constructed compositionally). By 
contrast, “inner” layers of the schema, i.e. the representation of the athlete’s 
perspective at the moment of pulling the trigger, completely relies on viewpoint 
packages until more direct information becomes available several days after the 
shooting. This pattern is consistent throughout the twenty articles and press 
releases of the first day after the shooting I have looked at.65 In general it is thus 
only on the basis of words such as accidentally and mistaken that readers can 
build an understanding of the athlete’s possible mindstates when he fired his 
gun. Given that newspapers publish details following up on precisely these 
mindstates without further introduction, we may conclude that readers must 
have some form of access to the packaged (or compressed) viewpoint layers 
when the context so requires. 
                                                
64 This picture is consistent throughout twenty articles and press releases of the first day after 
the shooting I have looked at: fifteen refer to the shooting with mistaken, mistook, mistaking, a 
mistake, accidental, or accidentally. Three (of those fifteen) also speculate on the possibility of 
murder explicitly; the remaining five mention neither of the two alternative scenarios in 
explicit terms, but arguably imply both. The reports published on 14 February 2013 were 
retrieved on 21 February 2013 using Lexis Nexis (http://academic.lexisnexis.nl). 
65  The only exception being Asian News International: “Pistorius […] has allegedly shot his 




Put differently: it seems that readers do not unpack (or decompress) 
packages by default—a package may usually be closed and taken on board 
holistically—but when necessary, the implied viewpoint layers can be accessed. 
This leads to a final core aspect of viewpoint packages. Consider the word 
mistaken: thanks to its holistic nature it does not automatically necessitate 
reflecting on a whole series of assumptions about “who knew what at which 
moment in time”. Still, it is easy to prompt assumptions about the distribution 
of such information over minds by providing specific contextual details along 
with it. This has clear communicative, and conceivably also cognitive, 
advantages: constructing the viewpoint complexity underlying a situation 
compositionally every time it needs referencing (e.g. by using sentence 
embedding) is possible, but often unnecessarily ponderous. Therefore, in 
contexts where space and time are limited (as is the case in news reports and 
headlines), holistic introduction of complexity using viewpoint packages 
appears to be a preferable option. The difference between the actual newspaper 
quotes in (3), (5), and (6) and the unpacked thoughtscapes as explicated in the 
introduction of this chapter (“news media suggest that various sources report 
that the athlete claimed…etc.”) and depicted in Figure 1-3 testifies to that: 
whereas the first will be perceived as natural and everyday formulations, the 
latter present the same information in the form of a layered structure that 
cannot be absorbed at a glance. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion and discussion 
 
4.4.1 Future directions: processing and acquisition 
In the past two decades, a fair amount of attention in cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology has been devoted to the cognitive challenges humans 
face in their social environments. In order to function well socially it is of great 
importance to be able to reason about mindstates of others, that is: assess what 
they think, believe, intend, desire, and so on. As a result, primate social life is 
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highly demanding of cognitive resources.66 Dunbar (e.g. 2003) suggests that 
humans typically form social networks of around 150 individuals. In his view, to 
maintain such a network, humans must be able to process what has been 
termed multiple-order intentionality up to five or six orders. Examples of such 
assumed processing tasks involving four orders (12) and five orders (13) are: 
 
(12) Jenny hoped the greengrocer believed the chemist had wanted to give Emma 
a job. (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007) 
 
(13) (a. Connie knew that John suspected that Pete thought that Sheila hoped that 
John would ask her out. (idem) 
 
Note that these statements show similarities to the phrasing of the 
thoughtscape underlying the Pistorius case in Section 4.1 of this chapter and to 
the layered structure depicted in Figure 1-3. Various studies have used such 
statements in multiple-choice questions to test a participant’s abilities to 
process multiple-order intentionality (see Chapter 6). Where participants 
generally make few mistakes in questions covering up to fourth-order 
intentionality, error rates increase quite drastically in questions that involve 
fifth- or sixth-order. This has led to the suggestion that humans face a natural 
limit at this point (Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998; Launay et al., 2015). 
However, in Chapter 2 I have argued that the way in which situations 
involving multiple-order intentionality (which I call thoughtscapes) are 
represented in discourse, greatly influences the actual performance by humans 
in processing such tasks. Consider Shakespearean drama: by the end of act II, 
the audience of Othello has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes 
that Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb 
the peace. When represented like this, using an embedded sentence structure, 
this is highly opaque, whereas it is beyond doubt that the play has been 
                                                
66 This is true throughout the entire primate world, where social groups are structured around 
dyads: every individual has a personal relationship to some or all of the other individuals in the 
group. Having a personal relationship with someone, involves keeping track of a lot of 
knowledge about this individual, including what this individual knows about other group 
members and oneself (e.g. David-Barrett & Dunbar, 2013). This idea is central in work on the 




understood and appreciated by innumerable different audiences for several 
centuries. I have suggested that in Othello and comparable stories, certain 
“expository strategies” characteristic to narrative facilitate the effective 
representation of complex networks of mindstates, thereby alleviating the 
reader’s or spectator’s burden of processing such complexity cognitively. In 
Chapter 3 I have come to a similar conclusion when analysing excerpts from 
several novels.  
In this chapter I have suggested that viewpoint packages serve to 
communicate complex thoughtscapes efficiently and naturally. They allow 
readers to take on board certain parts of a layered structure holistically, while 
the underlying complexity can be unpacked (or decompressed) if the context so 
requires, but need not be otherwise. Extending this point to the domain of 
cognitive processing, I suggest that, in psychological terms, viewpoint packages 
have Gestalt-like properties: they can be used as holistic items, while their 
constituent components remain accessible (Lakoff, 1977; see also Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Humphrey, 1924). As such, viewpoint packages could 
provide crucial scaffolding for the cognitive handling of complex 
thoughtscapes: given constraints of working-memory and processing, working 
with packages allows humans to engage in more complex patterns of reasoning 
than working with substantively identical, but non-packaged primitives 
(Beekhuizen and Van Duijn, 2013). This is an alley, I propose, that should be 
further explored in the future. It would fit with the broader idea that human 
cognition relies crucially on “tools” obtained through social learning and 
potentially accumulated through cultural evolution (see Tomasello, 1999; 
Dennett, 2000). Viewpoint packages can be considered such tools: when we 
learn to use them in language, their representational power opens new worlds 
of possibilities for our mental and communicative activities, not replacing but 
complementing existing ones. 
Finally, it is worth adding that there is another interesting connection 
between viewpoint packages and complementation constructions within the 
realm of language acquisition. Diessel & Tomasello (2001) have demonstrated 
that the earliest items that look like instances of complement taking predicates 
(thus of complex syntax) in children’s utterances actually have the status of 
formulaic items that mark subjectivity or illocutionary force (I think …, I wish …, 
Chapter 4
 153 
Look …). Thus, they may at that stage be regarded as a kind of viewpoint 
packages in the sense of this paper. In a developmental perspective, they differ 
from the other viewpoint packages discussed here in that they are relatively 
simple (but this is a matter of degree), and that they form the starting point of 
the growth, in due course of development, of a network of complementation 
constructions that also includes productive abstract patterns (cf. Verhagen, 
2005: 110). The latter is not the case for the English adverb allegedly, but the 
process of the acquisition of such items and the social cognitive capacities 
underlying it (both in initial and in later acquisition) may be assumed to be 
similar, if not the same. I leave it to future research to elaborate and test this 
intriguing possibility. 
 
4.4.2 The refined definition of viewpoint packages 
Throughout this chapter I have looked at newspapers reporting on the Pistorius 
case, finding that already on the first day after the shooting a complex 
thoughtscape was covered by headlines and news articles. This complexity 
(depicted schematically in Figure 3) was partly cued compositionally, with the 
constituting layers in the text, and partly holistically, using words such as 
alleged(ly), accident(ally), and mistake(n). I have proposed to label such words 
“viewpoint packages” and provided a preliminary definition, which can now be 
refined: a viewpoint package is a single lexical item that entails at least one 
implicit viewpoint layer. This (or these) layer(s) allow for the attribution of 
(parts of) the content to the viewpoint of particular discourse participants that 
can remain unspecified (as was the case with allegedly) or identified in the 
context (for example “the athlete” with accidentally). In this way, a viewpoint 
package can be used to regulate the (perception of the) amount of responsibility 
that is taken by the speaker and other involved parties exhibiting intentionality.  
In addition, a viewpoint package lets language users take on board 
complexity holistically, while underlying layers remain accessible: it can be 
decompressed if the context so requires. This makes it an efficient tool for 








Language and joint intentionality: reflecting on orders of 






In section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1 I have distinguished the three main roles of 
language in relation to mindreading, as used in this thesis. Language can 
represent mindstates and the relationships between them (first role), either 
formally, in propositions of the form “A thinks that B intends that C…etc.”, or 
naturally, using a mix of different linguistic elements capable of viewpoint 
coordination. Various types of these linguistic elements were discussed 
throughout the previous chapters. Going from the smallest to the largest level 
of analysis, these were: lexical items such as the viewpoint packages “allegedly”, 
“accidentally”, and “mistaken”, grammatical constructions such as 
complementation and the inquit-construction, the patterns of focalisation and 
reported speech and thought (STR) that coordinated the different perspectives 
presented in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, and the expository strategies of narrative 
that aided the audience in understanding the complex thoughtscape 
underlying Shakespeare’s Othello. What all of these linguistic elements had in 
common was that they provided conventionalised ways in which speakers of 
English could represent mindstates and the relationships between those in 
discourse—from a single belief held by one person up to an entire thoughscape.  
                                                
* Versions of this chapter, especially Sections 5.3 and 5.4, were presented at the 47th Annual 
Meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea (SLE) in Poznan, Poland, 11-14 September 2014, 
and at the Perspective Project Kick-off Meeting in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, 17 November 
2014. See the Reading Guide for more details. 
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In this way, it was argued that natural languages support not only 
efficient communication of mindstates and thoughtscapes, but seem also 
capable of providing support for cognition (second role). When looking at one 
particular usage event, language can provide a form of short-term “online” 
support: I have argued that the way in which mindstates and their mutual 
relationships are represented linguistically can execute strong influence on the 
ease or difficulty with which they could be processed (think of the expository 
strategies making a complex thoughtscape manageable and viewpoint packages 
conveying multiple intentional relationships at once in a holistic way). When 
looking at the longer term, language users somehow internalise ways in which 
language makes mindstates and their relationships insightful, which can 
account for what some researchers have referred to as “implicit support” for 
mindreading: I have discussed research suggesting that various aspects of 
language usage, once mastered, work as scaffolding, conceptual underpinning, 
or training for our intentional reasoning skills. For example, experimental 
evidence suggests that children aged 3-4 who were for a while exposed more 
intensively to embedding constructions and perspective-shifting discourse, pass 
false-belief tests earlier, presumably because their general “thinking repertoire” 
got enhanced when they learned to master particular grammatical patterns 
(Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Milligan et al., 2007). Also it has been 
suggested that stories in all their different appearances, ranging from the day’s 
latest gossip or a myth told around the campfire to an award-winning novel, 
help both children and adults to develop and sharpen up their mindreading 
skills over time (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2; Chapter). 
Language was also argued to be itself heavily dependent on our 
mindreading abilities (third role). In the current chapter, this dependency will 
be investigated in more detail. According to researchers such as Sperber (1994; 
2000) and Scott-Phillips (2015), it takes the capacity to reason at four or five 
levels of intentionality to exchange even very basic utterances.67 This position is 
intuitively controversial: if language is naturally capable of representing 
                                                
67 I agree with both Scott-Phillips and Sperber on many points regarding language and 
meaning. However, there also is an important issue on which I disagree: the way they construe 
the relationship between linguistic interaction (or, more generally, “pragmatic competence”) 
and multiple-order intentionality, which they refer to as “recursive mindreading” or “recursive 
metarepresentation”. This issue will be central in this chapter. 
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complex thoughtscapes, does that mean that an addressee of a short story 
involving, say, four mutually linked perspectives essentially has to deal with a 
total of eight or nine intentional states, four or five from the communicative 
situation plus four from the story? And if so, how can this be unified with 
evidence that dealing with multiple intentional states is cognitively demanding, 
or, for that matter, with the claim that humans can deal with at most five levels of 
intentionality reliably (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1)? What is the role of linguistic 
and narrative elements capable of viewpoint coordination, such as the 
viewpoint packages discussed in previous chapters? And how does all of this 
affect our evolutionary story? 
These questions lead up to the objectives of this chapter, which has two 
main parts. First, as announced in Chapter 1, I will contest the claim made by 
Sperber and Scott-Phillips. Using the concepts of common ground (Clark, 1996) 
and joint cognition (Hutchins, 2006; Verhagen, 2015) I will argue that only in 
exceptional cases do we need to bother about any layers of intentionality. 
Regarding some aspects I will be relatively brief in my analysis, and refer to 
existing work or point out opportunities for future research. Other aspects, 
however, will turn out to be closely tied to points made in the previous 
chapters, and be elaborated in full detail. An important role will be played by 
the ratchet effect: linguistic items “store” communicative experience of 
generations of language users on which every new generation can build.68 This, 
then, leads to the second part of this chapter: providing an integrated conceptual 
model for analysing the particular class of linguistic elements central in this 
thesis so far, namely: elements capable of viewpoint coordination in discourse. 
After the model has been introduced and explained, I will briefly explore some 




                                                
68 The term “ratchet” is taken from Tomasello (1999). My usage of it here is compatible with his, 
however, I apply the idea more specifically to linguistic items whereas Tomasello speaks about 
cultural conventions more broadly. 
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5.2 Association, ostension, and shared intentionality 
 
Throughout the literature, it is quite generally recognised that human 
communicative interaction “as we know it” requires some form of mindreading 
on behalf of both interlocutors, irrespective of whether we use language, 
gestures, facial expressions, or any other means to get our messages across (see 
e.g. Verhagen, 2005; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008). The usual argument is 
that signallers have to design their communicative behaviour such that their 
particular audience will be able to infer from it what they mean, and addressees 
have to reckon why a signaller picked out this particular behaviour—both these 
tasks entail a degree of understanding of the other’s mindstate. However, on top 
of this, some researchers have made a case for why human communication 
cannot succeed just by virtue of basic mindreading competencies. Indeed, 
Scott-Phillips makes this point explicitly: what most linguists and philosophers 
of language have failed to appreciate, according to him, is that sophisticated 
intentional reasoning skills including “recursive mindreading” are a 
prerequisite not only for the successful execution of communication-as-we-
know-it, but also for such communication to evolve and develop at all (2015: 68-
69). The argument thus has two components: it deals with the question “Which 
mindreading skills enable interlocutors to take part in communicative 
interaction as we know it today?” (“synchronic”), and with the question “Which 
mindreading skills were necessary for the emergence of such a form of 
communicative interaction in the first place?” (“diachronic”). It should be noted 
that these two components are not always brought forward and supported 
separately by Scott-Phillips, but in this chapter I find it useful at several points 
to keep the synchronic and the diachronic stories apart.69 
 
                                                
69 Note that this is a different divide than the “classic” one between ontogeny and phylogeny 
(Tinbergen, 1963). Here I mean not “development over a lifetime” versus “development over 
evolutionary time”, but “the working of communication as it is now” versus “the emergence of 
such communication over time”. In fact, my notion of “synchronic” is closest to Tinbergen’s 
question of the proximate mechanism, whereas what I call “diachronic” covers both his 
developmental and evolutionary questions. 
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5.2.1 Scott-Phillips’ two models of communication 
The starting point of the idea advocated by Scott-Phillips goes back for a large 
part to Sperber (1994; 2000) and Sperber and Wilson (1995; 2002), and ultimately 
has its roots in what could be called the “pragmatic turn” in linguistics and 
philosophy of language that began with the second half of the twentieth 
century.70 It sets human communicative interaction, whether or not involving 
language, apart against other communication found in nature by arguing that it 
is, at its core, not a system of “coding-and-decoding” information. A coding-
and-decoding system can be found in (to follow Scott-Phillips’ example) 
grasshoppers producing six different signals associated with six different states 
of the grasshopper world: “I would like to make love”, “You are trespassing my 
territory”, “How nice to have made love!”, and so on (2015: 5, citing Moles, 1963: 
125-126). Various forms of code-system communication can be found 
throughout the primate world, including in humans, ranging from olfactory 
cues (smell) guiding behaviour of newborns, to spontaneous emotional 
vocalisations working as alarm calls, and, potentially, (Duchenne) laughter 
signalling social solidarity (see Scott-Phillips, 2015: 5-6; Burling, 2005). Even 
though such code systems need not be fully deterministic or, for that matter, 
trivial, the primary mechanism linking signals to messages is association: every 
signal type stands for one particular meaning type (or, if a code is probabilistic 
instead of deterministic: a class of meaning types). However, association falls 
short of explaining human communicative interaction, given that there are 
many ways in which we can express a particular meaning, while at the same 
time all of our expressions can have multiple different meanings. The example 
given in Section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1 was that of someone saying to a friend “hey, 
there is Ann”, which could mean “all right, we can go inside”, “let’s go 
somewhere else”,  “what a coincidence”, and so on, depending on the 
circumstances. The same goes for non-linguistic communication: if we raise a 
full glass of beer in the air while seeking eye contact with someone who also 
holds a full glass, this probably means “cheers!”, while it can also mean 
                                                
70 Sperber has developed his insights on the basis of Grice (1957), although Grice was not 
interested in evolution. For overviews covering also the important contributions made by 
Austin (1962), Searle (e.g. 1969), and Wittgenstein (e.g. 2006 [1953]) see Hacker (1986: esp. chapter 
6-11) and Keller (1995).  
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“thanks!” if the other person is the one who just paid for the round, or “do you 
want one as well?” if the other is holding an empty glass.  
Neither the utterance “hey, there is Ann” nor the behaviour of raising a 
glass and seeking eye contact stand for all of these meanings in the sense of the 
code model: there are no one-to-one associations. There is a different system at 
work that forms the basis for the production of meanings, which Scott-Phillips 
describes as the “ostensive-inferential” model of communication (2015: 7-13; see 
also Sperber and Wilson, 1995). According to this model, signallers have the 
intention to alter an addressee’s mindstate or behaviour in some way. They 
provide particularly designed evidence for this, thereby enabling the addressee 
to draw the right inferences. This evidence can take the form of a string of 
words, but could, depending on context and desired effects, just as well be a set 
of gestures, facial expressions, or any other behaviour, as long as it is in some 
way ostensive: it has to be possible for the addressee to infer not only what the 
signaller wants her to understand (referred to as the “informative intention”), 
but also that the signaller is trying to communicate this in the first place (called 
the “communicative intention”). As an illustration, consider the example he 
borrows from Sperber (2000): 
 
Mary is eating berries. She wants Peter to know that she thinks that the 
berries are very tasty, so she eats them in a somewhat exaggerated, 
stylized way, and pats her tummy as she does so. This reveals two 
things to Peter: (i) that Mary thinks the berries are tasty (this is the 
content of her informative intention); and (ii) that Mary wants to 
communicate this fact to Peter (this is the content of her 
communicative intention). If Mary simply ate the berries 
enthusiastically, but did not do so in a stylized or exaggerated way, 
Peter would still be able to infer that they are tasty, but not because 
Mary had expressed either an informative or a communicative 
intention. There would be no communication in that case. 
(Scott-Phillips, 2015: 9) 
 
In other words, given that there is no fixed set of signals associated with 
particular messages in this case, Scott-Phillips (along with Sperber) suggests 
that each signal must in principle first be negotiated qua signal—a process that 
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is explained by the ostensive-inferential model of communication, but not by 
the code model (see also Stolk, 2014, for discussion and an experimental 
approach). Ostension and inference are thus the basis of human 
communication, according to Scott-Phillips. On top of this, he argues, there is 
also a code at work: the conventions of a language provide global links of 
linguistic forms to certain meanings. In this way, ostension and inference make 
human communication possible in the first place, and the linguistic code makes 
it even more powerful (2015: 15-17). 
The two different models of communication require quite different skills 
on a cognitive level.71 In principle, the code model only requires a “glossary” 
listing all signals and associated meanings (which can be as simple as with the 
grasshoppers, but also more complex). This can be a genetically inherited 
glossary, but the capability to develop such a glossary through associative 
learning can also do the job. The ostensive-inferential model, by contrast, 
requires a great deal of flexible reasoning abilities, including mindreading. In 
order to design the right evidence for their intended meaning, signallers need 
not only take into account the context (where and when the communication 
takes place, who is present, etc.), but also what their addressees (already) know 
and believe about the topic and context. Addressees, in turn, must factor in 
what they think the signaller believed about them, the topic, and the context 
when designing the signal, in order to make the right inferences. Both 
interlocutors must thus be able to reason about contextual factors, including 
the other’s intentional states, for ostensive-inferential communication to be 
possible. 
I support the distinction between the code model and the ostensive-
inferential model and agree with the analysis that the requirements on the 
cognitive level are the ability to form associations in the case of the code model, 
whereas flexible reasoning abilities including mindreading are needed in the 
case of ostensive-inferential communication. Yet this is where the debate 
begins: I disagree with the amount and complexity of the mindreading Scott-
                                                
71 My aim in this section is clearly not to provide exhaustive lists of what is required for 
communication on a cognitive level. Rather, I will highlight important differences between the 
kind of cognitive structure needed for the code and inferential models to work (see also Scott-
Phillips, 2015: 64), and in 5.2.3 I will do the same for my alternative communication model. 
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Phillips and Sperber consider to be necessary. In what follows I will argue that 
they misconstrue the complexity needed in theory. On top of that, I will argue 
that in practice we hardly need any mindreading at all for successful 
communicative interaction, by discussing various mechanisms that save 
interlocutors from cognitively taxing mindreading efforts. 
 
5.2.2 Cognitive requirements of ostensive-inferential communication 
As said at the beginning of the previous section, Scott-Phillips explicitly makes 
the point that many others across the literature agree that some mindreading is 
needed for human communication, but that its exact role and complexity are 
rarely spelled out. In order to get a grasp on this, he sets up the following 
argument, using a series of different scenarios taken from Sperber (2000):72 
 
Scenario one. Mary is picking and eating berries. She does this because 
the berries are edible. 
Scenario two. Mary is picking and eating berries. Peter is watching 
her, and hence forms a belief about the edibility of the berries. Here, 
Peter believes1 that the berries are edible (because otherwise Mary would 
not be eating them). Note that Mary may or may not know that Peter is 
watching. Whether she does or not, it makes no difference to her 
intentions or behaviour. 
Scenario three. Mary is picking and eating berries. Peter is 
watching her. Mary knows Peter is watching her, and she wants him to 
believe that the berries are edible. So: Mary intends1 that Peter believes2 
that the berries are edible. Here, note that Mary’s behaviour is identical to 
her behaviour in scenarios one and two. All that has changed is that in 
scenario two Mary informed Peter about the edibility of the berries 
only incidentally […] whereas here she does so intentionally – and she 
can satisfy this intention (that Peter believes hat the berries are edible) 
simply by picking and eating berries. She need not and does not do 
anything more than this. Mary’s intention is an informative intention. 
Scenario four. Mary is picking and eating berries. Peter is 
                                                
72 Note that Scott-Phillips uses numbers in subscript to indicate orders of intentionality: “Mary 
intends1 that Peter believes2 that…”. 
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watching her. Mary knows Peter is watching her, and she wants him to 
believe that the berries are edible. Furthermore, Peter knows that Mary 
knows that he is watching her and, for whatever reason, he has reason 
to believe that she would like him to believe that the berries are edible. 
Correspon-dingly, he believes1 that she intends2 that he believes3 that the 
berries are edible. Mary, however, does not know that Peter believes this. 
After all, she has not yet made her intention manifest to Peter. Indeed, 
Mary’s physically observable behaviour is the same as it is in scenarios 
one, two, and three. As yet, she has not picked berries in a way that 
signals to Peter that her behaviour is intended to be informative. She 
has not yet signalled signalhood. All that is different between this and 
scenario three is that here Peter believes, correctly, that Mary has an 
informative intention. 
Scenario five. Mary is picking and eating berries. Peter is watching 
her. Mary knows Peter is watching her, and she wants him to believe 
that the berries are edible. Furthermore, Peter knows that Mary knows 
that he is watching her, and Mary knows that Peter knows this. As such, 
when she eats the berries, she intends1 that he believes2 that she intends3 
that he believes4 that the berries are edible. 
(Scott-Phillips, 2015: 65-66, based on Sperber, 2000, and Grice, 1982; 
italics and subscript numbering in original) 
 
Scenario five embodies a significant leap according to Scott-Phillips: here Mary 
has reason to change her behaviour from regular, unremarkable picking to any 
degree of slightly stylized or exaggerated picking. She now has two intentions, 
the informative intention (labelled 3) she had earlier and the communicative 
intention (1) to “signal signalhood”, which is new to this scenario. However, only 
if Peter recognises both intentions, “ostensive-inferential communication 
proper” has emerged: 
 
Scenario six. As per scenario five, including the fact that Mary picks and 
eats berries in a particularly stylized, exaggerated manner. Because of 
this, Peter grasps both of Mary’s intentions, informative and 
communicative, as laid out above. As such, Peter believes1 that Mary 
intends2 that he believes3 that she intends4 that he believes5 that the berries are 
edible. (idem) 
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Scott-Phillips states that in a world with only the scenarios one to four, there 
would be no difference between doing things because you need or want to, and 
doing things in order to communicate with others, since “nobody would signal 
signalhood” (2015: 67). Only in scenario six is signalhood signalled and 
recognised. At this stage, a form of interdepence between signaller and addressee 
has emerged which Scott-Phillips considers to be a defining characteristic of 
human communicative interaction: this only obtains if there is mutual 
recognition of the communicative intention to exchange a particular 
informative intention, presupposing four and five orders of intentionality to be 
handled by the speaker and addressee respectively.  
After having laid out this strand of reasoning, Scott-Phillips anticipates 
three types of critique (2015: 68-75): (i) scenario five and six look complicated 
and cognitively taxing, while we all know from experience that communicating 
in this way is not; (ii) experimental evidence suggests that children and patients 
suffering from autism spectrum disorders cannot reason at higher orders of 
intentionality, but they certainly can be communicatively competent; and (iii) 
experimental evidence suggests that the limit of orders of intentionality for 
normally developed human adults lies around five, suggesting that 
communicative interaction as such is already at the limit. With respect to (i) he 
points out that there is no a priori reason to assume that something we 
experience as simple, is also simple in formal terms. He draws a parallel with 
vision: a formal model of this skill will clearly not be as straightforward as the 
act of seeing itself feels to us (see Scott-Phillips, 2015: 10). I agree with this in 
principle, however, we should of course note that this does not work as an 
argument the other way around: the alleged discrepancy between how vision 
feels from experience and how complex it may be formally, does by no means 
entail that everyday communication, feeling easy, should be complicated in 
formal terms. Besides that, a reason why Scott-Phillips’ parallel might not be a 
feasible one is that vision, being widely spread throughout nature, and 
pragmatic competence, being unique to humans, require explanations on very 
different evolutionary time scales. Without a priori excluding anything in the 
case of human evolution since the divide from the other great-ape lineages, the 
shortage of evolutionary time is an argument for looking at the most 
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economical hypothesis in terms of cognitive complexity first (see also 
Tomasello, 1999).  
Regarding (ii) and (iii), Scott-Phillips explains that there are in principle 
two ways out of the seeming contradictions posed by these types of critique: 
either the analysis he (and Sperber) set out overcomplicates the matter, or the 
experimental evidence is wrong and dealing with multiple-order intentionality 
is much easier and less effortful compared to what is generally assumed. 
Clearly, Scott-Phillips sets out to argue for the latter. I agree at least partly with 
him on this point, and do also think that there are issues with the ways in which 
the experimental evidence has been produced and interpreted (Chapter 6 will 
deal with this in more detail). However, the two ways out of the seeming 
contradictions he suggests are not mutually exclusive: besides agreeing that 
there are some issues with the experimental evidence, I still think that his 
analysis overcomplicates the matter—in the next subsection I will explain why. 
In short, his argument is thus that he sees no possibility to leave out any 
of the steps of recursive mindreading leading to the emergence of “ostensive-
inferential communication proper”, as cited above. Therefore, he states, 
experimental evidence must be at least partly wrong when suggesting that 
mindreading involving five orders of intentionality is highly cognitively 
demanding (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1), developing late in childhood or even 
adolescence (idem), and not available to people suffering from certain cognitive 
disorders (idem). He suggests that ever since mindreading has been investigated 
experimentally, starting from the late 1970s, the actual abilities of human test 
subjects have been masked by methodological shortcomings. For example, as 
soon as false-belief tests were carried out “implicitly”, i.e. not using explicit 
questions of the type “Where does she think the sweets are hidden?”, the age at 
which children were able to pass them could be brought down dramatically 
(from around 3-4 years of age to 12-18 months; see Baillargeon et al., 2010, but 
see also Apperly, 2011: 29-30 and Heyes, 2012). Similar arguments can be made 
for people suffering from several psychopathological conditions: different tests 
have led to better results.  
These are indeed important points, which should be kept in mind for the 
next chapter. However, Scott-Phillips takes them too far in my view: in Chapter 
6 I will analyse an “implicit” version of the mentalising test designed under his 
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supervision, which allegedly demonstrates that normally developed human 
adults are capable of handling up to eight or nine orders of intentionality 
effortlessly. His line of reasoning is the same here: he suggests that previous 
versions of the test have masked the actual performance, and that this is the 
first one being ecologically valid, thus providing insight into the capacity as it 
“really” is. He concludes: “There are good reasons, both theoretical and 
empirical, to conclude that recursive mindreading is not cognitively 
demanding. More likely, it is, like simple mindreading, something we do 
habitually and subconsciously, as part of our everyday, low-level perception of 
the world around us” (2015: 73). I will get back to this in the next chapter. In 
what follows here, I will take the other of the two suggested paths: instead of 
(only) criticising the existing experimental evidence, I will (also) scrutinise 
Scott-Phillips’ theoretical analysis of communicative interaction and argue that 
it is misguided regarding the amount of mindreading complexity it presumes to 
be necessary.  
 
5.2.3 Individual versus shared intentionality  
Brought back to its core, the point I intend to make here can be summarised as 
follows: whereas the basic cognitive unit in Scott-Phillips’ (and Sperber’s) 
analysis is that of a human individual, I argue that the basic cognitive unit of 
human communicative interaction should rather be understood as at least two 
people sharing a great deal of beliefs and intentions. As a consequence, all the steps 
suggested to explain how two individuals reach a state of mutual recognition of 
communicative and informative intentions are rendered superfluous. In other 
words, where Scott-Phillips sees communicative interaction as a process in 
which signaller and addressee have separate sets of intentional states which 
they eventually seek to “pair”, I suggest to see communicative interaction as a 
process in which interlocutors sharing a set of intentional states negotiate what 
is and what is not part of their shared intentionality.  
My view relies for an important part on Clark’s work on common ground 
(1996) and joint projects (2006), and on Verhagen (2015), who brings together 
insights from Tomasello’s and Rakoczy’s notion of self-other equivalence (2003; 
see also Tomasello, 2008; 2014), Searle’s we-intentionality (1995), and Hutchins’ 
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work on group-level cognition (1995; 2006). In the rest of this subsection I will 
provide some more details on the idea of shared intentionality. After that, I will 
explore what a communication model based on joint intentionality demands 
from interlocutors on a cognitive level, especially with respect to mindreading.  
The core idea of shared intentionality underlying communicative 
interaction is that interlocutors consider a particular set of beliefs and 
intentions to be mutually shared or “common ground”. Or perhaps rather: they 
a priori act as if these intentional states are shared, until they have evidence to 
the contrary. Which set of beliefs and intentions is considered common ground 
depends on the identity and situatedness of the interaction partner(s). As 
suggested by Clark and Marshall (1981) there are multiple types of “sources” of 
common ground. First of all, people can be in the same here-and-now, which is 
in linguistics generally referred to as sharing the same “Ground” (Langacker, 
1990; Verhagen, 2005). In that case they can, for example, use deictic 
expressions (including pointing and eye gaze) under the assumption that the 
other can figure out what they mean: they both believe that “now” stands for the 
same moment in time, “here” for the same place, “the book over there” refers to 
a particular book of which they both believe it is that one rather than another, 
and so on. Another source can be one’s personal relationship to someone, 
formed by a shared history of previous interactions. When speaking to a friend 
I can, for example, refer to a mutual acquaintance by just using her first name 
“Susanna”, given that we are used to referring to her in this way—in other 
words, we both know who we mean. However, if I want to refer to the same 
person when speaking to my mother, I may have to say “Susanna Smith”, since 
when my mother and I say “Susanna” we usually mean a different Susanna. In 
the case of strangers who do belong to the same cultural-linguistic group as we 
do, most of the common ground is less specific, but we can still assume that a 
great deal of beliefs are shared, most notably of course the conventional rules of 
our language. If I produce the sound “huis” (meaning “house” in Dutch) in front 
of any stranger in the Netherlands, there is a big chance that both our 
individual histories have assured that we both think of a fairly similar concept. 
In fact, within the Netherlands it is safe to assume this until encountering 
alongword 
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evidence to the contrary.73 Finally, our common ground with all other humans 
who are strangers and not members of our cultural-linguistic community is still 
sufficient for some form of shared intentionality to support communicative 
interaction: this is what we rely on, for example, when looking upward to refer 
to the sky, or when referring to “food” or “eating” by miming that we take a bite.  
Note that people who are in one’s personal social network, often also 
share membership of a cultural-linguistic community, and that both people in 
one’s network and strangers who are members of this community are humans. 
Therefore, my version of the sources for common ground, adapted from Clark 
and Marshall (1981) and Verhagen (2015), can be conceptualised as a series of 
concentric circles: 
                                                
73 Verhagen (2005) makes a categorical distinction at this point: (i) all linguistic signals, which 
rely on sounds (or signs, writing, etc.) being conventionally linked to particular functions within 
a linguistic community; and (ii) linguistic items that, on top of this, rely on particular knowledge 
shared between communicators, such as deictic expressions presupposing shared knowledge of 
the communicative situation or Ground. Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) rather seem to suggest a 
continuum where shared knowledge can be very general within a linguistic community on the 





Figure 1 – Types of “sources of evidence” for common ground, adapted from Clark and 
Marshall (1981) and Verhagen (2015) (I have added the outer circle, slightly altered the 
categories, and introduced dashed lines for the second and third circles). Which knowledge is 
considered to be part of the common ground depends on who the interaction partners are. Are 
they part of the same interaction event, and do they thus share the same here-and-now, i.e. 
same Ground? Are they people with whom I have a history of interaction? Are they members of 
the same linguistic and cultural community? Are they humans (or perhaps the question should 
be: are they normally developed human adults)? The dashed circles indicate that it is possible 
that interlocutors sharing the Ground can but need not be part of each other’s personal social 
network, and can but need not be members of the same linguistic community.  
 
Groupings like “all Dutchmen” or “all Italians” may yield strong prototypical 
examples of cultural-linguistic communities, but the definition of such 
communities also extends to, say, Londoners, dentists, fans of The Police, 
Oxford students, cricket players, generative linguists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 
so on. Whenever a Dutch dentist meets an American dentist, there will be 
particular knowledge they can consider to be shared on the basis of the 
community they take part in by virtue of their profession. This probably 
includes particular experiences and practices, but may also involve a specific 
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lexicon (sometimes also known as jargon, e.g. “endodontics” for root canal 
therapy) or certain behavioural conventions (e.g. never provide details about a 
patient’s identity). Clark (1996; 2006a) points out that some communities are 
nested (e.g. Londoners, Brits, speakers of English) and others are cross-cutting 
(e.g. Oxford students, Police fans, speakers of English). Viewed this way, people 
are members of many different communities. When two people interact, they 
generally have a gradation of common ground, based on the amount of shared 
community memberships: for example, any two Oxford students can assume 
that the other knows what to wear when sitting exams, whereas Oxford 
students who are also members of a particular college can not only assume that 
the other knows about exam dress codes, but also about who used to live 
upstairs from the old kitchens. 
Note that if shared knowledge is indeed a crucial basis for 
communication, one would expect that people interacting for the first time try 
to assess whether they share membership of one or more communities, 
potentially providing them with some common ground. According to Clark 
(2006a) this is indeed why most conversations with strangers begin by 
exchanging information about residences, interests, occupations, and so on. At 
the same time, accents, dressing style, or other aspects of people’s overall 
“habitus”, may work as cues (overtly or in disguise) for membership of 
particular communities. This is not just a matter of finding “something to talk 
about”, but goes much deeper: it is about finding out what the conventional 
rules underlying the interaction are. To start with, common ground includes 
knowledge of what to consider as a meaningful signal. Cricket players may 
draw crucial inferences from gestures hardly even noticeable by outsiders. Or 
what is just a plate with some used cutlery on it for a member of one 
community, may to members of another community signal “I haven’t finished 
eating yet”. Broadly speaking, these examples are not very different from the 
fact that speakers of any spoken language recognise speech sounds as 
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meaningful signals, but only some also recognise “clicks” as such.74 In all cases, 
membership of a particular community has, over time, assured that individuals 
take a particular bit of behaviour as being meaningful in a communicative 
setting.  
Among members of these communities there is thus no need to negotiate 
these behaviours qua signal, to “signal signalhood” in Scott-Phillips’ terms. Once 
they have identified an interaction partner as a member of the same 
community, hence established a basis for common ground, they can use a 
signal in the same way as this signal has been used towards them by members 
of this community. This is what Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) have referred to 
as self-other equivalence, leading not only to community-wide consensus over 
what does and does not count as a meaningful signal, but assuring also that 
linguistic form/meaning pairs become intersubjectively shared within cultural-
linguistic communities. In other words, if the principle of self-other equivalence 
is systematically adopted by members of a community towards other members 
of this community, this yields a mechanism through which conventions spread 
reliably. These conventions can be taken in the broadest sense, ranging from 
what to regard as a signal in the first place, or what to communicate about and 
what to leave implicit, to more specific conventional associations between 
forms and meanings such as the gesture “thumb up” signalling a positive 
attitude, the sound “bal” referring to a round object suited for playing particular 
games, or the word order “John hits Peter” meaning that Peter is at the 
receiving end of the action. 
The crux in the case of cultural-linguistic communities is that no previous 
contact between two individuals within a community is needed for them to 
have a similar set of knowledge states “installed” on their individual cognitive 
systems. On top of or besides such communal common ground, personal 
interaction is another way in which shared knowledge can be built, updated, 
and extended. As soon as two people start interacting, they not only do this 
                                                
74 E.g. the Khoeid languages spoken by hunter-gatherers peoples in Namibia (see Voßen, 1997). 
The difference is of course that such sounds are elements constituting symbols through 
combination—a very powerful trait of human language—whereas cutlery arranged on a plate 
is a symbol by itself. There is clearly a lot more to say about how combinations of sounds 
become conventionally associated with particular meanings, both developmentally and 
evolutionarily, but that is not relevant for my purposes here. 
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“against the common ground they believe they already share [but also] as a way 
of adding to that common ground” (Clark, 2006a: 107, referring to Stalnaker, 
1978). This can involve superficial updates (e.g. finding out about a mutual 
acquaintanceship with “Susanna Smith”, enabling unique reference using her 
name), but also go as far as two people (or a small clique of a few people), who 
interact frequently, developing their own words, constructions, accent, 
behavioural rules, and so on.  
In this way, we have specific common ground with all people in our 
personal social networks, besides or on top of the common ground we might 
have with them by virtue of shared membership of various cultural-linguistic 
communities, sharing the same “here-and-now” of the interaction (“Ground”), 
and/or, in the minimal case, being human. An important observation can now 
be made: once the degree and nature of common ground with a particular 
interaction partner have been established (possibly through visible cues, 
accent, conversations about interests, occupation, residence, etcetera), it is 
possible to derive inferences about this interaction partner’s individual 
knowledge, if need be. For me as a speaker of Dutch it is possible infer about 
another speaker of Dutch that she will know that the sound “huis” can be used 
as a signal to draw the attention to some house. Also, I can draw the inference 
that she will know that I know this, given that she knows that I am a speaker of 
Dutch too. Theoretically, I can draw infinitely many inferences like this about 
what other speakers of Dutch know, what they know that I know, what they 
know that I know that they know, and so on (this point is also made in different 
forms by Clark, 2006a, and Verhagen, 2015, both referring to Lewis, 1969). 
However, this is not what I need to do by default before communicating with 
them, given that “as such” these inferences add nothing new: each of them is a 
derivate from the already existing common ground between all speakers of 
Dutch, not a step towards the emergence of such common ground. The same 
holds true for any form of common ground. When I sit behind my desk and my 
office mate has gone out, before going home I can leave a note on his desk 
saying that I won’t be “in HQ” before next Tuesday, knowing that he will know 
that I mean our office by HQ (“Head Quarters”). And he will know that I know 
that he knows what I mean. Also, when we both sit behind our desks, I can 
point towards the windowsill, where our coffee machine is situated. He may 
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nod, which I can take as an indication that he indeed would fancy a cup. This 
works because I know that he knows where our coffee machine stands, and I 
know that he knows that I know this, and I know that he is a coffee drinker, and 
that he knows that I know that he is. All these inferences about who knows what 
about the meaning of “HQ”, or the location of the coffee machine and the desire 
of it being put to use, can be derived from our personal common ground and the 
common ground provided by our co-presence in the same here-and-now. Most 
of the time, we never get around to drawing such inferences, although it is 
possible to think of contexts in which we might do so. For example, imagine 
him saying “no thanks” once I put the freshly brewed cup of coffee in front of 
him. We might enter a conversation about what went wrong in the previous 
communication: I could say that I thought he wanted coffee because he nodded 
when I pointed at the coffee machine, to which he might reply that he 
understood I wanted to lower the blinds and therefore pointed at the window. In 
this example, intentional reasoning seems to enter the stage only because of a 
misunderstanding inciting some reflection on differences in perspectives. 
Towards the end of this chapter I will follow up on this point of explicitly 
constructing the different perspectives involved in an interaction event, also in 
the light of the distinction between holistic and compositional complexity 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
The analysis at this point closely resembles what I have covered in    
Chapter 1 by introducing the “Schelling mirror world” (following Levinson, 
2006). Interlocutors toss into the Schelling mirror world a piece of behaviour 
(words, gestures, facial expressions, or otherwise) which they consider suitable 
for letting the other draw the desired inferences. “Meetings of the mind” 
(Levinson, 2006: 49) in this world can, as discussed, occur by virtue of having a 
shared sense of salience. We can now see that such a sense can be derived from 
common ground using the principle of self-other equivalence: I can pick the 
behaviour I find most appropriate in order to evoke a particular inference in my 
interlocutor, which is, given our common ground, by definition also the most 
appropriate inference in her eyes. Only if this goes wrong, may we need to 
figure out what happened asking ourselves what the other was thinking, and 
possibly what the other thought we were thinking, what the other thought we 
were thinking the other was thinking, and so on. Even without a previous 
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misunderstanding we may want to reflect on the communicative situation in 
such a way, perhaps for purposes of analysis or strategic planning ahead. 
Crucial, however, is that complex mindreading or intentional reasoning comes 
with such reflection, and is not relied on by default.75 
Or is it after all? How often do we need such reflection? Are we not in 
need of reflection on the communicative situation all the time, either implicitly 
or explicitly? As also mentioned in Chapter 1, various mechanisms seem to be 
saving communicators from having to engage in cognitively demanding 
mindreading most of the time. First, following the idea of relevance as worked 
out by Sperber and Wilson (1995; 2002) most communication comes down to 
the signaller picking the first (i.e. the most relevant) expression that comes to 
mind and the addressee picking the first interpretation that comes to mind. 
Sperber and Wilson themselves argue that sophisticated mindreading skills are 
needed for this process. However, I agree with Apperly that they seem to 
overlook that especially their updated account of relevance (2002) renders 
mindreading almost entirely superfluous: given that interlocutors are “in 
complementary predicaments”, it is “a good bet for [them] to follow their own 
individual cognitive paths of least resistance” (Apperly, 2011: 115). Both pick the 
most relevant expression or interpretation first; if this does not lead to a 
satisfactory result, they can try the second-most relevant expression or 
interpretation, thus working downwards on the gradient of relevance. This fits 
with what various psycholinguists studying “alignment” have found: Pickering 
and Garrod (2004) argue explicitly that due to these mechanisms (relevance, 
alignment) interlocutors can refrain from constantly making inferences about 
the other’s mindstates (see also Apperly, 2011: 116). Besides this, Apperly makes 
another point that is relevant here: in everyday interaction, we do not have to 
go to the bottom of everything. Rather, we seem to work with representations 
                                                
75 Note that Tomasello seems to come to a similar conclusion in his 2014 book (see especially 
page 38). However, it is unclear from this passage, and from the parts of his 2008 book that he 
refers to here, what his exact position is in “diachronic” and “synchronic” terms. Does he see 
shared intentionality as a feature that emerges from and is conceptually underpinned by layers 
of embedded intentionality, but is in practice usually not decomposed into these constituting 
layers? In that case he would defend the same diachronic story as Scott-Phillips (2015) does, but 
a (somewhat) different synchronic one. Alternatively, his view could be that both the diachronic 
and synchronic stories can do without these layers, which is what I suggest in this chapter and 
in the Conclusion below. 
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that are “good enough” for the interaction to keep going, but no better (2011: 114-
119 and personal communication). If required in a conversation, interlocutors 
can together work out a particular point in more detail, aiding and steering 
each other in the desired direction turn by turn. In Levinson’s (2006) terms: 
many conversations do not have a “signal-response” structure, but rather one of 
“testing-adjusting-retesting”.76  
What is more, not only are signaller and addressee experienced in 
choosing the most relevant cues and interpretations, the linguistic tools they 
have available also contain a wealth of such accumulated “experience”. After 
all, they have emerged in the course of generations of language users 
attempting to coordinate the perspectives of themselves, their interlocutors and 
possibly third-party referents. Verhagen (2005; 2015) shows, for instance, for 
deixis, negation, and particular discourse connectives how they work 
“argumentatively” in the process of negotiating how (potential) deviations from 
the common ground can be resolved, in order for the interaction to be able to 
continue. This, then, introduces the issue central in the second part of this 
chapter: starting from a set of shared intentional states as defined by the 
interlocutors’ common ground, it is possible to single out and highlight 
differences between individuals and the non-shared part of each of their 
intentional states, thereby enabling negotiation about how the common ground 
should be updated. This is the domain of viewpoint coordination in discourse, 
for which language has a great number of specific tools, some of which have 
been discussed in the previous chapters. The next section discusses a 
conceptual model for analysing this class of linguistic tools.  
The final question remaining for this subsection is what kind of structure 
is required on the cognitive level for this alternative model of interaction, 
starting from shared intentionality or common ground, to work. It is important 
to note that I am not suggesting that processing efforts needed to determine 
what is and what is not part of the common ground with an interaction partner 
                                                
76 This again fits well with Clark’s work on conversations as joint projects, in which interlocutors 
implicitly commit themselves to particular goals (which could be anything from setting a coffee 
meeting for tomorrow to cooperatively completing a complex building task) and converse 
about how the common ground has to be updated in order to achieve these goals (see Clark, 
2006).  
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are always little or insignificant compared to those needed for ostensive-
inferential communication according to Scott-Phillips. However, I argue that 
such efforts start at or close to zero by default (given that common ground is 
assumed a priori), and are then scaled up if necessary. In contrast to this, Scott-
Phillips suggests that we use “recursive mindreading up to level five” by default. 
At least regarding the “synchronic” part of the story (see Section 5.1 above), a list 
of requirements needed for my alternative model would look like this: 
 
(i) quick and fairly accurate abilities of distinguishing between 
individuals belonging to our own social network and/or particular 
cultural-linguistic communities we participate in; 
 
(ii) abilities to keep track of former interactions we had with others, and 
access these “records” during interaction; 
 
(iii) the capability to apply the principle of self-other equivalence, as 
needed to operate in the “Schelling mirror world”; 
 
(iv) the ability to reflect on individual perspectives and how they deviate 
from the common ground when prompted to do so, especially in the 
light of misunderstandings or other special circumstances that require 
scaling up of processing efforts. 
 
In the conclusion of this chapter I will get back to this list from a “diachronic” 
perspective, thus exploring consequences for our evolutionary story.  
With all of this in mind, let us now briefly return to Scott-Phillips’ and 
Sperber’s example of Mary and Peter communicating about berries being 
edible. I suggest that Mary and Peter live in a world where particular beliefs 
and intentions can be considered to be shared by default. Therefore, they can 
under normal circumstances bypass any intentional reasoning about what the 
other believes, what the other believes that they believe, and so on, including 
what the other will believe to be a meaningful signal and what not. If Mary 
wants Peter to believe that the berries are edible, she can just carry on picking 
and eating. Only if she wants to deviate from this default do things become more 
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complicated: for example, if she wants to mislead him about the berries being 
edible, or if she realises that he should not be thinking they are.77 In this case, 
she can reflect on the situation, deriving from the common ground what Peter 
will believe and reasoning about how this will change according to her 
behaviour. In other words, she can begin negotiations with Peter about how the 
common ground should be updated without further difficulties, and only if 




5.3 Coordinating mindstates in discourse 
 
In this section I will propose a conceptual model for analysing the broad and 
diverse class of linguistic items capable of viewpoint coordination. The purpose 
of my model is not primarily to introduce another practice of drawing schemas, 
next to for example Dancygier’s (2012) narrative spaces framework (as used in 
Chapter 3 and 4) or Fauconnier’s (1985) mental spaces. It can be used for 
schematically representing individual viewpoint configurations as prompted by 
particular linguistic items, and I consider it illuminating to do this a few times 
when explaining its details, but the main purpose of including it here is to make 
a point about the general structure and working of linguistic interaction. This 
point is, to provide an anticipatory summary, that many linguistic items not 
only work to draw attention to some object or concept in the world—a function 
often described as reference—but also, and mostly at the same time, to provide 
and manage perspectives on or stances towards these objects or concepts. In 
Chapter 3 and 4 I have referred to this as the polyphonic nature of discourse. As 
such, the point that most language usage also entails viewpoint coordination is 
recognised by many linguists and narratologists; however, focus has mostly 
been either on how signallers and addressees mutually coordinate their 
perspectives (see e.g. Langacker, 1990; Sweetser, 1990; Verhagen, 2005), or on 
                                                
77 In his original discussion of the example, Sperber (2000) does address the special case of 
misleading someone else. However, this does not alter his analysis that even in basic, straight-
forward cases intentional reasoning up to five orders is needed. 
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how third-party perspectives are represented (e.g. Fludernik, 1993; Bal, 2009; 
Hühn, Schmid and Schönert, 2009).78 The model of linguistic interaction 
proposed here integrates these functions all at once, instead of approaching 
them as distinct phenomena, thereby capturing the polyphonic nature of 
discourse in a conceptual model—giving it a schematic “face”, as it were. 
 
5.3.1 Dyadic and triadic communication 
Communication in non-human animals typically involves a sender producing 
some observable behaviour (the “signal”) that increases the likelihood of a 
receiver responding, i.e. behaving, in some particular way—for example, a bird 
signalling to a competitor to stay away from his territory. When the benefits of 
such a pattern of linked behaviours outweigh the costs for both senders and 
receivers, a (relatively) stable communication system may emerge. Thus, most 
non-human communication is about “regulating and assessing the behavior of 
others” (Owings & Morton, 1998: i). At this very basic level, the conceptual space 
needed to characterise communication is one-dimensional: no other dimension 
than that of the sender-receiver relationship is necessarily relevant to 
characterise a signal and its causes and effects. In the words of Tomasello (2008: 
23), animal communication is mostly “dyadic”: by far the majority of cases can 
be explained in terms of regulating others’ behaviours without having to take 
into account attention (let alone joint attention) to any objects of reference. 
 
                                                
78 An exception is Dancygier (e.g. 2012), and to some extent also Vandelanotte (e.g. 2009): their 
approaches also integrate insights from linguists’ interaction models with narratological views 




Figure 2 – Schematic depiction of “dyadic” communication as found in non-human animals. In 
Stage A there is no communication between the two depicted subjects (circles). Stage B shows 
the situation in which the sender (S) transmits a signal to the addressee (A) in order to influence 
the latter’s behaviour, thus establishing one-dimensional communication. (Possibly, this 
induces a response signal: the subject on the right then becomes S and the subject on the left A.) 
 
In contrast, human communication is prototypically “triadic” (Tomasello, 2008: 
23) as it is by default about referents in the (shared) world outside of the 
communicators and their interaction. Following this idea, the conceptual 
framework needed to characterise normal human communication should thus 
at least be two-dimensional: apart from the relation between the 
communicators, the relation to the world must be taken into account to 
characterise signals and their causal connections. In other words, at the heart of 
interaction using language lies joint attention to some object of 
conceptualisation (person, event, relationship, etc.) and negotiating a particular 
stance towards this object.79  
                                                
79 Nonetheless, there are some instances of communication in non-human animals where 
functional reference to objects in the “outside world” does seem to play a role; a well known 
case is that of vervet monkey calls referring to different types of predators (see Seyfarth, 
Cheney, and Marler, 1980;  Dennett, 1987: chapter 6). Conversely, humans also regularly engage 
in purely dyadic communication, such as greetings (“Hi!”) or warnings (“Watch out!”). However, 
as Owings and Morton (1998: 211) argue, functional reference in animal communication should 
not be analysed as providing information about entities in the world, since it would confuse 
short term with long term causation; objects such as a snake in a snake alarm call should be 
seen as “long-term validators of the signal’s utility”, not as real-world correlates of signals which 
are causally involved in the receiver’s response to the signal. In human communication, 
however, triadic communication does prototypically involve real-world objects of joint 
attention. 
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Figure 3 – In Stage A, where no communication takes place, the two subjects (circles) both have 
their own views (dashed lines) on some object (rectangle). Stage B depicts triadic 
communication: the signaller/speaker (S) and addressee (A) both assume a set of shared beliefs 
(the overlapping part of which is the common ground discussed in Section 5.2 above) and 
subsequently negotiate how the common ground should be updated with respect to the object. 
As will be discussed below, the used signals typically reflect both aspects of and operations on 
the relationship between S and A (the (x)-axis) and on the relationship between the common 
ground and the object (the (y)-axis). 
In simple terms, the two-dimensional conceptual space depicted in Figure 3 
makes a distinction between the “intentional” aspect of language, its capacity to 
be about some object in the world, and the “(inter)subjective” aspect of 
language, according to which sender and addressee negotiate a particular 
stance towards this object. These aspects are depicted by the (y)- and (x)-axes 
respectively. 
 The field of cognitive semantics also embraces the idea that the proper 
characterisation of language use requires a two-dimensional conceptual 
framework, but its background and history differ somewhat from the biological 
and psychological considerations made here. In fact, the cognitive view was 
explicitly designed by Langacker (1987) in opposition to so-called “objectivist” 
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approaches to semantics, which held that meaning in natural language could 
be fully characterised in terms of no more than its relation to the/some world 
(its contribution to “truth conditions”). Objectivist semanticists were thus 
precisely ignoring the “perspectival”, “(inter)subjective” (y)-axis. This axis is 
indispensable in Langacker’s view, since he claims that different “perspectival 
construals” are just as inherent components of linguistic meaning as reference 
is.80 
 What I will argue now is that a proper characterisation of viewpoint 
management in discourse (and of linguistic elements supporting viewpoint 
management), requires recognising a third dimension. I will begin with a single 
case that presents a problem for the two-dimensional model, and show how the 
addition of a separate dimension relating the present communicative situation 
to other ones, provides a straightforward solution. Subsequently, I will show 
that this new model also provides a very natural framework for the analysis of 
other items and viewpoint configurations. 
 
5.3.2 Speaker commitment and viewpoint embedding: Dalabon and 
English 
Consider the following utterance in the Australian language Dalabon and its 
English translation as suggested by Nicholas Evans (class lectures 2009, 




                                                
80 Objectivist approaches to language thus in fact also assume a one-dimensional conceptual 
framework for the analysis of meaning in natural language, but highlight the other dimension 
(i.e. the (y)-axis) instead of the dimension I have suggested to be relevant for non-human 
communication (the (x)-axis). Verhagen (2005) extended Langacker’s model by including a 
systematic distinction between the viewpoints of the sender and addressee, in order to bring out 
the fact that construal is not (just) a matter of a single viewpoint (“subjectivity”) with respect to 
some object, but one of mental coordination between signaller and addressee with respect to an 
object of joint attention (“intersubjectivity”). In hindsight, we can say that the framework 
proposed by Verhagen (2005: 7) represents a merger of the biological and cognitive-semantic 
views of human communication. 
81 I thank Nicholas Evans for permission to use this example in this context. See Evans (2010) for 
more examples of elements for viewpoint coordination (esp. ch. 4), and for the glossing method 
used.  
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(1) Ka-h-kangurdinjirrmi-nj  yangdjehneng bûrra-h-marnû-dulu-djirdm-ey 
3SG-ASS-GET.ANGRY-PSTPERF SUSPENDED-    3DUHARM.SUBJ>3SGOBJ-ASS-BEN-SONG- 
  COMMITMENT STEAL-PSTPERF 
He got upset [because]  [he thought that]  the two of them had stolen his song 
 
(2) He got upset [because] [he thought that] the two of them had stolen his 
song. 
 
“Because” and “he thought that” are inserted in the paraphrase by Evans. I will 
briefly discuss the causal marker “because” in note 82, but focus on the 
insertion of “he thought that” in detail first. It is clear that the lexical unit 
yangdjehneng, glossed as “SuspendedCommitment” does not literally mean “he 
thought that”, but rather conveys the message: “I, speaker, am not committed 
(to what I am going to say now)”. A paraphrase closer to the original expression 
is thus: 
 
(3) He got upset [because] [I, speaker, am not committed to this:] the two of 
them had stolen his song. 
 
At first sight, it may seem remarkable that Evans renders the lexical unit that 
functions as a marker of suspended commitment with a complementation 
construction in English—are the two indeed equivalents? To illustrate that, in 
an important sense, they are, consider the differences between the more 
idiomatic translation in (2) and the more literal one in (3). The absence of “he 
thought that” in (3) does not mean that “he” no longer had the thought that “the 
two of them had stolen his song”. In fact, awareness of the information in the 
second clause is equally implied in (2) and (3); if “he” had not had that thought, 
the stealing of the song could not have caused him to be upset. In both the 
Dalabon and English versions the speaker invites the addressee to view the 
information about “the two of them” having stolen the song from the 
perspective of a third party, namely “he” introduced at the beginning of the 
sentence. However, there are differences in the degree to which this is 
accentuated: the coordination of a third-party perspective is significantly more 
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pronounced in the idiomatic English translation in (2) compared to the Dalabon 
original (1) and its paraphrase in (3).  
 In a similar sense, the Dalabon element yangdjehneng, the English phrase 
“I, speaker, am not committed to this”, and the idiomatic pattern of sentence 
complementation using the stance verb to think all three negotiate a(n 
epistemic) stance of the speaker towards parts of the presented content: in (1), 
(2), and (3), the speaker does not assert as true that “they had stolen the song”. 
Yet the difference is again in the accentuation: in (1) and (3) the tempering of 
commitment by the speaker is realised “on stage”, whereas in (2) this remains 
implicit.  
 In both the Dalabon and English versions the speaker thus invites the 
addressee to view the information about the two of them having stolen the song 
from the perspective of a third party, namely “he” introduced at the beginning 
of the sentence. However, there are differences in the degree to which this is 
accentuated or profiled: the embedding of the information in a third-party 
perspective is done explicitly by means of a particular syntactic construction 
(complementation) and a particular matrix predicate (thought) in English, with 
the speaker’s reduced commitment remaining more implicit, while the latter is 
precisely being profiled by the Dalabon element yangdjehneng, with the third 
party’s relatively higher degree of responsibility remaining more implicit. In 
short, these conventional ways, in these two languages, of distributing 
responsibility for a piece of information over the speaker and another party are 
each other’s mirror image: what is explicitly “put on stage” and “what is left to 
inference” is so to speak reversed. But the totality of what is communicated with 
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these structurally very different expressions, is very much the same, in 
particular the connections between different relevant viewpoints.82 
 Can both the similarities and the differences between these expressions 
be stated in a single analytic framework? If we try to do so using the two-
dimensional model of triadic communication in Figure 3, it soon becomes clear 
that this requirement cannot easily be satisfied. If the function of the element 
yangdjehneng (“I am not committed to this”) is straightforwardly characterised 
as the speaker signalling to the addressee ((x)-axis) what his stance is towards 
((y)-axis) the object of conceptualisation (i.e. “the two of them had stolen his 
song”), the associated heightened responsibility for this view of the third party 
(“he”, the one who got upset), is necessarily left out. The reason is that this third 
party is only present in this model as an element of the situation being talked 
about, as an object of conceptualisation, and not as another subject taking a view 
on this situation. 
 Conversely, the representation of the complementation construction in (2) 
(“he thought that…”) does not work very well in a two-dimensional framework 
either, conceptually. In (2) “he” is clearly not only an object of conceptualisation 
(we are presented with what he thought), but at the same time, “he” should not 
be seen as a subject of conceptualisation in the same sense as the speaker and 
addressee either. After all, the negotiation of a stance towards the object of 
conceptualisation takes place between speaker and addressee, meaning that the 
speaker can, as a part of this negotiation process, invite the addressee to 
consider the perspective of a third party on some aspect of the object of 
conceptualisation. However, perspective can never shift completely to this third 
party in the course of the modelled interaction event (cf. the way it can jump 
                                                
82 The phenomenon of marking explicitly only some aspects of what is to be conveyed is, of 
course, not limited to viewpoint expressions; on the contrary, it is quite general and well-
documented for various conceptual relationships, including causality (see e.g. Verhagen, 2005). 
It should be noted that an analysis similar to the one given above applies to the pair (i) He got 
upset; the two of them had stolen his song and (ii) He got upset because the two of them had stolen his 
song. The conceptual representation of both (i) and (ii) contains a causal relationship (otherwise 
no coherent interpretation seems possible), but this is only marked explicitly, “on stage”, in (ii). 
The difference between the Dalabon and English idiomatic ways of expressing both viewpoints 
and causal relations can be characterized as a difference in the available tools, and in the 
conventional rules for using them in the different languages. See also Wilkins’ (1986) discussion 
of “particle/clitics” for criticism and complaints in Aranda, another Australian language, and his 
argument that these encapsulate “culture specific modes of thinking” that become clear when 
their use is explicated. 
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from one character to another in a novel). In other words, the view of the third 
party “he” can be instrumental in the speaker’s and addressee’s negotiation of a 
stance towards the object of conceptualisation, but “he” is himself not a 
participant in this negotiation process. All in all, the common problem when 
representing the sentences (1), (2), and (3) seems to be that in a two-dimensional 
conceptual model of communicative interaction, third-person conceptualisers 
can only be situated either at the level of the object of conceptualisation, or at 
that of the speaker and addressee, while in fact they normally belong to neither. 
 I therefore propose to treat other subjects of conceptualisation not as 
additional entities in the two-dimensional space, but as implying the addition 
of a third dimension, which links third parties exhibiting intentionality towards 
the relevant object of conceptualisation to the level of the negotiation process 
between speaker and addressee. The basic idea is captured in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4 – The three-dimensional conceptual model of interaction featuring a non-speaker, 
non-addressee subject of conceptualisation. 
 
We conceive of the third person represented in Figure 4 as a subject of 
conceptualisation in exactly the same way (i.e. with the same cognitive 
capabilities, including intentional reasoning) as the speaker and addressee. 
Moreover, the object of conceptualisation for this subject is (at least in part) the 
same as the one that the speaker is inviting the addressee to consider, capturing 
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the idea that the speaker presents the situation to the addressee from a third-
party perspective. 
 This basic model provides the conceptual space to mark precisely the 
similarities and differences between the Dalabon and English viewpoint items 
discussed above, regardless of the fact that they belong to completely different 
language systems. A graphic representation of these forms can be found in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively. 
 
Figure 5 – Dalabon: yangdjehneng 
 




As in the two-dimensional model, the negotiation of epistemic stance 
performed by both the Dalabon and English elements is highlighted along the 
(x)-axis between S(peaker) and A(dressee). In Figure 5, this axis is marked with 
a dark line, indicating foregrounding of the speaker’s epistemic stance by the 
Dalabon element yangdjehneng, glossed as “I, speaker, am not committed”. In 
Figure 6 this axis is marked with a light grey line, indicating that the English 
complementation construction with to think does impact upon the negotiation 
of epistemic stance between S and A, but in a less pronounced way than the 
Dalabon element does. 
What is new in Figure 4, 5, and 6 compared to the two-dimensional 
version in Figure 3 is the (z)-axis connecting the (x)-axis to a third party, in this 
case the person referred to using “he” and “his” in Evans’ translation in (2). On 
this axis, the reverse pattern obtains with regard to profiling: whereas in 
Dalabon this third-person perspective is only implied, indicated by a light grey 
line along the (z)-axis in Figure 5, in English it is explicitly realised “on stage”, 
indicated by a dark grey line on the (z)-axis in Figure 6. Thus, thanks to the 
additional (z)-axis, we now have a single format for representing that both the 
Dalabon and the English versions of the utterance invite the addressee to 
consider the third person’s perspective on the matter talked about, i.e. the 
(actual or imagined) stealing of the song by “the two of them”, and that they do 
so in different ways, by highlighting what parts of the configuration are 
linguistically marked in each language, and which are implicit, but made 
inferable. 
 
5.3.3. The general model 
When I first introduced the three-dimensional model, I stated (below Figure 4) 
that the additional intentional party is a subject of conceptualisation whose 
perspective is instrumental in the speaker’s and addressee’s negotiation of how 
the common ground should be updated with respect to an object of joint 
attention, without himself being a participant in this negotiation process. 
However, this third party may himself be represented by the speaker as being 
involved in another communicative interaction event, and in fact, this party 
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may be talking or thinking about yet another interaction event. Thus, we may 
in principle expect to encounter more elaborate constellations of several 
subjects all in some way considering the same object of conceptualisation from 
different viewpoints, and affecting (more and less mediated through the 
viewpoints of others) the negotiation between S and A of epistemic stance, 
attitude, etcetera. Such a constellation is depicted in Figure 7: 
 
 
Figure 7 – While communicating about some object of joint attention, S and A may refer to 
other interaction events, each featuring their participants. 
 
In the situation depicted in Figure 7, viewpoints from the other interaction 
events must, in one way or another, be relevant to how S and A assess their 
object of conceptualisation. As an example, imagine two people, Simon and 
Arran, waiting for a man named John to show up at their appointment. Simon 
has seen John the day before and when the appointment was mentioned, John’s 
daughter Mary kindly reminded her father that he is always late. Now Simon 
says to Arran that “John assured Mary that he would be on time”. Figure 8 




Figure 8 – “John assured Mary that he would be on time” 
 
In this example, there is thus another interaction event being called up within 
the current interaction: Simon coordinates his perspective on John’s expected 
time of arrival with Arran by referring to how John was coordinating his 
perspective on his arrival time with Mary the day before. He could have done 
this in numerous alternative ways, for example by saying “John said to Mary: 
‘I’ll be on time’”, “When I saw John and Mary, John thought he would be on 
time”, “John will be on time. He promised Mary”, and so on. All these 
alternatives feature a slightly different distribution of responsibility for what 
John said and the amount of commitment made by Simon to John being on 
time, given that some elements modify the nature of the relationship between 
third-person conceptualisers and the speaker and addressee in different ways. 
Thus, in this example, the use of indirect discourse and the choice, by the 
speaker, of the verb “assure” (unlikely to have been used by John himself), 
indicate some degree of co-responsibility of (and interpretation of John’s 
utterance by) the speaker, higher than with the use of a neutral verb of speaking 
and direct discourse (e.g. “John said to Mary: ‘I’ll be on time’”). These 
differences are as such interesting from a semantic, grammatical, or 
narratological perspective, but go beyond the point I want to make here—
which is that all alternatives feature different linguistic elements (words, 
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grammatical constructions, patterns of speech and thought representation) 
with different meanings, leading to a variety of overall interpretations, by 
operating on parameters within the same conceptual space: the relationship 
between the speaker and addressee ((x)-axis), the relationship of the 
communicative interaction with other interactions featuring third-parties ((z)-
axis), and all of their perspectives on the Object of conceptualisation ((y)-axis).  
 
5.3.3 Thoughtscapes and the model 
Some of the examples provided in Chapter 4 were drawn from news sources 
reporting on the “Pistorius case”, the tragic shooting of Reeva Steenkamp by 
athlete Oscar Pistorius. Recall that the difference between the competing 
versions of what happened during the night of the shooting completely 
depended on the construal of Pistorius’ intentional state at the moment of 
pulling the trigger: did he think he was shooting at a burglar or did he know his 
girlfriend was behind the bathroom door? The news media not only reported 
the perspective of the athlete, but also of police detectives, spokespeople, 
journalists, witnesses, family members, and so on. The result was what I termed 
a “thoughtscape”, a series of perspectives that are mutually connected and 
embedded in various ways. What could be found in the news reports was what I 
referred to as “polyphonic” discourse representing this thoughtscape: all kinds 
of linguistic elements were doing some part of the labour of coordinating the 
involved perspectives, including grammatical constructions (such as 
complementation and inquit-constructions), various patterns of reported 
speech and thought, lexical items (such as allegedly and accidentally), tense, 
modality, and more. One of the examples was the following opening sentence 
from a South-African press release: 
 
(4) Athlete Oscar Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot dead his girlfriend at 
his house in Pretoria on Thursday morning, Beeld.com reported. 
(SAPA, ‘Oscar Pistorius shoots girlfriend: report’, 14 February 2013) 
 
As a whole, (4) fits a particular embedding pattern, termed an inquit-
construction in Chapter 4, in which the reported clause precedes the reporting 
Chapter 5
 191 
clause (underlined). The inquit-construction does part of the viewpoint 
coordination: it attributes the claim that “Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot 
dead his girlfriend” to the perspective of newspaper Beeld.com. However, there 
are more viewpoints being coordinated. It is implied by the adverbs allegedly 
and accidentally (boldface) that some external source claims that Pistorius did not 
intend to shoot his girlfriend. In other words, already on the basis of one 
sentence, readers are confronted with a thoughtscape involving three 
viewpoints, without even counting the perspective of the speaker (i.e. the 
journalist who wrote the sentence). 
 I will first abstract from the reporting clause of the inquit-construction 
and concentrate on the reported content: 
 
(5) Pistorius allegedly accidentally shot dead his girlfriend. 
 
The words allegedly and accidentally are instantiations of what was in Chapter 4 
described as viewpoint packages, words implying a topology that introduces 
one or several extra viewpoint layers. In the case of accidentally, it is given in this 
topology that an agent did not intend X, but it is known that the outcome is X. 
In actual usage this topology is assimilated (through blending; see Chapter 3) 
with details provided in the immediate context. For example, readers of (5) will 
blend their knowledge of the topology of accidentally with “Athlete Oscar 
Pistorius” and “shot dead his girlfriend”, and take it that he shot her dead, but 
did not intend to do so. In this way, using accidentally the speaker invites his 
addressee to consider the perspective of a third party, in this case Pistorius. 
Since this is not highlighted explicitly, in the depiction below a light grey line is 





                                                
83 The word accidentally clearly also negotiates a relationship to an object in the world on the 
(y)-axis, but in my discussion here I will abstract from these relationships and focus on those 
indicated on the (x)- and (z)-axes. 
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Figure 9 – accidentally 
 
In a similar way, in the topology of allegedly it is given that some source X, not 
the speaker, asserts the content under the scope of this adverb. This topology 
can be elaborated to various degrees. The identity of source X can be given in 
the context, or left open, as is the case in (4): readers of this sentence will 
understand that some external source not specified here claims that Pistorius 
accidentally shot dead his girlfriend.84 In that sense allegedly shows strong 
similarities to the Dalabon element yangdjehneng cited in (1) above. It suggests 
the presence of an extra viewpoint, lowers the epistemic commitment the 
speaker makes to the related content, and, indeed, could also be “translated” 
using a complementation construction: 
 
(6) It is claimed that Pistorius accidentally shot dead his girlfriend. 
 
                                                
84 Recall that in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3, an alternative reading of (5) is discussed next to the one 
given here. However, distinguishing between these two options is not relevant here. 
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In terms of the present model, allegedly is thus a linguistic cue that negotiates a 
particular epistemic stance of the speaker, while at the same time inviting the 
addressee to consider the perspective of a third, in this case unspecified, party. 
It operates along the (x)- and (z)-axes, albeit without a particular emphasis on 
either. Consider the schematic depiction in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10 – allegedly 
 
A schematic rendering of (5), involving at the same time the viewpoint 
coordination effected by accidentally (i.e. the athlete not intending to shoot his 
girlfriend), is also possible in the proposed conceptual space. This involves the 
inclusion of one more viewpoint along the (z)-axis, which can be done as 
follows: 
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Figure 11 – Sentence (5) 
 
Finally, the perspective of Beeld.com, which is coordinated with respect to the 
reported content using the inquit-construction in (4), can be added to the 
picture. Given that the introduction of the perspective of Beeld.com takes place 
explicitly, “on stage”, a dark grey line is used here along the (z)-axis. The 
introduction of the two additional perspectives (Source X and Pistorius) as well 
as the negotiation of epistemic commitment is done implicitly, “off stage”, 






Figure 12 – Sentence (4) 
 
All in all, using the conceptual framework suggested here, and depicted 
schematically in Figure 4-12, I argue that linguistic elements across different 
categories, levels of analysis, and languages (lexical units, grammatical and 
narratological patterns, English, Dalabon) operate along three dimensions: 
speaker and addressee negotiate ((x)-axis) how the common ground should be 
updated with respect to a particular object of conceptualisation ((y)-axis), 
potentially by inviting the other to view this object of conceptualisation (in part) 
from the perspective of third parties ((z)-axis). In the case of some interaction 
events this process of updating the common ground involves no third-party 
perspectives at all (to those interaction events only the first two dimensions are 
relevant), whereas in other cases a complex thoughtscape is conjured up in the 
course of this process. Sometimes, the perspectives in these thoughtscapes are 
embedded into one another (cf. Figure 11 and 12) and sometimes they are related 
in different ways. For example, third parties can themselves be represented as 
being interlocutors in a different interaction event (cf. Figure 8), or their 
viewpoints can form meaningful conjunctions or exhibit causal relations from 
the perspective of the speaker and addressee. These latter two options have not 
been explored using examples in this chapter (however, Chapter 6 will feature 
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several examples). In conclusion, it is worth noting that the suggested 
conceptual space can accommodate such thoughtscapes comprising conjunct, 
causally related, or otherwise linked third-party perspectives: 
 
Figure 13 – In the course of some interaction events, a thoughtscape is conjured up taking the 
form of a network of perspectives related in various kinds of ways. This has been discussion in 
more detail in Chapter 3 and will be further discussed in Chapter 6. The dashed lines and 
circles suggest a conjunction between one single perspective and two perspectives exhibiting a 
form of embedding (e.g. “John believes that X while Mary thinks that Peter doesn’t want that 
X”).  
 
5.3.4 Updating the common ground 
In this final subsection I will introduce the view of viewpoint coordination as a 
matter of highlighting, negotiating, and anticipating how individual 
perspectives deviate from the common ground (see again also Clark, 1996). This 
view will be important throughout the next chapter and be built on in the 
Conclusion. As one last example, consider the following excerpt of a recorded 





(7) A:   oh dan is vandaag Allerheiligen. 
B:   ‘t is vandaag Allerheiligen ja. […] 
A:    oh oh dan heeft Ella zich denk ik vergist. 
        want ze dacht dat morgen Allerheiligen was en dan waren de 
 winkels beperkt open 
B:   ja. 
A:   nee dat is dat is uh dat is vandaag. 
 
A:   oh in that case today is All Saints. 
B:   today is All Saints indeed. […] 
A:   oh oh then I think Ella was mistaken. 
      because she thought that tomorrow was All Saints and then the shops  
  were only open for a limited period of time 
B:   yes. 
A:   no that is that is uh that is today. 
 
Interlocutor A finds out that Ella, a third-party subject not present in the 
current interaction event, falsely believed that All Saint’s Day was tomorrow. 
The underlying assumption is that knowledge of when this is, is part of the 
common ground within the cultural-linguistic community of which A, B, and 
Ella are apparently members. Interlocutor A first opposes Ella’s false belief-
state to the common ground using the viewpoint package “mistaken” (i.e. 
holistically in terms of Chapter 4), and then further elaborates using the 
complementation construction “she thought that tomorrow was All Saints” 
(compositionally in terms of Chapter 4). Just as in the example given above of my 
office mate and me having a misunderstanding (note the viewpoint package!) 
over whether pointing was directed at the coffee machine or the window blinds, 
the working out of different perspectives enters the stage in order to figure out a 
deviation from the common ground. 
In fact, this is not different with the Pistorius case: the entire thoughtscape 
hinges on the fact that there are two competing versions of the story (i.e. a 
crucial discrepancy in common ground) distributed over various third-party 
subjects. What the interaction as depicted in Figure 11 boils down to is a 
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journalist negotiating the exact nature of this difference in front of a reader. In 
Figure 8, depicting the situation of Simon saying to Arran “John assured Mary 
he would be on time”, we see how Simon singles out John’s perspective, which 
is contrasted to both interlocutors’ (and Mary’s) expectation that he will be late. 
Recall also once again the case of Shakespeare’s Othello discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2: the plot of this play combines multiple scenarios (revenge, a 
scheming plan, suspected adultery) that imply crucial knowledge differences 
between the involved parties, inducing a long sequence of negotiations about 
how various character mindstates deviate from a common ground. I will say a 
few more words about this point in the Conclusion, after it has been applied in 




5.4 Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
Verhagen (2005: 4) argues that “mental coordination” is an essential part of 
linguistic interaction, and therefore it is to be expected that languages have 
developed, over the course of their history, special conventionalised signals to 
support this function, in line with Du Bois’ (1985) claim that grammars code best 
what speakers do most. Verhagen (2005) focuses specifically on words and 
constructions (besides gestures, facial expressions, and other meaningful 
elements) which support mental coordination between speaker and addressee, 
but here I have cast the net wider and also included the marking and 
coordination of the mindstates of third parties, who may or may not be present 
at the time of speaking, or who may even exist only in the imagined worlds of 
thought and fiction. What I have argued is that linguistic items capable of 
viewpoint coordination serve to highlight and negotiate how individual 
perspectives deviate from the common ground. This reflects an important 
characteristic of human interaction: instead of starting from individual 
intentional systems that seek to become “paired”, the default is that 
interlocutors take part in a system of shared intentionality or common ground 
and negotiate how individual perspectives relate to this. 
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An important remaining question is how all of this affects our 
evolutionary story. As pointed out in Chapter 1, it is generally assumed that our 
ancestors had to reach a certain threshold of intentional reasoning capacity 
before communication “as we know it” could begin. Indeed, according to 
Sperber (2000) and Scott-Phillips (2015), the capacity to reason at five orders of 
intentionality had to predate “proper” ostensive-inferential communication. 
After all, individuals had to mutually recognise communicative and informative 
intentions, understanding that the other intends one to see that the other 
intends one to understand that something is the case. However, the view 
advocated in this chapter allows for an alternative: I suggest that our ancestors 
in some way first started to establish forms of common ground, and then 
developed increasingly sophisticated ways of singling out individual 
perspectives and ways in which they differed.85 This process is presently 
reflected in all kinds of linguistic items being capable of highlighting and 
negotiating how the perspectives of signallers, addressees, and third-party 
subjects relate to and, indeed, deviate from the common ground. 
Finally, note that this, on an abstract level, is a similar kind of theoretical 
“move” as the one made by Shultz et al. (2011) regarding early primate social 
life. Their evidence seems to support a scenario in which individuals first 
started living (c.q. foraging) in groups, and then developed increasingly 
profound dyadic bonds and relationships. In the Conclusion I will integrate this 
point in Dunbar’s framework as set our in Chapter 1. However, before getting 
there I will apply the developed views to the practice of assessing multiple-
order intentionality experimentally in the next chapter. 
                                                
85 Note that this is much in the fashion of what Moll and Tomasello (2007) term the “Vygotskian 
intelligence hypothesis” (cf. Vygotsky, 1978). 





The Mentalising Test Revisited 
 
 
In several parts of this thesis I have referred to “mentalising tests”, versions of 
the instrument used by experimental psychologists for assessing people’s 
ability to reason about intentional states at various levels of complexity. In the 
Introduction and in Chapter 1, various key findings of research using these tests 
were listed, such as the correlations between individuals’ mentalising scores 
and the sizes of their social networks, or the amount of grey matter in particular 
brain areas. In Chapter 2 a story used in a version of the test was cited (about 
Emma trying to get an increase in wages with her job at the greengrocer) and an 
example of a question was discussed (Jenny wanted Emma to believe that her 
boss thought…etcetera), after which the distinction was made between situations 
involving multiple orders of intentionality and their linguistic representation in 
the form of a proposition or narrative. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discussed 
representations of multiple-order intentionality across plays, novels, 
journalistic discourse, and spoken language. In Chapter 5, I have argued that, 
when interacting, reasoning about orders of intentionality enters the stage 
especially when we need to determine how individual perspectives differ from 
shared knowledge or common ground. The present chapter first discusses key 
issues of mentalising tests in general, in the light of insights from the previous 
chapters, followed by a detailed investigation of a selection of stories and 
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6.1 Five central conclusions of the mentalising-test paradigm 
 
As discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 2, in mentalising tests 
“complexity” has always been conceptualised as the number of embedded 
intentional states featured in each question, following Dennett’s scale of the 
orders of intentionality (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1). As an illustration, consider 
the following two true/false-statements86 from the version of the mentalising 
test used by Brown (more details of her study follow in 6.2 below):  
 
(1) Sam wanted to buy a stamp 
(2) Henry knew Sam believed he knew where the Post Office was 
 
After a short story was read out twice, participants had to answer “true” or 
“false” for twenty of such statements. Ten were “intentionality questions” and 
concerned intentional states of characters featured in the story; the other ten 
were “memory questions” and concerned factual details, for example: 
 
(3) The Post Office was closed because it had moved to Bold St 
 
In the case of intentionality questions, the level of complexity for each question 
is determined by counting the number of embedded intentional states, whereas 
in the case of the memory questions, complexity corresponds with the number 
of factual details included in the statement. In this way, statement (1) has 
complexity level 2, since the participant has to work at second-order 
intentionality following Dennett’s scale: the intentional system (the participant) 
has to know1 whether or not Sam wanted2 to buy a stamp. Statement (2) has 
complexity level 4, since the participant has to know1 whether or not Henry 
knew2 Sam believed3 he knew4 where the Post Office was. In a similar way, 
statement (3) is a memory question at complexity level 2, since it has two factual 
                                                
86 Some of the studies used true/false statements and others (such as the original study by 
Kinderman et al. (1998) or the recent one by O’Grady et al. (2015) discussed below) presented 
two alternative statements from which participants had to choose the right option. 
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elements which have to be checked against the story: the Post Office was closed1 
because it had moved to Bold St2. 
The original finding by Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall (1998), who used 
a test comprising five such stories and sets of questions, is that error rates go up 
steeply at complexity level 6 (when counting as explained above)87 in 
intentionality questions, but not in memory questions. The following graph 
presents this result: 
 
 
Figure 1 – Graph from the original paper by Kinderman et al. (1998). The proportion of 
incorrect answers (error rate) is indicated on the y-axis; the level of complexity on the x-axis. 
Mentalising questions are labeled “Theory-of-Mind”; questions about factual details “Memory”; 
n=77 participants.  
 
The asymmetry between error rates at higher levels in intentionality versus 
memory questions, along with indications of significant variance in 
performance between participants, as found in this study, were interpreted as 
                                                
87 It is important to note that in this paper the number of orders was counted starting from level 
0, which means that their level 1 would be referred to as level 2 in terms of the counting method 
used in this thesis and in by far the majority of cases throughout the literature. In the counting 
of Kinderman et al. (1998), error rates thus went up at level 5 instead of level 6. The rationale 
behind the common way of counting is given in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1: in for example (1) above, 
the participant has to work at second-order intentionality, since s/he has an intentional state 
about Sam having an intentional state. 
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the first evidence for three of the total of five central conclusions of the 
mentalising-test paradigm that I will distinguish:88 
 
conclusion (i) In mentalising questions, mean error rates remain constant 
or increase to a limited degree with each level of complexity 
added, until a steep increase takes place at level 6 (i.e. level 5 
counting according to Kinderman et al.), suggesting the 
presence of a natural “limit” at that level. 
conclusion (ii) There is significant between-subject variance in error rates 
at the different levels of complexity, suggesting that some 
individuals have their “limit” at level 4, some at level 5, some 
at level 6, and some at an even higher level of mentalising 
complexity. 
conclusion (iii) Performance on mentalising and memory questions is 
related (participants making more mistakes in memory 
questions, also tend to make more in intentionality 
questions), but the results cannot be explained in terms of 
memory alone: beyond remembering multiple, mutually 
related details from the story (which is necessary for 
answering both types of questions), reasoning about 
embedded intentional states adds an extra challenge, as 
reflected in the differences in error rates at especially the 
higher levels of complexity. 
Another issue investigated in the paper by Kinderman et al. concerns 
correlations between scores on the mentalising questionnaire and scores on 
another test, known as the “Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions 
                                                
88 I will refer to research using versions of the discussed method as studies within the 
“mentalising-test paradigm”. The original title of the questionnaire was the “Imposed Memory 
Task” or “IMT”, and it is sometimes referred to using this title across the literature. 
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Questionnaire” or “IPSAQ”. This latter test was designed to measure 
participants’ tendency to attribute negative and positive experiences in social 
settings to either themselves, others, or situational circumstances. A (strongly) 
increased tendency to see others as responsible for negative social events is 
associated with psychopathological disorders (most notably, paranoia). In a 
healthy subject population, there is nonetheless individual variation in how 
such attributions are made. Kinderman et al. showed that this variation in part 
correlates negatively with mentalising performance: those individuals who 
exhibited less ability to reason about intentional states had a higher tendency to 
attribute negative social events to others (or, put bluntly, “were somewhat more 
paranoid”). This was interpreted as the first evidence for what can be identified 
as the fourth central conclusion of the mentalising-test paradigm: 
 
conclusion (iv) Mentalising performance is relevant to people’s actual 
social lives: an individual’s mentalising score tends to be 
reflected in indicators of this person’s social life and general 
aptitude in the social domain. 
The patterns found by Kinderman et al. have been replicated in an array of 
subsequent studies among different participant populations. These studies 
used improved versions of the mentalising questionnaire and introduced new 
measures against which the mentalising scores were tested. In this way, they 
have yielded additional evidence for the conclusions (i) – (iv), and added a fifth 
one situated in the neuroscientific realm (see below). The most important 
additions include findings pertaining to several domains of social and cognitive 
functioning, further supporting conclusions (ii) and (iv). First, performance at 
higher levels of mentalising complexity was found to be lost in patients 
suffering from bipolar disorders (Kerr, Dunbar, and Bentall, 2003). Secondly, 
estimates of people’s personal social network size turned out to be associated 
with their mentalising scores. Stiller and Dunbar (2007) found that people who 
exhibited higher mentalising performance, on average tended to have a larger 
“support clique” (defined as the innermost circle of social contacts, from which 
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one receives emotional support).89 Thirdly, studies using a version of the 
mentalising test adapted for children indicated that higher scores were 
associated with higher social competence as independently rated by their 
teachers (Liddle and Nettle, 2006). Moreover, associations were found between 
mentalising performance and personality traits (Nettle and Liddle, 2008; Van 
Duijn et al., 2014), schoolgrades (Van Duijn et al., 2014), empathy, and aspects of 
executive functioning (Launay et al., 2015). 
The fifth and final central conclusion of the mentalising-test paradigm 
can be formulated as follows: 
 
conclusion (v) Mentalising performance is related to brain size, in 
particular to the amount of grey matter in the orbital 
prefrontal cortex in humans. 
This conclusion forms an important background to the idea, discussed earlier at 
the end of Chapter 1, that our hominid ancestors gradually, over many 
generations, evolved an increasing capacity for mentalising, going from a limit 
at around complexity level 2 in our last common ancestor with chimpanzees 
and bonobos, through a limit at level 3 in homo erectus, one at level 4 in archaic 
humans, and eventually a limit at level 5 or 6 in anatomically modern humans 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.6 above). This idea rests on the pillars of two findings. 
Firstly, monkeys with smaller brains seem capable of only first-order 
intentional attributions, whereas monkeys and apes with relatively bigger 
brains can (under certain circumstances) handle second-order intentionality 
(see e.g. Call and Tomasello, 2008). Secondly, as expressed in (v), there is 
evidence in humans that the subjects in test populations who perform better at 
mentalising tests, have more brain volume in the orbital prefrontal cortex, an 
area associated with various aspects of social functioning (Powell et al., 2010; 
Lewis et al., 2011). More precisely, the claim is that the amount of grey matter in 
the orbital prefrontal cortex is positively correlated with social network size, 
                                                
89 Even more interesting than the correlation with mean support clique size might actually be 
the possibility that mentalising competence imposes a limit on an individual’s maximum 
possible support clique size—Stiller and Dunbar find some support for this suggestion in their 
data (see 2007: 98-100). The correlations of mentalising scores with estimates of mean social 
network size were replicated by Lewis et al. (2011), Powell et al. (2012), and Powell et al. (2014). 
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and that this relation is mediated by mentalising competence (Powell et al., 2012; 
Powell et al., 2014). Note that this comes down to a within-species version of the 
social brain hypothesis: bigger and more powerful brains allow for the 
management of larger and more complex social networks not only between 
different species of primates, but also between human individuals.90  
All in all, the current status quaestionis is that individuals having 
relatively more brain volume in particular areas relevant to social functioning 
(through genetic or developmental factors, or both), possess some social 
competences that can be measured using the mentalising test. As a 
consequence of these social competences they can maintain a larger and more 
complex social network. What those social competences measurable with 
intentionality tests entail precisely is unclear, but they correlate with particular 
psychometric measures (causal attribution of negative and positive social 
events) and indicators of traits such as short-term memory performance, 
personality, empathy, and, potentially, executive functioning. I will get back to 
this interpretation below and in the Conclusion. 
 
  
6.2 Testing mentalising competence 
  
For non-human species, a broad range of behavioural tests have been 
developed to investigate their abilities and limitations in reasoning about 
intentional states. Examples include (to name just a few) interpreting 
informative cues (e.g. Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Tomasello, 2008), hiding 
and tracking food in competition with others (e.g Hare et al., 2006, for 
chimpanzees; Clayton and Emery, 2004, for corvids), or working together to 
gain access to food (De Waal, 2005; Yamamoto, Humle, and Tanaka, 2012). Such 
                                                
90 The same trend has been found in macaques, although evidence there seemed to indicate 
that the increase in grey matter in relevant areas was the result of living in a larger social 
network rather than a precondition (see Sallet et al., 2011). This interpretation seems also 
feasible in humans: living in more complex social environments (such as a larger personal 
social network) could increase social capability, which is then reflected in the amount of grey 
matter one has in the orbital prefrontal cortex and one’s scores on a mentalising test. Note that 
these scenarios (more complex social life>more grey matter; more grey matter>more complex 
social life) are not mutually exclusive: “boot-strapping” or co-evolution is a likely possibility. 
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tests have broadly been combined with observations in the wild and other 
forms of “anecdotic” evidence (in the non-pejorative sense; see e.g. De Waal, 
2005; Boesch, 2005).  
For normally developed human adults, as well as for infants and several 
“special” subject populations (such as individuals suffering from 
psychopathological disorders), an even greater variety of tests attempting to 
provide insight into intentional reasoning abilities have been used (see Apperly 
2011 for an overview). Roughly, these tests can be classified as follows: 
 
 explicit/reflective implicit/behavioural 
1st- and 2nd-order A B 
3rd-order and above C D 
 
Table 1 
Categories A and C include tests that are mediated by descriptive language of a 
kind one would not normally find in interaction. Such language usage is very 
similar to what is in Chapters 1 and 2 referred to as “propositional” or “formal”. 
For example, the proposition “Mary intends that John believes that it is raining 
outside” is quite different in nature from the actual (linguistic and/or non-
linguistic) behaviour one can expect Mary to exhibit in the described situation, 
which would probably consist of saying “Hey, it’s raining”, “Be prepared to get 
wet”, or just handing John an umbrella (see also Section 6.2.3 below on this 
point). In a similar way, classic false-belief tasks (such as the original version of 
the Sally-Ann test, see Apperly, 2011: chapter 2) ask of participants to reflect on a 
situation using explicit descriptions of mindstates and behaviour, rather than 
participating in such a situation oneself, which makes them fall under A in the 
above matrix. For the same reason, classic mentalising tests (following 
Kinderman et al., 1998) fall under C, since participants have to read a story 
describing a social situation and then are asked to reflect on this situation by 
judging statements as true or false.  
By contrast, implicit/behavioural tests, indicated by B and D in the above 
matrix, ask of participants to take part in a (controlled) social situation. 
Examples of such tests include those in which children have to provide a 
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particular kind of help to an experimenter who tries to solve a task (after which 
conclusions can be drawn about their ability to judge the experimenter’s goals; 
see Tomasello, 2008) or a “Schelling game” in which participants have to ask 
themselves what the other would do, what the other will think they would do, 
and so on. Note that in practice, A/C and B/D are extremes on a scale rather 
than clear-cut categories. For example, Baron-Cohen’s (2001) Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes-test could be located somewhere in the middle, as it does use 
descriptive language to label the moods that participants are supposed to pick 
up from the pictures they are shown (more A), but also involves the “implicit” 
act of reading the eyes (more B).91 
In what follows, the focus will be on three studies that can be located on 
the imaginary scale ranging from C to D. One is a “classic” mentalising test, 
close to the Kinderman et al. (1998) original. The other two broadly maintain 
the format, but replace stories and/or questions by dialogues or movie clips, 
marking a move from C (somewhat) towards the direction of D in the matrix 
above. I will refer to each study using the surname of its primary investigator. 
The studies can be outlined as follows: 
 
Brown  This is a classic mentalising study (C in the matrix above) 
that was performed using a questionnaire adapted from 
the original by Kinderman et al. (1998). It was run by 
Rachel Brown as a pilot for subsequent neuroimaging 
studies (leading to the publication of Lewis et al., 2011) and 
remained unpublished. It featured 25 participants (18 
female; age 21-76) to whom the stories were read out twice, 
after which the same was done with each question (they 
could not see the story or the questions in written form so 
they had to go by their ears). Each story was followed by 
around 20 questions, typically 10 intentionality and 10 
                                                
91 Note that this scale is also to some degree meaningful in the case of tests for non-human 
animals. Even though such tests are of course non-linguistic, they can still be more reflective or 
more behavioural: for example, Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) chimpanzee Sarah had to 
choose which tool use could solve a task using video recordings (which is, relatively, more A), 
whereas chimpanzee’s in an experiment by Yamamoto et al. (2012) had to actually hand the 
right tool to a peer themselves (which is B). 
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memory ones in random order. Participants had to answer 
“true” of “false” using two buttons after each question. 
 
Haddad This study, run by Anneke Haddad, had the same 
procedure as Brown’s, but stories were replaced by 
dialogues that were recorded using different voices for 
each character (thus arguably moving slightly on the scale 
from C to D, given that the dialogues mimic real-life 
interaction more closely than descriptions of social 
interaction do). However, the questions were still 
presented in the classic format. There were two 
participant groups: adolescents and adults. Slightly 
different versions of the dialogues were used to attune to 
each participant group: “colleague” was replaced by “class 
mate” for adolescents, and so on. The results are currently 
under review; I thank Anneke Haddad for permitting me 
to use her study here. 
 
O’Grady This study, run by Cathleen O’Grady, was recently 
published in Evolution and Human Behaviour (O’Grady, 
Kliesch, Smith, and Scott-Phillips, 2015) and comprised 
four conditions: (i) stories acted out and presented using 
movie clips, followed by a series of pairs of alternative 
continuations of the story also in acted movie clips, one of 
which was “true” and the other “false” (called the 
“implicit-implicit” condition by the authors); (ii) acted 
movie clips followed by pairs of alternative propositions 
read out by one “actor” facing the camera (implicit-
explicit); (iii) stories read out by one actor facing the 
camera, followed by pairs of alternative continuations of 
the story in acted movie clips (explicit-implicit); and (iv) 
stories read out followed by propositions read out 
(explicit-explicit). Participants were allowed to watch each 
item as often as they wanted, but could not go back once 
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they had gone to the next item. The conditions can be 
placed on the scale from C to D in reverse order: (iv) is 
closest to C, (iii) and (ii) are in between, and (i) is relatively 
closest to D. However, none of the conditions is “D 
proper”, given that even the implicit-implicit condition, 
featuring movie clips mimicking real-life interaction to 
some degree, yields a reflective rather than a behavioural 
test. Participants were 66 students (41 female) who 
declared that they did not know the actors in any of the 
movie clips. 
 
Below I will discuss selected examples from these studies; more questions and 
stories can be found in the Online Appendix (see note 95). Given that Haddad’s 
and O’Grady’s studies are derived from the type of study represented here by 
Brown, I will discuss this latter one in detail and use it as a benchmark against 
which the other two can be compared. 
 
6.2.1 Narratives and propositions 
Brown’s study is a good representative of what could be called the “classic” 
mentalising study. It used a questionnaire close to the Kinderman et al. (1998) 
original, which was also used (abstracting from some various smaller revisions) 
in many other studies over the years, for example: Stiller and Dunbar (2007), 
Powell et al. (2010), Lyons, Caldwell, and Shultz (2010), Lewis et al. (2011), Powell 
et al. (2012), Powell et al. (2014), and Launay et al. (2015). I will first discuss some 
issues I consider to be general for al these studies, using the first story and 
question set of Brown’s questionnaire. 
 
 
(4) WHERE’S THE POST OFFICE?  
 
Sam wanted to find a Post Office so he could buy a Tax Disc for his car. He 
was already late buying one, as his Tax Disc had run out the week before. 
Because traffic wardens regularly patrolled the street where he lived, he 
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was worried about being caught with his car untaxed. As Sam was new to 
the area, he asked his colleague Henry if he could tell him where to get one. 
Henry told him that he thought there was a Post Office in Elm Street. 
When Sam got to Elm Street, he found it was closed. A notice on the door 
said that the Post Office had moved to new premises in Bold Street. So Sam 
went to Bold Street. But by the time he got there, the Post Office had 
already closed. Sam wondered if Henry, who was the office prankster, had 
deliberately sent him on a wild goose chase. When he got back to the 
office, he asked another colleague, Pete, whether he thought it likely that 
Henry had deliberately misled him. Pete thought that, since Sam had been 
anxious about the Tax Disc, it was unlikely that Henry would have 
deliberately tried to get him into trouble. 
 
After hearing the story twice, participants were presented with the questions 
listed below (answer and level are added here; during the test questions were 
presented in mixed order). They received the instruction: “do not guess, if you 
think you cannot answer the question on the basis of (what you remember 
from) the story, choose ‘false’”. 
 
 Intentionality questions Answer Level 
1 Sam wanted to buy a stamp F 2 
2 Henry wanted to play a trick F 2 
3 Henry thought that Sam knew he was a prankster F 3 
4 Pete suspected that Henry was playing a prank on Sam F 3 
5 Henry knew Sam believed he knew where the Post Office was T 4 
6 Sam thought Henry knew he wanted a Tax Disk F 4 
7 Sam thought that Henry knew the Post Office was in Bold Street 
and hence that Henry must have intended to mislead Sam 
T 5 
8 Sam believed that Pete thought the Post Office was in Elm Street 
and hence that Pete must not have intended to mislead Sam 
T 5 
9 Pete wanted Sam to know that Henry believed that the Post Office T 6 
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was on Elm Street and hence did not intend to mislead him 
10 Pete wanted Sam to know that he believed that Henry had 
intended not to mislead him 
T 6 
    
 Memory questions   
11 Sam needed a Tax Disc from the office F 1 
12 The Post Office was closed and Sam's insurance had run out F 2 
13 The Post Office was closed because it had moved to Bold St T 2 
14 The Post Office in Elm St. had a notice on the door T 2 
15 Sam left Bold Street, then went to the office and spoke to Pete T 3 
16 Sam found the Post Office closed and couldn't buy a tax disk for 
Pete 
F 3 
17 Pete, the man who worked at the same place as Henry, and who 
knew that Henry was the office prankster, was Sam's cousin 
F 4 
18 Sam asked Henry, and did not ask Pete or the traffic wardens, 
about where the Post Office was in order to buy a Tax Disk 
T 4 
19 Sam who worked with Pete and Henry did not know where to buy 
a Tax Disk because he was new to the area 
T 4 
20 Henry, the man that Sam spoke to about where to buy a Tax Disk 





Looking at this test, several observations can be made. First of all, some of the 
formulations of the questions are quite puzzling: it could well be that the 
participants did understand the story correctly, even remembered the relevant 
details about who-knew-what, who-wanted-what (etc.), but then got lost when 
dealing with the questions. As discussed in Chapter 2, propositions of the form 
used for the higher-order questions (such as questions 7, 8, 9, and 10) do not 
exist in the “wild”, so language users cannot rely on experience when assessing 
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them.92 The stories communicate the same information in a somewhat more 
natural way: in fact, they offer another demonstration that in natural 
communication “narrative takes over” when more than three perspectives are 
involved. This leads to the first general issue: 
 
issue (i) Classic mentalising tests use narratives to present a social 
situation, but use propositions to present the questions. 
Especially above complexity level 3, such propositions are 
a very unnatural way of representing intentional states in 
discourse. With the analysis from Chapter 2 in mind, I 
suggest that the unnatural presentation of the questions 
can be a factor limiting performance on especially higher 
levels of complexity. 
 
On top of this, the propositions used in the questions vary in complexity, 
measured in terms of the number of embedded mindstates they present. 
However, in the stories mindstates may not only be embedded into one 
another, but also connected in different ways. As an example, consider the 
following two sentences from the story cited (4) above: 
 
(5) Sam wondered if Henry, who was the office prankster, had deliberately 
sent him on a wild goose chase. When he got back to the office, he asked 
another colleague, Pete, whether he thought it likely that Henry had 
deliberately misled him. 
 
Looking at this passage in the way used to analyse the narrative texts in Chapter 
3 and the news-paper excerpts in Chapter 4, one must conclude that it 
                                                
92 An indication that such sentences are very infrequent or even non-existent at least in spoken 
discourse is that the Corpus of Spoken Dutch (CGN; 10 million words) features not a single 
sentence with four or more embedded intentional clauses (see also Chapter 2). Note that from 
this indication that these sentences are idiosyncratic in the context of everyday interaction it 
does not automatically follow that the test cannot be used to assess some aspects relevant to 
such interaction—quite generally, tests do of course not always have to mimic their target 
subject as closely as possible to be valid. However, when interpreting test results it is crucial to 
know in what respects the test differs from “real life”, and in what follows I suggest that, in the 
case of studies investigating mentalising using the test described in this section, this has not 
always been in clear focus. 
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coordinates a thoughtscape of mutually interlinked, but not necessarily 
embedded, intentional states. First of all, there is a narrator providing insight in 
the perspective of Sam. Using a form of indirect thought (“wondered if…”), the 
reader (or, in the experimental setup, hearer) is informed that Sam wants to 
know whether or not Henry had deliberately sent him to the wrong location, in 
order to play a prank. Within the scope of Sam’s thoughts, there are thus two 
alternative mindreads of Henry’s intentions: either Henry intended to provide 
the right location but did not know that the post office had moved, or he did 
know that the post office had moved, but intended to provide the wrong 
location because he thought that this would be funny. Eventually, Sam checks 
with Pete what he thinks Henry had intended. Readers end up with the 
knowledge that Sam still has two alternative mindreads of Henry to choose 
from, plus Pete’s opinion on which one is the most likely. 
Put more compactly, the second issue is: 
 
issue (ii) Narrative language usage features all kinds of cues that 
prompt and mutually coordinate intentional states of 
characters. As the analysis in Chapter 3 showed, a 
thoughtscape emerging in this way is easily 
misrepresented by propositions featuring only embedded 
mindstates. This suggests a structural discrepancy between 
the nature of the complexity presented in the stories and 
in the questions. 
 
Related to this, an observation that can be made repeatedly in especially 
higher-order questions in Brown’s study is that the chains of embeddings are 
“broken”. Consider question 7 as an example: 
 
7. Sam thought that Henry knew the Post Office was in Bold Street and 
hence that Henry must have intended to mislead Sam93 
 
                                                
93 Given that the questions from Brown’s study are already numbered in Table 2, when citing 
them I will not continue my regular numbering between brackets: (1), (2), and so on. 
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The method of schematic depiction of “narrative spaces” introduced in Chapter 
3 is once again a useful tool here. The following configuration of narrative 
spaces can be drawn on the basis of question 7: 
 
 
Figure 6 – Schematic depiction of the narrative-spaces configuration prompted by question 7. 
NS1 and NS2, together with the background knowledge gained earlier when reading the story, 
work as premises for the conclusion drawn in NS3 and NS4. Sam is the main focaliser in NS1 
and all spaces within this space (NS2, NS3, and NS4); Henry is an embedded focaliser in NS2 
and NS4. Note that NS4 contains a viewpoint package (“mislead”) that could be unpacked into 
further spaces (see Dancygier, 2012, and Chapter 3 above for more details about narrative 
spaces). 
 
Question 7 is not composed of a continuous string of four embeddings, but 
instead of a proposition exhibiting two embeddings (“Sam thought Henry knew 
the Post Office was in Bold Street”), coupled to another proposition (“Henry 
must have intended to mislead Sam”) using a combination of connectives 
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marking causality (“and hence”).94 This is different in question 10, in which the 
chain is unbroken: 
 
10. Pete wanted Sam to know that he [Pete, MvD] believed that Henry 
had intended not to mislead him [Sam, MvD] 
 
Here the following schematic depiction can be drawn: 
 
 
Figure 7 – Schematic depiction of the narrative-spaces configuration prompted by question 10. 
As in the case of Zunshine’s paraphrase of Mrs Dalloway discussed in Chapter 3, each narrative 
space is embedded into the former one. 
                                                
94 Note that alternative interpretations of how the question should be read can lead to slightly 
different narrative-spaces configurations. The one drawn here would in fact be expressed more 
naturally by the sentence: “Sam thought that Henry knew the Post Office was in Bold Street and 
hence that Henry must have intended to mislead him”). Usage of “Sam” instead of “him” seems 
to suggest that the second proposition (NS3 and NS4) is not what Sam thought (so not part of 
NS1), but instead added by an external observer/narrator (hence best drawn as part of the MNS 
in Figure 2). However, this interpretation is again countered by the word “must” (suggesting an 
inference on Sam’s part), meaning that the interpretation drawn here seems to fit best after all. 
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A similar broken-chain structure as in question 7 can be found in the questions 
8 and 9 cited in Table 2 above, as well as in a handful other questions 
throughout the questionnaire.95  
The paper presenting the results of O’Grady’s study (see O’Grady et al., 
2015) begins with a critical discussion of the questionnaire used in most 
previous studies, of which Brown’s study discussed here also uses a version. 
The authors object to the use of broken-chain questions, stating that instead of 
testing a “single metarepresentational unit” of higher-order complexity, these 
test the conjunction of multiple lower-order mindreading tasks that can be 
processed as separate chunks. This means that participants can possibly use a 
short-cut to determine the right answer: in some cases they can check the 
separate parts against the “reality” of the story without ever having to 
considering the statement as a whole (more about this below). O’Grady et al. 
argue that including broken-chain questions therefore boils down to a 
methodological flaw. I agree with their critical stance in as far as comparing 
questions with and without broken chains is concerned: it may be 
methodologically tricky to assume that a, say, fifth-order question with a 
broken chain exhibits the same complexity as one without a broken chain. 
However, regarding the general validity of both types of questions I come to a 
different conclusion. Whereas O’Grady et al. suggest to avoid broken-chain 
questions because they do not test “real” higher-order mindreading, my 
analysis suggests they may in fact be better at testing how well participants 
understood the relationships between intentional states contained in the story. 
As pointed out in issue (ii) above, the story presents the intentional states not as 
being just embedded, but instead prompts a thoughtscape of intentional states 
that are interconnected in all kinds of ways. From that perspective, a question 
such as 7 above exhibits a structure that is more “realistic”, compared to the 
narrative presentation of events in the story, than does question 10. Broken-
chain questions, as it were, “burst” out of the artificial straitjacket of 
embedding-only propositions above a certain level of complexity and adopt a 
structure that leaves more space for expressing the viewpoint complexity 
                                                
95 The broken-chain/narrative structure can be found in questions 29, 30, 31, 48, 50, 67, 68, 69, 70, 
and 85. See the Online Appendix for the full questionnaire at 
http://liacs.leidenuniv.nl/~duijnmjvan/TLM/Appendix, password “thelazymindreader”. 
Chapter 6
 219 
contained in the story in a nuanced way—once again narrative seems to be 
taking over. 
 
6.2.2 Packages and inferences drawn from the common ground 
Some of the viewpoint layers are fully spelled out in the story, i.e. prompted 
compositionally, to use the term introduced in Chapter 4. For example, “Sam 
wondered if Henry […] had deliberately sent him on a wild goose chase” 
features the compositional construction of Sam’s viewpoint using the verb 
“wondered” and the complement “if Henry […] had deliberately sent him on a 
wild goose chase”. However, there are additional layers contained in the story 
that are coordinated holistically: following the conditions defined in Chapter 4, 
the word “mislead” is a viewpoint package adding extra viewpoint layers from 
which the related content can be seen. The same goes for “prank(ster)” and 
arguably for “deliberately” and “sending someone on a wild goose chase”. The 
entire possible mindread of Henry knowing where the post office is, but deliberately 
telling Sam the wrong location because he thinks this is funny, is nowhere spelled 
out but added holistically by the combination of these cues. It is possible for the 
reader or hearer to unpack (or decompress; cf. Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6) this 
mindread into single constituent propositions (as I just did in italics), but this is 
not necessary for following the story as such: as argued in Chapter 4, readers or 
hearers can take a viewpoint package on board holistically, and integrate only 
its relevant implications in their understanding of the situation. 
The third and fourth issue I want to point out pertain to these dynamics 
of unpacking (or not unpacking) the situations and events presented by the 
story into single viewpoint layers. Consider again the passage cited in (5) above, 
this time in relation to question 2: 
 
2. Henry wanted to play a trick 
 
There is no direct evidence that Henry wanted to play a trick, but also no 
conclusive evidence to the contrary. Or more precisely: it is not written 
explicitly in the story that Henry wanted to play a trick (i.e. there is no 
compositional construction of this viewpoint), nor are there any other (holistic) 
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cues provided from which the inference can be drawn that Henry wanted to 
play a trick. All we know is that Pete thought that Henry did not want to play a 
trick, given Sam’s anxiety about the tax disc. Although Pete’s view sounds 
reasonable (and leads to the right answer according to the test: “false”), strictly 
speaking participants cannot know the answer to this question. They are best 
advised following the instruction (cited before Table 2 above) to choose “false” 
whenever the text provides no conclusive evidence. Out of Brown’s 25 
participants 23 indeed chose “false”, thus answering correctly according to the 
test.96  
 A similar analysis can be made in the case of question 3: 
 
3. Henry thought that Sam knew he was a prankster 
 
There is no clear answer provided to this question either. In the story, there is a 
narrator inserting the comment “Henry, who was the office prankster” when 
reporting Sam’s thoughts (see excerpt (5) above), suggesting that this is shared 
knowledge or common ground for everyone working at their office. In this 
sense, in the “reality” of the story, it is quite likely that Henry does know that 
Sam knows that he (Henry) is a prankster—after all, this is what he can derive 
from this being common ground. Question 3 thus presents a thought that 
Henry theoretically could have had, but, realistically speaking, only will have 
had if a context occurred in which it was relevant for him to derive this 
information from the common ground. Such contexts would be, for example: 
him understanding that Sam is anxious about the tax disc, and therefore 
anticipating that Sam might not trust him straight away, given that he is known 
as the office prankster; or: the context of Sam coming back from his failed 
attempt to buy a tax disc and confronting Henry himself (instead of Pete) with 
the suspicion that he had deliberately misled him, after which they could talk 
about the misunderstanding that occurred because Henry had not anticipated that 
Sam knew that he was the office prankster. However, the story features no 
evidence for any of these contexts.  
                                                
96 More information on the error rates can be found in the Online Appendix, see note 95. 
Chapter 6
 221 
All in all, question 3 presents viewpoint layers that Henry could have 
unpacked if there had been a context requiring this. Given that there is no 
conclusive evidence of the presence of such a context, the answer should be 
“false” following the same line of reasoning as with question 2. This is indeed 
what 24 out of Brown’s 25 participants chose, thus answering correctly 
according to the test. 
So far so good—now consider question 5: 
 
5. Henry knew Sam believed he knew where the Post Office was 
 
From the story it can be concluded that Sam did believe that Henry knew 
where the Post Office was, but there is no conclusive evidence whether Henry 
did or did not know that Sam believed this. The answer can again be “true” in 
theory, given that Henry had a conversation with Sam in which he told him 
where the Post Office was, and under normal circumstances Henry should be 
able to draw the inference that Sam believes what he told him. However, again 
there is no evidence of a context in which Henry would indeed have drawn this 
inference, so following the same line of reasoning as with questions 2 and 3 the 
answer should be “false”. Yet according to the test the correct answer is “true”, 
which is what 17 out of the 25 participants went for. The “failure” of the other 8 
participants to provide the “correct” answer can be due to their inability to 
handle the fourth-order-intentionality proposition featured in question 5, but 
also to the fact that they followed the instruction to choose “false” whenever the 
story provides no conclusive evidence for the existence of particular intentional 
states, either by constructing them explicitly/compositionally or by providing a 
context from which they can be inferred. 
Two further issues can be formulated with this analysis in mind: 
 
issue (iii) Following the same line of reasoning leads sometimes to a 
correct and sometimes to an incorrect answer, suggesting 
that factors other than the amount of orders of 
intentionality involved in a question (which is of course 
the target variable of the test) can quite easily interfere 
with error rates produced by participants.  
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It is clear that the tests can be improved by checking the questions one by one 
for such inconsistencies (and some authors have done so, as examples below 
will show).97 In addition, it may be advisable to add a third answer option apart 
from “true” and “false”, which participants are supposed to tick when a 
question cannot be answered on the basis of evidence from the text. This avoids 
at least some of the ambiguity between cases where participants have failed to 
process the intentional reasoning task and those where they have failed to 
apply the instructions correctly. 
A more important and fundamental issue, however, has to do with the 
unpacking of viewpoint layers where this is not relevant in the context of the 
story. I have above discussed this for the questions 3 and 5, and question 10 
contains another example. From the story we know that Pete and Sam had a 
conversation about what happened to Sam, and that “Pete thought that […] it 
was unlikely that Henry would have deliberately tried to get him into trouble”. 
Question 10 asks whether “Pete wanted Sam to know that he believed that 
Henry had intended not to mislead him” (the answer is indeed “true”). The core 
issue questioned here is really whether Pete believed that Henry intended to 
mislead Sam, which is a fourth-order problem. That Pete wanted Sam to know 
this, follows logically from the fact that they have a conversation. In other 
words, the first two orders of the question in fact “unpack” what is naturally 
given in the discourse situation. In Chapter 3, I have argued that Zunshine 
unnecessarily starts to count from the author, suggesting that Woolf intends her 
readers to believe that Richard Dalloway thinks, and so on. However, just as 
these first two layers normally do not have to be processed by readers of a 
Woolf novel, I suggest that we are normally not concerned with processing that 
a speaker intends the hearer to understand that he thinks, and so on. In Chapter 5 
I have argued, following Clark (1996; 2006a), that such viewpoint layers belong 
to the (infinitely large) category of inferences that can be drawn from the 
common ground. When Sam and Pete have a conversation about what Henry 
                                                
97 Also, it must be noted that the outcomes of the tests are averages produced by multiple 
questions (usually between five and nine) at each level of complexity and by mostly quite 
substantial samples of participants, which means that such inconsistencies are at least to some 
extent balanced out as part of regular “error variance” for a test like this. 
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wanted, it can be inferred that Pete wants Sam to know what he (Pete) thinks 
about what Henry wanted, just as it can be inferred that Pete wants Sam to 
know that he (Pete) wants Sam to understand what he thinks about what Henry 
wanted, and so on. Normally, such inferences are not drawn, since they state 
obvious truths in a complicated way, without adding anything to what both 
interlocutors consider to be common ground. However, as said above with 
respect to questions 3 and 5, it is possible to think of exceptional contexts in 
which drawing such inferences can be useful. Most notably, this is the case 
whenever it turns out that interlocutors do not understand each other or are, as 
it were, not “on the same page”. For example, imagine the following 
conversation between Pete and Sam: 
 
(6) Pete: Henry may be a prankster, but above all he is an empathic person. 
Sam: What do you mean? 
Pete: I want you to understand that I think Henry did not want to 
deliberately mislead you, given your anxiety about being too late. 
 
Here, Pete first tries to share his thoughts in an indirect way, expecting that 
Sam will draw his conclusions on the basis of the information that Henry is an 
empathic person. However, when Sam makes clear that he does not know what 
to do with that information in this context, Pete “unpacks” and makes explicit 
what he wanted Sam to understand.  
There is no evidence in the story for a situation in which Pete and Sam 
are not on the same page, which means that it is unlikely that any of them 
needs to bother about unpacking the discourse situation into separate 
viewpoint layers. Of course this does not mean that it is impossible for 
participants to do this when answering the questions. However, when looking 
at the questions I think it is important to make a distinction between viewpoint 
layers that are in some way relevant to the characters in the story and the 
development of the story’s plot, and viewpoint layers that are “generated extra” 
by unpacking layers that would normally be obvious and/or unnecessary. 
All in all, the fourth issue can be formulated as follows: 
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issue (iv) Participants are asked to reflect, in the same way, on:  
- viewpoint layers that are relevant to the characters and 
the development of the plot (whether or not these are 
spelled out compositionally or cued holistically); and  
- viewpoint layers that can in principle be inferred from the 
story, but do not have such relevance. 
 
Potentially, including obvious though irrelevant viewpoint layers in the 
questions leads to confusion about whether the answer should be “true” or 
neither-true-nor-false, and thus “false” (see analysis of questions 2, 3, and 5 
above). In addition, it may also introduce pseudo-complexity: in question 10 a 
fourth-order problem is preceded by two obvious layers, which in fact come 
“for free” with the information that Pete and Sam are having a conversation; it 
is irrelevant for the interlocutors to reflect on this, neither is it relevant for the 
development of the plot. It is unclear how a question like 10 compares to a 
question staging six viewpoint layers that do have such relevance. 
 
6.2.3 Judging facts and intentional states 
Another point is that judging whether a factual statement is true or false is 
conceptually a different task from judging whether an intentional statement is 
true or false. Being so-called control questions, the factual questions clearly 
have to be different—however, the problem may be that they are too different. 
Ideally, the only difference between intentional and factual questions would be 
that the first concern intentional states and the latter do not. This is not the case 
in Brown’s study: another important difference here concerns what I have 
referred to as “(in)transitivity” in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2. This property affects 
strategies available for assessing statements for truth-value, either with respect 
to “reality”, or, in this case, with respect to a story: the “intransitive” nature of 
embedded intentional states make sure that participants have to process the 
statement as a whole, whereas the “transitive” strings of factual statements can 
be checked against the reality of the story element by element. As a 
consequence, there are often “short-cuts” to the answer available in factual 




4. Pete suspected that Henry was playing a prank on Sam 
16. Sam found the Post Office closed and couldn't buy a tax disk for 
Pete 
 
The answer to both questions according to the test is “false”. As a participant, in 
order to determine this for question 4, one has to think about what Pete thought 
about Henry’s intentions—a task in which all elements of the statement are 
somehow involved. However, seeing that 16 is false is a lot easier: all one needs 
to know is that Sam was not going to buy something for Pete but for himself. 
 This means that in theory there is a structural gap between the 
complexity of intentionality questions and factual questions. In practice, as 
pointed out above, a few of the intentionality questions in at least Brown’s 
questionnaire exhibit broken chains of embedding, sometimes also enabling 
short-cuts for participants (I will say a few more words about this in the next 
section). The fifth general issue can thus be formulated as follows: 
 
issue (v) Questions exhibiting unbroken chains of embedding have 
to be processed as a whole, whereas in questions 
containing conjunctions and/or causal links each 
constituting element can be checked against the story 
separately. Given that the first category contains only 
(some of the) intentionality questions and the latter all 
factual memory questions (and the rest of the 
intentionality ones), this may have affected the observed 
difference in performance on both types of questions. 
 
A similar argument is put forward by O’Grady et al. (2015) in their critical 
discussion of the existing mentalising questionnaire. They make the general 
point that a part of the intentionality and factual questions of the classic 
mentalising questionnaire (in this chapter represented by Brown’s study) can 
be answered without processing the entire statement. In addition, they raise 
two specific objections regarding the factual control questions. First, they 
demonstrate that the intentionality questions use syntactically more 
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complicated sentences by counting the number of embedded clauses (they 
report a significant difference between the overall median being 0 versus 2 in 
factual versus intentionality questions). Second, they argue that the factual 
questions are inappropriate controls in the first place, since they do not involve 
conceptual embedding. They suggest to eliminate all possibilities for short-
cutting, and to match the syntactic and conceptual complexity of intentionality 
and factual questions at every level by making use of “non-mental recursive 
concepts”, such as relationships of possession or localisations in space and time. 
They implement these suggestions in their version of the mentalising test. 
Consider the following three example questions from their questionnaire ((7) is 
a mentalising question, (8) and (9) are factual memory questions; participants 
had to choose between alternative options A or B): 
 
(7) A. Victor knows that Amy knows that Sheila intends that John thinks that 
she hasn’t realised that he likes her. 
B. Victor doesn’t know that Amy knows that Sheila intends that John 
thinks that she hasn’t realised that he likes her. 
(complexity level seven98; see story 4, intentionality question 6 from the 
online supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015) 
 
(8) A. Michelle and Nick started dating after a walk in the park, when Nick was 
tipsy, in the afternoon, on November 22nd, before Thanksgiving. 
B. Michelle and Nick started dating when Nick was tipsy, during a walk, in 
the morning, on November 29th, after Thanksgiving. 
(complexity level six; see story 2, control question 5 from the online 
supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015) 
 
(9) A. Shaun is Sheila’s supervisor Mike’s boss’s PA John’s best friend’s 
girlfriend Amy’s brother. 
                                                
98 Note that O’Grady et al. (2015) start counting from level zero, as do following Kinderman et al. 
(1998). According to their study, a participant judging what a character in the story believes is 
working at first-level intentionality (instead of second-order as counted in most other studies 
and throughout this thesis), so they would refer to (7) as being level six. See also note 2 above.  
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B. Shaun is Sheila’s best friend Mike’s supervisor’s boss John’s PA’s 
girlfriend Amy’s brother. 
(complexity level seven; see story 4, control question 6 from the online 
supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015) 
 
O’Grady et al. argue that in all three questions both the concepts and the 
syntax are recursively embedded. This is clearly the case in the intentionality 
question in (7), but how about the memory questions in (8) and (9)? In a way, it 
is true that in (8) the walk in the park is conceptually embedded in Nick being 
tipsy, which is again conceptually embedded in an afternoon, embedded in the 
day November 22nd, embedded in the period before Thanksgiving. In some way, 
it can also be argued that the syntax of clause(s) indicating when Michelle and 
Nick started dating exhibits a recursive structure: a noun phrase embedded in a 
noun phrase, embedded in yet another noun phrase, and so on ([a walk in the 
park, [when Nick was tipsy, [in the afternoon, [on November 22nd, [before 
Thanksgiving]]]]]).99 However, if the aim is to match the form of intentionality 
questions as closely as possible, this type of recursion does not do the job: as I 
have argued in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2, a distinctive feature of embedded 
intentional states is that they exhibit “intransitivity”: “A thinks that B thinks 
that C thinks that X” means something quite different than does “A thinks that 
C thinks that X”, and if the first is true it does not follow that the latter is true as 
well. This is not the case in chains of conjunct clauses or causally related 
clauses: if the proposition “A and B and C” is true, it follows that “A and C” is 
true as well, and if “A leads to B leads to C” is true, it follows that “A leads to C” 
                                                
99 This is the interpretation O’Grady et al. (2015) seem to suggest on the basis of a different 
example they discuss in their paper. I think it can be argued for, however, I doubt whether this 
is the most natural analysis, given that it asserts the possibility of inserting the entire 
(recursively formed) noun phrase elsewhere in the sentence: [It was after a walk in the park, 
[when Nick was tipsy, [in the afternoon, [on November 22nd, [before Thanksgiving]]]], that Nick 
and Michelle started dating]. This might yield a “grammatical” sentence in the strict sense, but 
certainly not one that language users would easily produce in practice. Alternatively, one could 
argue that the relevant part of (8) is not one recursively formed noun phrase, but a string of 
serially combined noun phrases: [after a walk in the park,] [when Nick was tipsy,] [in the 
afternoon,] [on November 22nd,] [before Thanksgiving]. Following this analysis, which I think is 
the more credible from a language usage point of view, the sentence would be more like an 
elliptic version of a “narrative” presentation in multiple sentences: Nick and Michelle started 
dating after a walk in the park. Nick was a bit tipsy. It was in the afternoon on November 22nd, 
before Thanksgiving… See also Verhagen’s (2010) discussion of “tail versus true recursion”. 
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is true. If one of the elements in a string of conjunct or causally connected 
clauses does not fit with the story, the entire statement is false. However, if the 
intentional clause “B doesn’t know about X” does not fit with the story, it does 
not follow that “A thinks that B doesn’t know about X” does not fit with it. In 
other words, all that participants need to know for picking the correct option in 
the case of (8) is the answer to any one of the following questions: did the 
couple start dating before or after Thanksgiving? Was it on the 22nd or on the 
29th? Was it in the morning or in the afternoon? In the case of (7), though, they 
do need to know something about what Victor knows that Amy knows that 
Sheila intends that John thinks that she thinks about him liking her. (However, 
note that participants may be crucially “aided” by the forced-choice design 
here: in fact, they only need to know whether Victor does or does not know about 
all this. More about this issue in the next section). 
All in all, I think that question (8) embodies an unsuccessful attempt of 
the authors to solve all three of their own objections against the old test: taking 
a short-cut is possible after all, the question exhibits a different form of 
conceptual embedding compared to intentionality questions, and it exhibits a 
different form of syntactic embedding (or, arguably, no syntactic embedding at 
all, see note 99). A total of 14 out of 28 control questions in the relevant 
condition (“explicit”; see below) of O’Grady’s study are structurally similar to (8) 
(cf. the supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015).  
The other 14 questions in the relevant condition take the form of the one 
cited in (9). Do they do a better job of eliminating those objections? Each single 
clause is dependent on the clause to its left: for example, Sheila’s supervisor’s 
boss’ friend is not the same person as Sheila’s friend or Sheila’s boss’ friend. 
However, there is also a difference. It can be the case that John thinks that it is 
sunny outside, while Mary thinks that John thinks that it is raining. Yet it is not 
possible that John’s mother is Mary’s boss, while at the same time Mary’s boss 
is not John’s mother. In other words, Dennett’s substitution test, explained in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, does not work for intentionality statements, but it does 
work for possessive relationships. As a consequence, spotting the one element 
that is at odds with the story can here also be done without processing the 
entire string: in the case of (9) all one needs to know is that Mike is Sheila’s 
supervisor and not her best friend in order to choose the correct option: A. 
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Intentionality questions like (7) and memory questions like (9) may thus be 
matched in the sense that the concepts and the grammar exhibit recursive 
embedding100 (the second and third objections are eliminated), but the 
possibility to short-cut processing keeps haunting these questions. 
In the third study I have introduced at the beginning of Section 6.2, 
carried out by Haddad, the two types of questions are also matched more 
closely compared to the original questionnaire. Here the philosophy was not to 
introduce conceptual and syntactic embedding in the memory questions, but to 
concentrate on matching sentence length. The questionnaire as a whole is 
indeed well balanced in this respect (see the Online Appendix as referred to in 
note 95). In addition, broken-chain intentionality questions were eliminated. 
However, in this study it is also still possible to use processing short-cuts in the 
ways described in this section for quite a few of the questions.  
Whether all of this is a problem or not depends on what is expected from 
the control questions: in, for example, Kinderman et al. (1998) factual questions 
serve to determine whether memory for details from the story is a factor 
limiting performance. However, given that the intentionality questions are 
different in a variety of respects, it may be problematic to make more precise 
comparisons between these questions (as has been done in, for example, Powell 
et al., 2010, where factual questions have been used as a baseline task). In some 
studies this may have led to interpretation problems, given that it is hard to 
determine to which part of the difference between factual and intentionality 
questions the findings have to be attributed. Although this problem is also 
noticed by O’Grady et al. (2015), their attempt to match the factual questions 
closer to the intentionality question comes with new problems, as I have 
discussed above. The same is true for Haddad’s improved control questions. 
 
                                                
100 Interestingly, from the perspective of language usage, the resulting statements are also 
equally idiosyncratic: for both (7) and (9) it is impossible to think of a real-life context where 
such sentences would be uttered (except, perhaps, a humorous context like the one in the 
Friends episode discussed in the Introduction of this thesis). 
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6.2.4 True and false statements 
Answering a question without processing it as a whole, i.e. taking a short-cut, is 
structurally more likely to be possible in questions where the right answer is 
“false”. Consider the following factual memory questions taken from Haddad: 
 
(10) Sam asked about finding a Post Office so that he could send a birthday 
present [false] 
(question 13 in Haddad’s questionnaire, see note 95) 
 
(11) Sam couldn't send the card because when he got to the Post Office, it was 
closed [true] 
(question 15 in Haddad’s questionnaire, see note 95) 
 
Haddad’s version of the story about the Post Office is slightly different: the 
office prankster Henry goes by the name Helen and instead of wanting to buy a 
tax disc, Sam wants to send a birthday card to his grandmother. All that 
participants need to know to determine that (10) is false is that Sam was going to 
send a card, not a present, but to see that (11) is true, they have to know that Sam 
found the Post Office closed and that he was going to send a card. In other 
words, in “false” questions spotting one element that does not fit with the story 
is enough, whereas in “true” questions participants have to determine that all 
elements fit with the story. The higher the order of complexity of the question, 
the more this misbalance is amplified: in a second-order question it is one false 
element against two correct ones, but in a fifth-order question this ratio is one 
to five. 
This issue is not limited to factual memory questions. Consider the 
following example: 
 
(12) A. Megan wants Lauren to know that she, Megan, knows that Stephen 
knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well 
enough to date, so that Lauren asks Stephen out [correct] 
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B. Megan doesn’t want Lauren to know that she, Megan, knows that 
Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him 
well enough to date, so that Lauren doesn’t ask Stephen out [false] 
(see supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015)  
 
Question (12) can be answered by knowing the answer to the simple (second-
order) question: does Megan want Lauren to go out with Stephen or not? The 
clauses containing the “conclusions” (“so that Lauren asks Stephen out” and “so 
that Lauren doesn’t ask Stephen out”) have the same effect as had the broken 
chains discussed above: by inserting one causal link into the string of 
embedded clauses, it became possible to process the “cause” and the 
“consequence” as separate chunks. If one of the two did not match the story, the 
entire proposition was false. Similarly, in (12) it is possible to process the 
premise (involving eight orders of intentionality) and the conclusion (involving 
two orders) as separate chunks. Given the forced-choice design, plus the fact 
that the two conclusions present opposing scenarios, it follows that one of the 
conclusions has to be inconsistent with the story. What is an “eighth-order” 
question according to the authors, can in this case be answered by simply 
comparing two second-order propositions. 
From this follows a crucial difference between the true/false design used 
in Brown and Haddad and the forced-choice design used in O’Grady: in the 
former it should be structurally harder to answer questions where the answer is 
“true”, whereas in the latter this effect does not occur.101 After all, in a forced-
choice design it is always possible to find the right answer by spotting a single 
false bell. Whether or not this is an advantage can be debated: it certainly does 
increase consistency within the questionnaire, however, if the overall aim is to 
test participants on their ability to handle questions at different orders of 
complexity, it may be rather disruptive, as became clear with question (12). 
Note that there are also false statements in which spotting the 
inconsistent element is possible only by processing the statement as a whole. 
                                                
101 In studies using a true/false design it may be advisable to calculate mentalising scores of 
individual participants on the basis of questions where the answer is “true” only. This was done 
by Van Duijn et al. (2014) in their study of mentalising performance in relation to school grades 
and personality traits: the questionnaire featured both true and false questions, but only the 
true ones were used to calculate the scores. 
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This goes for statements that exhibit an unbroken chain of embedding and, at 
the same time, do not involve unfamiliar or implausible elements. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
(13) Pete thought that Helen wanted Sam to know that she realised that the 
Post Office was no longer on Elm St. [false] 
(question 7 in Haddad’s questionnaire, see note 95) 
 
(14) A. Megan knows that Stephen doesn’t know that Elaine knows that 
Bernard feels that she doesn’t know him well enough to date [false] 
B. Megan knows that Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels 
that she doesn’t know him well enough to date [correct] 
(see supplementary material of O’Grady et al., 2015)  
 
Both questions consist of statements exhibiting unbroken chains of embedding. 
On top of this, (13) refers to a scenario that is false, but that does have some 
credibility, given that the entire confusion in the story is exactly about Helen 
(alias Henry in Brown’s version) intending or not intending to send Sam to the 
wrong street. Likewise, both options in (14) are credible, given that the story is 
precisely about Megan finding out what Stephen does or does not know about 
Bernard and Elaine.  
The observations discussed in this subsection can be summarised in the 
issues (vi) and (vii) as follows: 
 
issue (vi) Some questions exhibit a disproportionate increase in 
complexity per level for questions where the correct 
answer is “true” versus those where the correct answer is 
“false”: if the correct answer is “true” participants have to 
check every element for consistency with the story, 
whereas questions where the correct answer is “false” can 
be answered by spotting one element that does not fit. 
This issue seems to be best avoided in questions that 
exhibit an unbroken chain of embedding and that present 
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a scenario that is (about) equally credible when thought of 
as true or false. 
 
issue (vii) Given issue (vi), there is a crucial difference between 
questionnaires using a true/false design and those using a 
forced-choice design: when using the latter, spotting a 
single “false bell” is possible in all questions (although it is 
more difficult in questions exhibiting an unbroken chain 




6.2.5 Structure of interaction 
As mentioned in the brief description of the study at the beginning of Section 
6.2, the central aim of O’Grady et al. is to increase ecological validity by 
introducing movie clips that feature acted-out versions of the stories and 
questions. Whereas I make a distinction between narrative and propositional 
presentation in this thesis, they make a distinction between “explicit” and 
“implicit” presentation. Confusingly, at least in this context, is that by “explicit” 
they mean both the narrated stories and the propositional questions as used in 
the classic mentalising tests (which I have argued to be very different in kind in 
Chapter 2), and by “implicit” they mean their novel acted-out stories and 
questions. In four conditions they cross narrated stories with propositional 
questions (explicit-explicit), narrated stories with acted-out questions (explicit-
implicit), acted-out stories with propositional questions (implicit-explicit), and 
acted-out stories with acted-out questions (implicit-implicit). The example 
questions cited in (7), (8), and (9) above are all from the propositional/explicit 
condition. The scripts for their acted-out counterparts from the implicit 
conditions are as follows (cited again from the supplementary material of 
O’Grady et al., 2015): 
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(15) A. Sheila: Anyway, so I chatted to Amy about it at the office and she 
reckons it’s a good plan to just keep letting John think I haven’t figured it 
out. 
Victor: Yeah, Amy came by and told me about it all. 
B. Sheila: Anyway, so I chatted to Amy about it at the office and she 
reckons it’s a good plan to just keep letting John think I haven’t figured it 
out. 
Victor: That’s weird, I spoke to Amy today. I had no idea that she knew 
about this situation. 
 
(16) A. Nick: We started dating before Thanksgiving, in the afternoon on 
November 22nd. I was a bit tipsy and we’d just got back from a walk in the 
park. 
B. Nick: We started dating after Thanksgiving, in the morning on 
November 29th, while we were walking in the park. I was a bit tipsy at the 
time. 
 
(17) A. Amy: Yeah, it’s really complicated. So your best friend is Sheila’s 
supervisor Mike’s boss’s PA, John, and Shaun is my brother. 
B. Amy: Yeah, it’s really complicated. My boyfriend is PA to Sheila’s best 
friend Mike’s supervisor’s boss, John, and Shaun is my brother. 
 
An important innovation here according to the authors is that they, by 
introducing their acted-out presentation form, have managed to present 
conceptually embedded information without using embedded sentences. Note 
that this was already done in the narratives used in the original tests. However, 
a novelty indeed is that they also have two conditions in which the questions are 
presented without using embedded sentences. 
It is indeed true that (16) and (17) look a lot closer to normal language 
usage than their propositional/classic counterparts (7), (8). However, it should 
be noted that (17) retains the problem I have pointed out above: it is still 
possible to find the right answer just by knowing whether it was before or after 
Thanksgiving, on the 22nd or the 29th, or in the morning or afternoon—each of 
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which is literally given in the story that the participants have just heard or seen 
in acted-out form. Question (18) is only minimally disentangled compared to 
the embedded-sentence version in (9). Yet if anything, this has made it even 
easier to spot the element that does not fit the story. The same goes for the 
acted-out/implicit version of questions (12) (boldface added): 
 
(18) 7. A. Megan: So, I’m thinking that Lauren needs to know what I heard. 
Right? Because if she knows what I know right now, about Elaine’s crush, 
and Bernard’s rejection, and that Stephen knows the whole thing…she’ll 
work up the guts to ask him out! So I’m going to tell her tonight.  
B. Megan: Well, if you think about, if Lauren knew what I heard today – 
and if she knew that Stephen knew all about it too, about Elaine’s crush 
and Bernard’s weird reason for rejection and everything – she’d ask 
Stephen out. But I don’t want her to do that, so I’m not going to tell her.  
  
As pointed out above, it was possible with (12) to bypass the processing of the 
eight-order string of embedded intentional states. This is made even easier in 
(19), especially in the implicit-implicit condition, given that the acted-
out/implicit version of the story ends as follows (boldface added):   
 
(19) Megan: Right! So, Lauren doesn’t want to ask Stephen out because she 
thinks he’s into Elaine – but if she knew that Stephen knows that Elaine 
likes Bernard, and that Stephen knows that Elaine’s not into him, she 
might work up the guts to ask Stephen out.  
Chris: I guess...so are you going to tell her?  
Megan: Yeah, I’m going to tell her the whole thing tonight. 
 
All participants need to remember to answer the question that allegedly 
embodies the highest level of complexity in the test, are the ten final words of 
the acted-out story. 
O’Grady et al. (2015) present as their central finding that participants 
performed strikingly well at all levels of complexity, especially in their implicit-
implicit condition. Performance did not drop drastically at any level, as was 
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claimed on the basis of the classic tests. They argue that this is probably due to 
the high ecological validity of their stimuli: according to them our natural 
human social ecology is full of higher-order intentional processing tasks. By 
designing stimuli that mimic this ecology as closely as possible, they claim to 
have shown that participants can almost effortlessly handle tasks up to eight 
orders of intentionality. However, I think that their test is highly ecologically 
valid precisely because participants do not need to process long strings of 
embedded intentional states, as shown in my analysis, but instead can rely on 
simple cues that bypass such processing when deciding between alternative 
scenarios. Other than in the classic tests, where participants are at least 
sometimes forced to deal with idiosyncratic statements that have to be 
processed as single units, O’Grady et al. (2015) allow participants to be normal 
mindreaders—and that is: lazy mindreaders. 
 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter I have distinguished five central conclusions brought forward by 
the mentalising paradigm. In short:  
- error rates of intentionality questions show a steep increase at 
complexity level 6, suggesting a limit to the ability of participants to 
handle embedded intentional states; 
- between-subject variation suggests that some individuals have their 
limit around level 4, others around level 5, and again others around level 
6 or even higher; 
- although scores on intentionality questions and memory-control 
questions tend to be related, the steep increase in error rates at level 6 
cannot be explained in terms of memory performance only, suggesting 
that there is something especially challenging about reasoning with 
embedded intentional states; 
- participants’ mentalising scores correlate with other measures of these 
individuals’ social aptitude; 
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- participants’ mentalising scores correlate with the amount of grey 
matter in relevant brain areas. 
These conclusions are based on a series of studies, in which the general pattern 
has been replicated multiple times. However, nearly all of these studies have 
used versions of the same questionnaire, featuring stories describing social 
events, followed by forced-choice or true/false questions with embedded 
intentional states and factual details. In this chapter I have discussed issues 
connected with this way of testing mentalising competence, pertaining to the 
discrepancy between a narrative presentation in the stories and use of 
embedded sentences in the questions, inconsistencies regarding viewpoint 
layers that are sometimes “unpacked” and sometimes left implicit, structural 
differences between questions exhibiting embedded clauses and those with 
clauses that are related in different ways (e.g. conjunct or causally related), 
structural differences between true and false questions, and the gap between 
the use of intentional reasoning in the test and in real-life interaction. 
The recent study by O’Grady et al. (2015) has raised doubt regarding the 
conclusions from the mentalising paradigm, partly based on the same issues 
with the questionnaire that I have pointed out here. However, as I have also 
discussed in this chapter, their own updated mentalising test, while having 
promising aspects, is also partly haunted by some of the old issues and for 
another part comes with new problems. Therefore, more research is needed 
before anything reliable can be said about the consequences for the central 
conclusions of the paradigm.  
For now, I think, there is another important puzzle still unsolved: how can 
it be explained that the mentalising tests, despite all issues, produce meaningful 
variation correlating with measures of participants’ social lives and overall 
aptitude in the social domain? I see two non-exclusive explanations: 
- There are problems with quite a few of the questions, but others (such as 
(13) and (14) above) work well in the sense that they genuinely force 
participants to process the entire task they pose as one single unit. The 
meaningful variation in mentalising scores between participants could 
be principally driven by these questions. I have argued throughout this 
thesis that the processing of such unbroken chains of embedded 
intentional states is something we do not do by default when interacting, 
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but rather in exceptional cases, such as anticipating or repairing a 
misunderstanding. This can explain correlations with measures of social 
aptitude: if filling out a mentalising test is like handling exceptional 
situations in social interaction, those participants who are better at the 
test are also better at trouble-shooting whenever an interaction 
threatens to break down—a skill that may well be a good indicator of 
general social aptitude. 
- The way in which the questions, and to some extent also the stories, 
present the fictive social situations used in the mentalising tests may be 
unnatural and problematic, however, the test itself creates a new and 
real situation of social interaction: the one between experimenter and 
participant. The experimenter has designed the questions and decided 
what the correct answers are. Some participants may be better at 
estimating what the experimenter wanted them to do, and be more 
motivated to figure this out in the first place. They may pick up even the 
smallest cues (like those in questions 7 and 10 from Brown’s study, see 
also note 94 above) directing them towards the answer that the 
experimenter had in mind. This is a point that may theoretically 
produce biases in any test involving questionnaires, but in this 
particular case the bias happens to overlap with the target variable: 
being better at estimating the experimenter’s intentions may indicate 
greater general social aptitude. 
Both these explanations thus suggest that the associations between mentalising 
scores and other factors relevant to participants’ social lives were not produced 
because the tests accurately “mirrored” the complexity generally involved in 
human interaction, but because they assessed participants on factors indicative 
of their ability to deal with special (partly extreme) cases of such interaction. 
This does not mean that these associations are no longer meaningful, but it 
does shed a different light on the foundations of social cognition: although it 
may be possible to assess general social aptitude using a task that forces 
participants to deal with embedded intentional states, this task should not be 











In the Introduction I have put forward a series of observations and questions, 
and  set out as the overall aim for this thesis to work these out in detail, thereby 
rethinking the nature of the complexity posed by intentional states underlying 
human interaction events. Throughout the subsequent chapters, I have looked 
at how such complexity should be thought of conceptually and how it can be 
handled linguistically. Also, I have made suggestions about how human agents 
are able to process it cognitively. I have pointed out that this thesis’ methods and 
frameworks are ultimately rooted in the humanities, but that its topic requires 
analysing and bringing together insights and material from areas across both 
the humanities and sciences, in particular linguistics, literary studies, 
philosophy, and various disciplines within the social, cognitive and biological 
sciences. Therefore I have characterised the overall project as being an example 
of topic-oriented scholarship: instead of working with the questions, assumptions, 
and methods common in one academic discipline, I have applied a pragmatic 
mix of expertise and methodology I considered suitable for making progress on 
the chosen topic.  
The observations and questions put forward in the Introduction are 
grouped in thematic rubrics: complexity posed by multiple intentional states, 
representation of complex thoughtscapes in discourse, communicative and 
cognitive economy, and the consequences for existing theories and frameworks, 
in particular our evolutionary story. Given that Chapters 2-6 already end with a 
section summing up discussion points and conclusions, I will structure what 
follows using these rubrics rather than going through the final remarks in the 
“chronological” order of the chapters. However, before doing so I will first 
provide an overview that will pull together the lines connecting this thesis’ 





Human interaction is characterised by an endless “polyphony”, a perpetuated 
multitude of perspectives and perspectives-on-perspectives. Not only do we 
share and coordinate our own inner life with that of the people we interact 
with, but we also constantly make implicit and explicit reference to the 
intentional states of others who may or may not be present at the time of 
speaking, or who may even exist only in the imagined worlds of thought and 
fiction.  
In philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, this polyphony of 
perspectives has often been conceptualised as a series of embedded layers of the 
form “A thinks that B understands that C expects...etc.”. Building on this tradition, 
tests have been devised targeting what is referred to as “multiple-order 
intentionality” or “mentalising”, generally finding that humans can handle up 
to around five layers of embedded complexity. This idea was subsequently 
implemented in theories and frameworks concerning such topics as 
cooperation, moral reasoning, social aptitude and variations in quality and size 
of individual social networks, (a)typical development, language competence, 
and appreciation and production of literature. 
However, throughout this thesis I have suggested that the conceptualisa-
tion of mentalising involving series of embedded layers stands in stark contrast 
to how dealing with a polyphony of intentional states takes shape in actual 
discourse and interaction. Firstly, it appears that intentional states are normally 
connected and interlinked in all kinds of different ways, forming what I have 
termed a “thoughtscape” rather than a recursive string. Secondly, if a (complex) 
thoughtscape is being represented in natural discourse, the labour of indicating 
the connections between intentional states is generally distributed over a wide 
variety of linguistic elements across lexical, grammatical, and narratological 
categories. Hence, representing a thoughtscape by a proposition featuring only 
recursive embedding of clauses frequently yields an infelicitous rendering of 
the actual relationships between the intentional states. Thirdly, parts of the 
thoughtscapes underlying interaction events come “packaged”, and they are 
unpacked only if the context so requires. Fourthly, instead of thinking of 
human interaction as a process in which individuals seek to “join” their 
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intentional states through working out what others intend one to understand that 
they want one to believe, and what one intends others to think that one intends 
them to believe, such interaction should rather be seen as a joint activity in 
which cues are provided negotiating how a set of already shared beliefs 
(referred to as the common ground following Clark, 1996) should be updated. 
Fifthly, linguistic items, ranging from lexical units to grammatical patterns and 
narratological structures, embody a wealth of experience accumulated from 
generations of language users attempting to coordinate their own intentional 
states with those of interlocutors and third parties, regarding the non-
intentional world by which they are surrounded. As such, linguistic items can 
be thought of as “supercues” supporting the process of negotiating how a 
thoughtscape should be conceptualised: depending on context and signaller’s 
goals, language can offer precise analytical tools for working out details and 
nuances of how intentional states are mutually connected, or, conversely, 
language can offer cues referring to entire chunks of a thoughtscape 
holistically, leaving such details and nuances packaged in order to serve 
convenience and efficiency. In this way, the “toolkit” offered by the symbols of a 
language contributes at once to the richness and detail of the total system, as 
well as to its economy and workability. Sixthly and finally, by acquiring the 
lexical, grammatical, and narratological conventions that constitute this toolkit 
children become full-blooded human mindreaders—who are as a rule lazy 
mindreaders: operating in a socio-cultural environment that contains the 
coagulated interactional experience of earlier generations, saves processing 
costs on the individual level. 
 
Complexity posed by multiple intentional states 
As an alternative for conceiving of intentional-state complexity as a series of 
embedded layers, I have suggested the notion of the thoughtscape, defined in 
Chapter 1 as the total network of interlinked intentional states that are in some 
way relevant in the course of an interaction event. With respect to this, there is 
a question brought up in the Introduction that has not yet been answered: can 
the concept of the thoughtscape function as an alternative measure of 
intentional-state complexity? In this section I will suggest that this is possible, 
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but that an accurate implementation of the thoughtscape as a measuring tool 
requires further investigation of the qualitative differences between different 
sorts of intentional relationships. 
The idea of embedded layers clearly comes with a natural complexity 
scale: counting layers and comparing numbers of layers across tasks, 
individuals, species, and so on, seems to be inherent in the very concept of 
multiple-order intentionality. However, I have pointed out that this is 
problematic: when the orders of intentionality are used as a meta-linguistic 
measuring tool to form paraphrases of how intentional states underlying an 
interaction event are related, they often force these intentional states into a 
strait-jacket that misrepresents the actual complexity. Paraphrases featuring 
only embedded clauses are at the same time too complex and too simple: on the 
one hand, they easily produce opaque renderings of a situation that is not too 
hard to grasp as such or in the form of a story, while, on the other hand, such 
propositions often fail to convey all kinds of nuances and details. A good 
example is Zunshine’s paraphrase discussed in Chapter 3, which is indeed 
much harder to understand than the relevant passage of the novel itself is, 
while at the same time underrepresenting the subtle perspective shifts 
characteristic of the 360-degree view offered by Woolf’s prose. Even in the case 
of Othello this holds true: as I have argued in Chapters 2 and 5, this play has the 
quite exceptional feature of meaningfully embedding a relatively large number 
of perspective layers. However, this only works because its plot combines 
multiple scenarios that come with significant differences in shared knowledge or 
common ground (scheming plans, revenge, adultery), and, as argued in Chapter 
5, it is precisely in those cases that it is relevant to work out what A knows that B 
intends that C thinks…(etc.) In that sense, the embedded proposition “Iago 
intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona intends that Othello considers that 
Cassio did not intend…” does in some way accurately summarise the situation 
with which the audience is confronted after the first two Acts. Even so, this 
proposition suggests a sense of opaque complexity that is unlikely to be 
perceived when following the play’s narrative on the one hand, while being far 
too narrow to catch the full complexity of the thoughtscape that has emerged 
by the end of Act II on the other hand.  
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In the case of both Mrs Dalloway and Othello intentional-state complexity 
was better conceptualised as a thoughtscape than using a proposition featuring 
a string of embeddings. However, although the relevant parts of both texts were 
misrepresented by such a proposition (that is, the first more so than the latter), 
it offered an easy way to compare the two in terms of the assumed intentional-
state complexity, simply by counting the number of embeddings. Such 
counting is much less straight-forward when comparing two thoughtscapes. To 
recapitulate, in Chapter 1 and 5 I have discussed that the basic unit of a 
thoughtscape is the interaction event, in which two or more parties interact 
using linguistic and/or non-verbal cues. Prototypically, these are interlocutors 
in a face-to-face setting, but in the special case of fiction the position of the 
speaker is taken by the narrator and that of the addressee by the reader, hearer, 
or spectator. Speaker and addressee have a common ground, a set of shared 
beliefs, which they update in the course of the interaction event. This does not 
by default include reasoning about intentional states, but both the intentional 
states of the speaker and addressee and those of third parties can become 
relevant depending on setting and context (whether they are subsequently 
spelled out in language or left implicit is another question—see the next 
section). For example, when a narrator tells a story about two characters, it 
makes sense to use linguistic items that invite the reader to form 
representations of these characters’ intentional states at various points in the 
development of the plot. These intentional states are both embedded in the 
perspective102 of the narrator, but not necessarily into one another. They can 
exhibit causal relations (A thought X, which made B want Y), form meaningful 
conjunctions from the perspective of the reader (A thought X and B thought Y), 
or, indeed, be embedded (A believes that B thinks that X). A thoughtscape is 
therefore, as I have argued, best conceptualised as a network of mutually linked 
intentional states. This network emerges in the course of an interaction event to 
the extent that particular contexts require interlocutors to draw inferences 
about each others’ or third parties’ intentional states. For example, the context 
                                                
102 At the beginning of Chapter 4 I have made the distinction between “intentional 
state/mindstate” and “perspective/viewpoint” roughly as follows: intentional states or 
mindstates are atomic “snapshots” of a subject’s relation to an object; a perspective or viewpoint 
comprises the broader total of an actor’s subjectivity of which intentional states are isolated 
parts or “snapshots”. 
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of a practical joke may require A to make B believe that X is the case, while at 
the same time telling C that B thinks Y; or, in the context of a misunderstanding 
A may wonder what B intended A to think when saying X.  
With this in mind we can turn to the question of measuring intentional-
state complexity. Having the form of a network, thoughtscapes can in principle 
be used for this purpose: counting the number of intentional agents and 
relationships between them (i.e. the number of edges in a network graph) can 
work as a global quantitative measure of thoughtscape complexity. However, the 
practical implementation of this measure is not straightforward, given that one 
would also have to account for the fact that the relationships (i.e. edges) can be 
qualitatively different in complexity: “A thinks that X and B thinks that Y” may be 
easier to process than “A suspects that X and B does not think that Y” or “A wants 
B to believe that X”. Getting a grasp on such qualitative differences can begin by 
incorporating existing psycholinguistic insights into processing grammatical 
procedures such as negation or anaphoric reference into the framework of the 
thoughtscape. In this way, single relationships can be compared and weighted 
for the amount of processing effort they require. On top of that, it will be 
necessary to develop new research that evaluates the processing implications of 
incrementally integrating multiple intentional relationships. With the “old” 
conceptualisation of complexity as embedded layers it seemed evident that 
every added layer led to an increase in cognitive load, until a limit was reached 
at around five orders (or, according to some authors, a higher number—see 
Chapter 6 for a discussion). Contrastingly, it is not clear whether every 
additional edge in a network of intentional states should be seen as a factor 
adding cognitive load, and whether this adds up to a maximum network size in 
terms of what individuals can on average process cognitively. In Chapter 2 and 
3 I have suggested that it is not plainly the case that cognitive factors limit story 
complexity, but rather that understanding reaches as far as the maximum 
complexity that can be covered by a story. At a glance this may seem a sophistic 
twist instead of a real claim, but think of it this way: if the reader’s, hearer’s, or 
spectator’s understanding of a network of intentional relationships depends for 
an important part on factors inherent in the language and narrative used, it 
must be assumed that stories employing a more optimised mix of such factors 
can represent more complex networks. In this way, the limits of what is the most 
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complex network that can be covered by a story can be pushed until, at some 
point, the story “breaks down” in terms of coherence, becomes unreadable, or 
in another way fails to do the job of exposing its plot to its addressees. In this 
view, the upper boundary to handling intentional state complexity is not given 
by individual cognitive limits that have an average height in human 
populations, but instead dynamically produced by an interplay between 
individual cognitive factors and group-level cultural phenomena of language 
and narrative. Such a view has consequences for the evolutionary story set out 
in Chapter 1 and fits with two other pieces of the puzzle: one pertaining to 
linguistic symbols as “supercues” and the other to cognitive economy. 
 
Representation of thoughtscapes in discourse 
Far from all intentional states relevant to interaction events are highlighted or 
made explicit. Consider once again the picture with the woman on a staircase 
carrying a suitcase in Figure 1 of Chapter 1 (it can be debated whether standing 
in the position of the photographer and deciding to offer a helping hand counts 
as “interaction”, but let us for the sake of the argument assume that it does). 
Within this interaction event as seen from the perspective of the person 
standing in the position of the photographer (referred to as the mindreader in 
Chapter 1), there is a role for the intentional state of the woman with the 
suitcase: an estimation of this intentional state (the mindread) is one of the 
factors on the basis of which the mindreader decides whether to take action.103 
It is possible to formulate an explicit paraphrase of the mindread (e.g. 
“mindreader thinks that mindreadee intends to carry the suitcase upstairs”), but 
in most cases the mindread will remain an implicit factor in a decision about 
future behaviour, which can be non-linguistic (provide a helping hand) or 
linguistic (e.g. “Can I help you?”). Only in exceptional cases will an utterance in 
the practice of everyday interaction come close to an explicit paraphrase. In this 
                                                
103 Later on in Chapter 1 I have nuanced this view by suggesting that this can be safely said on 
the W-level of what the task is, but that caution is needed on the H-level of how the task is 
carried out: in this context, stating that the intentional state of the person on the staircase is a 
factor on the W-level does not entail that the process “running” in the mindreader’s mind 




example that could happen when the mindreader appears to have made the 
wrong estimation after all: imagine that the mindreadee wanted to test whether 
the suitcase would be too heavy to be carried around for a week. In that context, 
a conversation could be imagined in which she declined help, after which the 
mindreader said “I thought you intended to carry it upstairs…” 
I have argued that interaction events should be seen as a negotiation 
process between speaker and addressee of how a (presumed) set of shared 
beliefs or common ground should be updated. Whereas it is in principle 
possible to carry out such negotiation without language, language comes with 
powerful, specialised cues (or tools) on several levels (lexicon, grammar, 
narrative) to facilitate this process: from packages that project entire scenarios 
at once (e.g. “Sorry, I misunderstood”) to all kinds of tools for indicating subtle 
perspective shifts, epistemic stances, and so on, to work out the details (e.g. “I 
see! You wanted to try whether…but to me it looked as if…I just wanted to be 
helpful…”). It is significant to notice that a context in which the help is 
appreciated goes much more naturally without words than one in which help is 
declined. In the first case, both parties are “on the same page”, whereas in the 
latter case there is clearly a difference in how they envisage the interaction to 
continue—this once again suggests that contexts with differences in common 
ground are the ones in which working out who-thinks-what is relevant. 
In Chapter 5 I have argued that the dynamics of negotiations about how 
to update the common ground can be pictured as having three dimensions, 
with cues serving coordination between the intentional states of signaller and 
addressee ((x)-axis), with respect to objects of joint attention ((y)-axis), and with 
respect to third-party perspectives ((z)-axis). From a “synchronic” perspective 
looking at one single interaction event, each linguistic item supports this 
process because both interlocutors share knowledge about how it operates on 
one or more of these axes (i.e. their meaning in this model). From a “diachronic” 
perspective, however, it can be said that every lexical item and grammatical 
procedure ultimately is the result of generations of language users trying to 
coordinate their mindstates in interaction with each other and the 
environment, thereby converging on solutions that are communicatively 
effective, cognitively efficient, and learnable for new generations of language 
users. In this sense, when we use language today, we have “supercues” at our 
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disposal that embody the accumulated interaction experience of generations of 
language users.  
 
Evolution of the lazy mindreader 
The advocated view allows individuals to be “lazy” in multiple ways. In Chapter 
5 I have argued that Scott-Phillips (2015) and Sperber (2000) misconstrue the 
complexity of the mindreading abilities needed for present-day human 
interaction in theory: rather than working at several levels of intentionality by 
default, individuals make the a priori assumption that a set of knowledge states 
(the common ground) is mutually shared. In terms of investing processing 
effort, this allows them to start from zero and scale up if necessary.104 On top of 
that, I have suggested various mechanisms and principles that in practice save 
individuals from having to scale up most of the time, including the observation 
from relevance theory and the study of alignment that interlocutors operate “in 
complementary predicaments” (Apperly, 2011: 115, referring to Sperber and 
Wilson, 2002), and the idea that most everyday interaction exhibits a structure 
of testing-adjusting-retesting in which representations have to be just “good 
enough” for the interaction to continue, but no better. These views were also 
consistent with observations made in Chapter 2 and 3, where the focus was on 
the exceptional situation posed by some works of (literary) fiction: rather than 
being challenged to the extreme by the necessity to keep track of complicated 
networks of intentional states in order to follow the plots, it appeared that the 
reader could “sit back and relax” while the narrator brought a rich mix of 
strategies to bear gradually exposing all the involved intentional states and 
their mutual relations. 
A different part of the story is that human children can not only use 
linguistic elements they acquire for communication, but they presumably also 
extend their thinking repertoire through the process of learning how to use 
                                                
104 Note that this view also solves the “infinity paradox” mentioned briefly in the Introduction. 
Interlocutors normally do not have to “meet” the other’s mind a few mindreading steps down 
the line (in which case there are always more steps possible—the infinite regress, as many 
authors suggest); instead, they are already “together” at zero by default. If each step is jointly 
taken from there (through communicative negotiation), there is no longer a reason why an 
infinite regress would be lurking. 
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some of them. It is important to note that this works for all individuals within a 
particular cultural-linguistic community in the same way: given that A and B are 
both (adult-level) members of the same community, individual A can not only 
presume a particular set of beliefs to be mutually shared with B, but she can 
also be sure that B has the same “toolkit” on board for negotiating how these 
beliefs should be updated or how differences in common ground should be 
detailed. Examples of tools for such negotiation (as discussed in Chapter 4 and 
mentioned in the former section) include viewpoint packages, supporting the 
possibility to project entire scenarios holistically, and various grammatical 
patterns making it possible to work out the details of who-knows-what one by 
one. If A uses the word “mislead” she at the same time activates in herself and 
in B the complete topology packaged by this word, including the roles of a 
misleading and a misled party and the default intentional relationships 
between them. Both interlocutors can benefit from this in the next steps of their 
interaction by integrating the topology with context-specific details. 
This view also implicates a special niche for narratives of all kinds, 
ranging from the day’s latest gossip to myths, parables, and even literature. 
Acquiring the tools for negotiating and coordinating intentional stances comes 
down to learning how they are used in different contexts. Stories of all kinds 
provide a rich and varied environment for such learning. Whereas “mislead” 
may perhaps occur frequently enough in everyday contexts for language 
learners to acquire its full topology, this may be different in the case of, for 
example, “scheming plan” and the scenario attached to it on which Othello’s plot 
builds. I suggest that one of the functions of our tendency to tell stories is that it 
allows language users to get accustomed to a wide set of such tools available in 
their cultural-linguistic community.  
The question finally remaining now, is how all of this affects our 
evolutionary story. It is important to emphasise the qualification I have put 
forward in Chapter 1 once again: the material studied throughout this thesis 
and the arguments developed on the basis of it should not be taken as an 
attempt to “prove” a particular chronology of evolutionary events. However, 
given that the ways in which different scenarios of human cognitive evolution 
can be compared are necessarily limited (archaeology and comparative biology 
can tell us only so much in this domain), I have suggested to look at how 
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complex thoughtscapes are handled in the actual practice of human 
interaction. What exactly do we find in a play or novel renowned for dealing 
with wide arrays of perspectives? How do newspapers report on cases in which 
multiple intentional states are relevant? What can we learn from usage-based 
linguistic approaches as developed by Clark (1996) and Verhagen (2005)? How 
do participants seem to deal with experimental tasks forcing them to consider 
multiple intentional states at the same time? By investigating such questions 
one by one, a view has emerged that certainly can be said to be more compatible 
with one evolutionary scenario than with the other. 
In this light I have suggested a “move” that is conceptually comparable to 
the one made by Shultz, Opie, and Atkinson (2011):105 the route to a cultural-
linguistic community should not be seen as one in which individuals developed 
increasingly profound mindreading abilities, going step-by-step from “A 
intends that B believes…” to “A intends that B believes that A intends…” to “A 
intends that B believes that A intends that B understands…”, and so on, until 
addressees and speakers had arrived at fourth- and fifth-order intentionality 
respectively, which they needed to establish the sort of cognitive 
“interdependence” Scott-Phillips (2015) and Sperber (2000) consider to be a 
prerequisite for human (“ostensive-inferential”) communication. Instead, the 
alternative supported in this thesis is that a form of shared intentionality 
preceded the capacity to deal with complex thoughtscapes, including the ability 
to work out in detail what A believes that B believes that A believes (…etc.). 
Roughly, instead of interaction in dyads growing more sophisticated, gradually 
including more “minds” and thereby eventually forming the basis for cultural-
linguistic communities, I suggest that the presence of such a community was 
needed for increasingly sophisticated interaction in dyads.  
At the end of Section 5.2.3 in Chapter 5 I have discussed the cognitive 
structure individuals need for participating in a system of interaction based on 
shared intentionality from a synchronic perspective, thus abstracting from the 
diachronic story of how such a system could emerge over time (see also the first 
                                                
105 Clearly, there are also important differences: their model concerns going from a situation in 
which individuals form no group at all to one in which there is a social group, whereas my 
suggested move concerns a situation in which there already is a group to one in which 
individuals within this group form a cultural-linguistic community.  
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note in Chapter 5). I have listed the following abilities: (i) distinguishing 
between individuals and recognising whether or not they belong to our social 
network and/or cultural-linguistic community (in order to identify the 
appropriate sort of common ground); (ii) keeping track of former interactions 
and accessing “records” of this in real time; (iii) applying the principle of self-
other equivalence; and (iv) assuming a particular set of intentional states to be 
shared with one’s interlocutor and singling out individual perspectives only if 
the context requires to do so. In order to put together the diachronic story it 
would be necessary to determine when and to which degree these abilities were 
available to our ancestors. I think that more research efforts should be invested 
in this in the near future;106 however, having said that, I will end by giving it a 
provisional shot. 
The abilities (i) and (ii) are in principle primate skills, found in our great-
ape relatives to a degree of sophistication that I could imagine to be sufficient 
for getting started. In my view there is thus no reason that these would have 
been factors limiting the emergence of the sort of interaction system suggested 
here at some point in our evolutionary path after the divide from the other 
great-ape lineages (that is not to say that we have not become better at these at 
later stages). Ability (iii), applying the principle of self-other equivalence, is 
what I have discussed as the skill needed for taking part in the “Schelling 
mirror world” (Levinson, 2006) in Chapter 5. It is fair to assume that this ability 
requires a degree of mindreading beyond what our great-ape relatives can do, 
but there is no reason why it should involve higher-order intentionality: 
interlocutors have to reflect on their own and the other’s perspective, and they 
would need to be capable of imagining that roles be reversed in order to 
consider contributions to the interaction from both sides. This involves working 
with two related, but not necessarily embedded, intentional states in a flexible 
way.  
Fitting ability (iv) into the diachronic story first involves specifying the 
conditions under which it makes sense at all for individuals to enter an 
                                                
106 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Stolk’s (2014) experimental work provides an important basis, but 
it comes with the unavoidable issue that the participants have already been through the process 




interaction event under the assumption that a set of intentional states is 
mutually shared. I suggest that an attempt to deal with this issue should at least 
include the elements of cooperation and repeated interactions between a 
somewhat stable set of individuals. In this way, it is of interest to individual 
participants to find an efficient solution for achieving a common goal. Roughly 
put, if repeated interactions lack common goals, there is no incentive for 
individuals to invest effort in coming to any solution; if common goals have to 
be achieved only occasionally there is little incentive for coming to an efficient 
solution. It is when trying to achieve a joint goal in an efficient way that it 
makes sense to assume a set of shared intentional states.  
This then forms a context in which the emergence of conventional signals 
for singling out individual perspectives and negotiating deviations from a 
common ground makes sense—after all, entering an interaction event under 
the assumption that a particular set of intentional states is shared may form a 
good starting point, but if the exact same set is also necessarily the end point of 
the interaction, it has little practical use. With the availability of signals for 
negotiating how this set of shared intentional states should be updated, such 
usefulness increases. In this way, I suggest that a co-evolutionary loop was 
triggered in which increasingly profound negotiation signals led to wider 
applicability of the assumption of shared intentionality and vice versa, 
eventually producing the cultural-linguistic communities in which the 
sophisticated linguistic items I have argued to be crucial for both 
communication and processing of complex thoughtscapes could coagulate and 
get passed on from generation to generation. As soon as such items are 
available to members of a group, they introduce a sort of supra-individual order 
capable of orchestrating joint actions, saving individuals lots of negotiation 
costs including time, risk, and cognitive power. 
In Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2, I have discussed the “bonding gap”, the idea 
that our hominid ancestors needed to find new ways of bonding increasingly 
large social groups. Whereas our primate relatives, and presumably also the last 
common ancestors we share with them, use(d) time-consuming one-on-one 
activities (social grooming in particular), our ancestors must at some point have 
relied on more efficient alternatives such as laughing, dancing, and singing 
together. It has been suggested that language also played a key role, but 
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contributed to social bonding in a more indirect way through, for instance, 
gossiping or sharing jokes and stories. These activities (except maybe telling 
basic jokes) have been argued to require the availability of a fairly sophisticated 
form of language, and given the assumption that such a language demanded 
around five orders of intentionality to be in place, its arrival was positioned late 
in our evolutionary history. Although I agree that storytelling involves quite 
sophisticated language forms, I have argued that higher-order intentionality is 
not a prerequisite for this, and that the ability to deal with complex 
thoughtscapes is not so much inherent in individual cognitive capacities, but 
rather produced by an interplay between individual cognitive factors and 
phenomena that are part of language and narrative itself.  This points towards a 
scenario in which linguistic and narrative abilities, cultural-linguistic 
communities, and increasingly sophisticated mindreading skills have co-
evolved rather than one in which the latter are a prerequisite for the former to 
emerge.  
To conclude, the key elements in my provisional version of the diachronic 
story of interaction based on shared intentionality that are not likely to have 
been present in the last common ancestor with our great-ape relatives, are thus 
the mindreading skills for operating in the Schelling mirror world and forms of 
cooperation among somewhat stable groups of individuals geared towards 
achieving common goals. Gamble, Gowlett, and Dunbar (2014: 140-146) 
convincingly argue on the basis of brain size, complexity of artefacts, and 
patterns of their socially mediated activities on landscapes that these elements 
were available to the makers of the famous Acheulean hand axes: homo erectus 
who lived in the Lower Palaeolithic from around 1.7 million years ago. Given 
my arguments in this final section there is clearly no reason to assume that our 
ancestors at that stage possessed fully-blown linguistic abilities, 
instantaneously involving such sophisticated features as gossiping and 
storytelling. However, I suggest that the capacity to deal with higher-order 
intentionality can be no reason for why the co-evolutionary loop described 
above could not have started in this era. From there, I suggest that our social 
brain includes an individual and a collective, socio-cultural dimension. Our 
evolution in increasingly complex social environments has not just put pressure 
on our individual brains to get bigger and more powerful (i.e. the classic social 
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brain hypothesis), but also on finding culturally transferable solutions for using 
these brains in an optimally efficient way. These solutions can today be found 
in the toolkit that language and narrative offer us for dealing with complex 
social situations and their underlying thoughtscapes. 
I very much look forward to future arguments and evidence supporting or 
challenging my version of our story, thereby shedding more light on the 
process of which the outcome has been studied in this thesis: on the individual 
level we are lazy mindreaders who could do little intentional reasoning with 
our “bare” brains, but empowered with the toolkits available in our cultural-
linguistic communities we appreciate Shakespeare and Woolf, project complex 
thoughtscapes when reading headlines, enjoy Friends-style practical jokes, or 
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De luie gedachtenlezer 
 
Buren en naaste verwanten 
Voor de deur van het huis waar ik sinds kort woon, stond ik recent een paar 
planken in te korten met een decoupeerzaag. Stofmasker voor, oorbeschermers 
op, werkhandschoenen, grote beschermbril, zaagsel in mijn haar. De buurman 
die ik al enkele keren met zijn hondje had zien lopen kwam zijn deur uit. Hij is 
een opvallende verschijning met lang, donkergeverfd haar en modieuze 
kleding. Met een gestileerde beweging stak hij twee duimen omhoog en zei: 
“Ziet er goed uit, buurman!” 
 Pas dagen later kwam ik erachter dat dit niet zomaar een (al dan niet 
ironisch bedoeld) complimentje van een buurtgenoot was. Iemand wees mij er 
namelijk op dat de buurman bekend is van televisie als helft van het illustere 
duo dat de “modepolitie” vormt. In het gelijknamige programma gaan de 
“agenten” van deze politie blijkbaar de straat op om voorbijgangers te 
betrappen op schrijnende modemissers, of ze juist te complimenteren met een 
geslaagd voorkomen. Nu begreep ik opeens dat de buurman waarschijnlijk dacht 
dat ik wist dat hij bekend was van de modepolitie, en dat ik daarom zou 
verwachten dat hij iets van mijn opmerkelijke klusoutfit zou vinden. Wat de 
buurman niet kon weten is dat ik een notoir slechte kenner ben van beroemde 
televisiegezichten. 
 Deze situatie heeft van alles met het onderwerp van mijn proefschrift te 
maken. Laten we ervan uitgaan dat de buurman inderdaad een grap maakte 
gebaseerd op zijn televisierol: hij dacht dat ik zou weten dat hij van de 
modepolitie was, en voerde daarom zijn voor veel kijkers direct herkenbare act 
uit met de duimen omhoog op het moment dat ik in vol doe-het-zelfornaat op 
straat stond. Om deze grap tot zijn volle recht te laten komen, is een proces 
nodig dat ik in mijn proefschrift gedachtenlezen noem. Immers, ik moet me 
verplaatsen in het perspectief van de buurman en begrijpen dat hij denkt dat ik 
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weet dat hij van de modepolitie is, en dat hij een act opvoert die in de context 
van dit programma betekent dat ik voldoe aan de momenteel geldende 
modestandaarden. Daarbij beseffend dat ik met mijn oorbeschermers, 
stofmasker en plastic laboratoriumbril op waarschijnlijk aan alles behalve deze 
standaarden voldoe, kan ik vaststellen dat de woorden van de buurman niet 
letterlijk moeten worden opgevat… 
Dat we tot op zekere hoogte kunnen vaststellen wat er in andermans 
hoofd omgaat lijkt misschien vanzelfsprekend, maar over het geheel van de 
levende natuur genomen is ons vermogen tot gedachtenlezen absoluut 
spectaculair. Niet-menselijke dieren zijn hier vele malen slechter in: als ze het al 
kunnen, dan in veel minder diepte en detail. Het ligt voor de hand dat het 
gegeven dat andere dieren minder goed kunnen gedachtenlezen, er iets mee te 
maken heeft dat ze geen taal hebben. Maar die vaststelling op zichzelf is niet 
voldoende, ze verschuift het probleem alleen maar. Het menselijk 
taalvermogen is niet te begrijpen zonder inzicht in het geheel van 
mechanismen dat mensen gebruiken om zich in anderen te verplaatsen, en uit 
te vinden wat ze denken, bedoelen, hopen, van plan zijn, enzovoorts. 
Taaluitingen zijn immers bijna nooit letterlijke weergaven van 
gedachtentoestanden. Ze vormen een krachtig hulpmiddel als je probeert je 
gedachten met een ander af te stemmen, maar moeten door die ander altijd 
worden geïnterpreteerd en aangevuld met achtergrondkennis, wat een zekere 
mate van gedachtenlezen vraagt. Taalgebruikers moeten zich voortdurend 
(meer of minder bewust) realiseren wat hun gesprekspartner eigenlijk bedoelt 
met een bepaalde uitspraak en in het licht van welke gedeelde 
achtergrondkennis deze precies moet worden begrepen. Iemand die dit—vaak 
bij wijze van flauwe grap—even achterwege laat, zegt bijvoorbeeld “ja, dat 
mag” op de vraag of een tafelgenoot de peper zou mogen, in plaats van het 
molentje daadwerkelijk aan te reiken. 
Iedereen kan talloze van zulke voorbeelden uit de dagelijkse omgang 
verzinnen en als je erop let, dan geldt voor nagenoeg alle talige communicatie 
dat de taaluitingen op zichzelf (“in isolatie” bezien) geen doorslaggevende rol 
spelen, maar een sturende werking hebben in een veel ruimer proces van het 
uitonderhandelen van betekenissen en het op elkaar afstemmen van 
gedachtentoestanden. Bij dit proces speelt de capaciteit tot gedachtenlezen een 
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belangrijke rol: gesprekspartners moeten zich tot op zekere hoogte in elkaar 
kunnen verplaatsen om te zien wat de ander bedoelt met een bepaalde uiting. 
Behalve taal dragen vaak ook gezichtsuitdrukkingen, lichaamshouding, 
blikrichting, enzovoorts, bij aan het afstemmingsproces. Met andere woorden, 
taaluitingen op zichzelf zijn maar een deel van het verhaal van communicatie, 
en moeten worden aangevuld met andere elementen die het tot stand brengen 
van wederzijds begrip mogelijk maken—denk maar aan het spelletje “Hints”: 
als je geen taal mag gebruiken is het weliswaar lastiger om over te brengen wat 
je bedoelt, maar het lukt alsnog vrij aardig door gezichtsuitdrukkingen, 
lichaamshouding, enzovoorts, optimaal te benutten. 
De gangbare opvatting in de wetenschappelijke literatuur over dit 
onderwerp is dat menselijke interactie van beide partijen vraagt om recursief te 
denken, ofwel meervoudige metarepresentatie toe te passen. Mensen moeten dus, 
volgens deze opvatting, voortdurend meerdere geestesgesteldheden 
(“intentional states”) in elkaar kunnen inbedden zonder de draad kwijt te raken. 
Bij elke communicatieve interactie die A en B hebben moet A in staat zijn te 
begrijpen dat B bedoelt dat A zal denken dat X het geval is—met andere woorden, 
A moet niet alleen “decoderen” wat B zegt, maar ook voortdurend het 
perspectief van B proberen te nemen (c.q. zijn gedachten proberen te lezen) om 
te begrijpen wat B werkelijk met zijn boodschap wil zeggen. Onderzoekers als 
Dan Sperber (2000) en Thom Scott-Phillips (2015) gaan nog een stap verder en 
stellen dat zelfs dit niet genoeg is: volgens hen moeten taalgebruikers aan de 
zijde van de zender en ontvanger respectievelijk vier en vijf stappen van 
inbedding maken om normaal te kunnen communiceren. Komt er net als in de 
situatie met mijn buurman bovendien nog ironie bij kijken, dan komen er nog 
extra lagen bovenop en zitten sprekers en ontvangers zo op zes of zeven 
stappen: 
 
  De spreker wil 
  dat de luisteraar begrijpt 
   dat de spreker bedoelt 
    dat de luisteraar inziet 
     dat de spreker niet letterlijk X voor ogen heeft 
     maar eigenlijk Y bedoelt 
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(vgl. Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift en Scott-Phillips 2015; er bestaat 
discussie over de vraag hoe de inbeddingen precies moeten worden 
geconstrueerd in geval van ironie) 
 
Hier raakt dit theoretische “model” van menselijke interactie een belangrijk 
punt uit een ander vakgebied. Onderzoekers uit de experimentele en 
evolutionaire psychologie zijn al sinds enkele decennia geïnteresseerd in de 
vraag hoeveel van deze lagen (“orders of intentionalilty”) mensen en andere 
dieren aankunnen. De basisgedachte is dat veruit de meeste dieren een 
cognitief systeem van de eerste orde belichamen: ze hebben allerlei gedachten 
zoals “eetbaar”, “giftig”, “die kant op”, “vijand”, enzovoorts (dit wil overigens 
niet zeggen dat ze zich bewust zijn van deze gedachten zoals wij mensen dat 
kunnen zijn). Maar wat ze niet hebben zijn gedachten over gedachten: “hij wil 
mijn eten stelen”, “mijn kind denkt dat ik wegga”, enzovoorts—dit is 
voorbehouden aan cognitieve systemen van de tweede orde. De algemene 
opvatting is dat geen enkel ander levend wezen dan de mens drie of meer ordes 
aankan, mogelijk met als enige uitzondering onze naaste verwanten in de 
natuur, chimpansees en bonobo’s. Maar zelfs voor deze mensapen geldt dat ze 
slechts bij uitzondering slagen voor testjes waarin het nodig is te redeneren met 
drie ordes van ingebedde geestesgesteldheden. 
 Dit is vooral interessant aangezien chimpansees en bonobo’s een heel 
belangrijke rol spelen in het onderzoek naar de evolutie van de mens. Tussen 
vijf en zeven miljoen jaar geleden leefde in Afrika rondom de evenaar een 
primaat die de voorouder was van zowel de hedendaagse chimpansees en 
bonobo’s als van de moderne mens, onze zogenaamde “last common ancestor” 
of LCA. Met name de chimpansee wordt vaak gezien als een goed model voor 
hoe deze voorouder er uitzag en leefde. Het is dus redelijk om aan te nemen dat 
de LCA qua gedachtenlezen op hetzelfde niveau zat als de hedendaagse 
chimpansee—op twee, in sommige gevallen drie ordes, uitgaande van de 
bovenstaande manier van tellen. Van onszelf, de hedendaagse mens, weten we 
dat we vanaf een bepaalde leeftijd slagen voor testjes waarin met vier, vijf of 
soms zelfs zes van zulke ordes van ingebedde geestesgesteldheden moet 
worden geredeneerd. Dit suggereert dat mens(achtig)en in de loop van hun 
evolutionaire pad dus een steeds geavanceerder vermogen tot gedachtenlezen 
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moeten hebben ontwikkeld. Gegeven de juiste context en presentatie (daarover 
zo meteen meer) kunnen wij begrijpen dat ik me realiseer dat de buurman dacht 
dat ik verwachtte dat hij vond dat mijn outfit er niet uitzag. Op basis van 
experimenten (waarover hieronder ook meer) wordt in het algemeen 
aangenomen dat dit de limiet is waarop ons evolutionaire pad is gestrand: waar 
sommige dieren op eerste orde zitten, andere op tweede of misschien derde, 
zitten mensen op vijfde of misschien zesde orde. 
 De suggestie dat mensen een hogere-orde cognitief systeem belichamen 
en andere mensapen niet, zou kunnen stroken met een direct zichtbaar 
verschil: onze herseninhoud is ongeveer vier keer zo groot. Robin Dunbar (e.g. 
2014), die een invloedrijke positie inneemt in dit debat, verklaart de groei van 
ons brein in de afgelopen paar miljoen jaar als een reactie op de steeds grotere 
sociale complexiteit waar onze voorouders mee te maken kregen. Deze 
verklaring staat bekend als de social brain hypothesis. Volgens hem zijn we in 
steeds grotere en fijnzinniger georganiseerde groepen gaan leven: waar 
chimpansees (vermoedelijk net als onze gemeenschappelijke voorouders) in 
hun natuurlijke omgeving leven in verbanden van 40-60 individuen, lijkt 
archeologische evidentie te suggereren dat dit aantal bij mensen gaandeweg 
gegroeid is naar ongeveer 150—de groepsgrootte die we nu nog vinden bij 
hedendaagse jager-verzamelaarvolkeren. Dit lijkt misschien een geringe 
stijging, maar bedenk dat primatengroepen een netwerkstructuur vertonen. 
Anders dan bijvoorbeeld in een kudde schapen of een vlucht vogels is het niet 
zo dat individuen een aantal willekeurige (en regelmatig wisselende) buren 
hebben waarmee ze rekening moeten houden, maar in een primatengroep 
heeft elk individu een persoonlijke relatie met ieder ander. Leden moeten 
bovendien iets weten over de onderlinge relaties van anderen om succesvol te 
kunnen opereren binnen het netwerk: wie is familie van wie? Wie zijn bevriend 
en wie staan op gespannen voet? Komt er in een groep van 50 één nieuw lid bij, 
dan moet ieder individu niet alleen een relatie ontwikkelen met dit ene nieuwe 
lid, maar ook in de gaten houden wat de relatie van de andere 50 leden is tot de 
nieuwkomer. Daarom is het goed verdedigbaar dat de hoeveelheid cognitief 
vermogen die nodig is om in een primatennetwerk te kunnen functioneren 
exponentieel stijgt met het aantal leden. Op basis hiervan doet Dunbar de 
suggestie dat de afhankelijkheden, globaal samengevat, als volgt zijn: er bestaat 
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druk op populaties van onze voorouders om in grotere groepen te gaan leven 
(bijvoorbeeld omdat dit veiliger is). Vervolgens oefent dit druk uit op 
individuen om zich beter in deze groepen te kunnen handhaven. Wie een iets 
krachtiger brein heeft—waarmee hij iets beter kan redeneren over wat anderen 
in de groep denken, willen, bedoelen, enzovoorts, inclusief wat anderen denken 
dat weer anderen denken—kan zich beter handhaven in een grotere groep en 
heeft meer kans om zich succesvol voort te planten. Zo ontstaat er een stijgende 
lijn in het vermogen tot gedachtenlezen, fysiek zichtbaar in de groei van het 
brein. Maar een groter brein op zichzelf verklaart niet hoe wij ingewikkelde 
gedachtenleestaken oplossen, zoals die in het voorbeeld van mijzelf en de 
buurman. Wat doen we precies als we met zo’n situatie te maken krijgen; of, in 
het groot gezegd: hoe werkt het sociale brein? Ik licht eerst de methoden, 
onderzoeksmaterialen en analyses uit mijn proefschrift toe. Vervolgens leg ik 
uit wat deze analyses te maken hebben met gedachtenlezen, het sociale brein 
en onze evolutie, en tot slot kom ik op terug op het voorbeeld. 
 
Taal en verhalen ondersteunen gedachtenlezen 
Verschillende onderzoekers (met name Sperber en Scott-Phillips) hebben dus 
beweerd dat het voor normale interactie nodig is om met vijf ordes van 
ingebedde gedachtentoestanden te kunnen werken. Ze verklaren op deze 
manier ook waarom menselijke communicatie uniek is: volgens hen was het 
vermogen tot vijfde-orde gedachtenlezen de basis waarop taal kon ontstaan. Ik 
betoog in mijn proefschrift dat deze opvatting verschillende problemen 
oplevert. Ten eerste lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat normale interactie al uitgaat 
van wat volgens sommigen de limiet is van ons vermogen tot gedachtenlezen: 
wat gebeurt er dan als er nog meer ordes bijkomen omdat er bijvoorbeeld 
ironie in het spel is, of omdat een gesprek gaat over wat persoon C denkt dat D 
van plan is E te doen hopen? Ten tweede blijkt uit de genoemde testjes dat 
hogere-orde gedachtenlezen een cognitief inspannende activiteit is. Hoe valt dit 
te verenigen met het feit dat we de hele dag door met alle gemak taal 
gebruiken? Ten derde zijn er aanwijzingen dat kinderen eerst bepaalde stappen 
in hun taalontwikkeling doormaken voordat ze in staat zijn tot hogere-orde 
gedachtenlezen. Dit suggereert dat ook het evolutionaire scenario het 
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overwegen waard is waarin taal aan hogere-orde gedachtenlezen voorafgaat (in 
plaats van dat taal noodzakelijkerwijs erop volgt). Ten vierde lijkt analyse van 
verschillende genres van taalgebruik in contexten waar meerdere 
perspectieven een rol spelen erop te wijzen dat taal, en in het bijzonder 
narratief taalgebruik, het moeten redeneren met meerdere ingebedde 
perspectieven juist “van ons overneemt”. Wat ik hier precies mee bedoel, zal 
duidelijk worden aan het eind van deze paragraaf. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 begin ik met het bespreken van een toneelstuk waarin 
het publiek in korte tijd meerdere ingebedde perspectieven voor de kiezen 
krijgt: Shakespeare’s Othello. Al aan het eind van de tweede akte moet een 
toeschouwer of lezer van het stuk inzien dat 
 
(ii)  Iago de bedoeling heeft Cassio ervan te overtuigen dat Desdemona 
zal proberen Othello te doen inzien dat Cassio de bedoelding had om 
het belang van de publieke zaak te dienen toen hij Montano 
aanviel. 
 
Zo gesteld klinkt het onmogelijk ingewikkeld, maar tegelijk weten we dat dit 
toneelstuk al eeuwenlang door talloze verschillende lezers en theatergangers 
wordt begrepen en gewaardeerd. Wat doet de tekst precies in die eerste twee 
akten om te zorgen dat het publiek deze zesvoudige inbedding van 
perspectieven kan volgen, en kan meenemen in zijn verdere begrip van de 
ontwikkeling van het plot? Ik stel dat hier zes “strategieën van expositie” 
(expository strategies) bij komen kijken. Mijn analyse concentreert zich op de 
tekst en het verhaal dat hierin wordt overgebracht, en gaat niet in op de 
bijzonderheden van opvoeringen van het stuk door acteurs op het toneel. 
Om te beginnen moeten er door de tekst personages worden 
opgeroepen aan wie het publiek gedachtentoestanden kan toeschrijven. 
Hierdoor ontstaat er een fictioneel netwerk van personages die interacties met 
elkaar hebben, en die van alles over elkaar zeggen en denken. De 
gebeurtenissen van het verhaal worden beleefd, waargenomen en verteld via de 
perspectieven van leden van dit netwerk. Het effect is dat het publiek het ene 
moment met het perspectief van het ene personage meekijkt, en het andere 
moment met dat van het andere personage. Er is dus geen moment waarop er 
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“van buitenaf” moet worden gekeken naar het totaal van in elkaar ingebedde 
perspectieven, zoals dat gesuggereerd wordt in zin (ii) hierboven. Niettemin 
geeft zin (ii) een getrouwe, zij het wat kunstmatige, samenvatting van de situatie 
aan het einde van de tweede akte: het valt niet te ontkennen dat in Othello een 
complex netwerk van onderling samenhangende perspectieven centraal staat. 
Dus zelfs als het publiek ze dankzij de eerste twee strategieën geleidelijk en 
“van binnenuit” kan leren kennen, in plaats van inééns als hele stapel, blijft de 
vraag staan hoe deze complexiteit door de tekst behapbaar wordt gemaakt. Ik 
betoog dat het antwoord besloten ligt in de resterende vier strategieën. Ten 
eerste is dit framing, het principe dat door het aanduiden van één bepaald 
concept een heel “raamwerk” (frame) van achtergrondkennis wordt geactiveerd 
bij het publiek. Met andere woorden: er hoeft niet bij nul te worden begonnen 
bij het overbrengen van hoe de onderlinge verhoudingen tussen de personages 
liggen. Het publiek is al bekend met begrippen als “wraak”, “complot”, 
“vriendschap” en “overspel”, en kent de scenario’s en rollen die hierbij passen. 
De tekst bouwt voort op algemeen gedeeld veronderstelde kennis van deze 
frames en schuift ze op ingenieuze wijze in elkaar. Zo ontstaat met weinig 
woorden de situatie die de kern van het stuk uitmaakt: Iago wil wraak nemen 
en zet een complot op waarin hij probeert Othello wijs te maken dat zijn vrouw 
overspel pleegt met Cassio, terwijl ze eigenlijk alleen vrienden met hem is. Het 
publiek heeft hiermee al een hele serie verwachtingen klaar over wie wat zal 
denken, hopen, bedoelen, enzovoorts. In plaats van dit allemaal stap voor stap 
te hoeven uitleggen kan een auteur volstaan met het “managen” van deze 
verwachtingen via een paar welgekozen details en plotwendingen—en dat is 
ook precies wat in de tekst van Othello terug te zien is. 
De vierde en vijfde strategie hebben betrekking op de verhouding tussen 
het tijdsverloop van het vertelde verhaal (ook wel fabel of story genoemd) en dat 
van de vertelling (ook wel sujet of plot). In de narratologie is veel onderzoek 
gedaan naar mogelijkheden om hier flexibel mee om te springen 
(vooruitwijzingen en flashbacks zijn hiervan de bekendste voorbeelden). In 
Othello wordt hiervan handig gebruik gemaakt bij de presentatie van hoe 
perspectieven van verschillende personages zich tot elkaar verhouden. Het 
publiek krijgt het verslag voorgeschoteld van gebeurtenissen die zich 
ontwikkelen in minder dan 48 uur, terwijl er op de achtergrond verhaallijnen 
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spelen die veel meer tijd in beslag nemen. Deze worden in gecomprimeerde 
vorm aan het publiek meegegeven om, waar nodig, de verhoudingen te 
verduidelijken of de geloofwaardigheid te vergroten. Bovendien vindt de 
presentatie van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen en plotwendingen episodisch 
plaats. Eerst onderhandelen twee of drie personages iets uit. Het resultaat 
hiervan wordt vervolgens weer meegenomen naar een volgende scene, waar 
opnieuw twee of drie personages tot een volgend resultaat komen, enzovoorts. 
Zo worden er nooit te grote stappen in een keer genomen, zoals dit wel het 
geval is als je zonder verdere context zin (ii) krijgt voorgeschoteld. De zesde 
strategie, tot slot, is eenvoudig: redundantie. Teksten zoals Othello herhalen 
belangrijke informatie gerust veelvoudig. Dankzij rijke stilistische variatie en 
doordat dit telkens vanuit verschillende perspectieven gebeurt, valt dat 
nauwelijks op. Toch helpt het natuurlijk voor het begrip van complexe situaties 
als een stuk informatie maar liefst zes keer wordt verteld, zoals het geval is in 
een van de voorbeelden die ik bespreek. 
De verankering van de zes strategieën van expositie die ik onderscheid 
in de langlopende traditie van de narratologie, de studie van universele 
kenmerken van verhalen, rechtvaardigt de conclusie dat niet alleen Othello, 
maar verhalen meer in het algemeen in staat zijn om complexe verhoudingen 
tussen verschillende perspectieven inzichtelijk te maken. Uiteindelijk stel ik dat 
lexicale en grammaticale processen beneden zinsniveau geschikt zijn voor het 
onderling coördineren van ten hoogste twee tot drie perspectieven, maar dat 
daarboven de verhalende modus het overneemt. In Hoofdstuk 5 werk ik deze 
gedachte verder uit in een theoretisch model van menselijke interactie, 
waarvan de hoofdgedachte als volgt is. Met taal kun je iemand anders’ aandacht 
vestigen op een object, gebeurtenis of concept. Stel ik zeg “die voetballer” nadat 
mijn gesprekspartner en ik het net over de nieuwe aanwinst van een zekere 
voetbalclub hebben gehad, dan laat ik hem de aandacht richten op die 
voetballer. Door te zeggen “die middelmatige voetballer”, vestig ik niet alleen 
de aandacht van mijn gesprekspartner op die voetballer, maar geef ik 
bovendien een bepaalde kijk/bepaald gezichtspunt mee, in dit geval een niet al 
te positieve evaluatie. Dit is iets wat je als taalgebruiker eigenlijk voortdurend 
doet: je brengt zaken onder andermans aandacht en onderhandelt 
gezichtspunten op die zaken uit. In dagelijks taalgebruik zijn dit doorgaans 
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jouw eigen kijk en die van je gesprekspartner. Ook is het mogelijk om 
gezichtspunten erbij te betrekken van derde personen die al dan niet aanwezig 
zijn op het moment van spreken. Maak ik er bijvoorbeeld van “die figuur van 
wie Piet zegt dat hij een voetballer is” , dan geef ik mijn eigen gezichtspunt aan 
(ik impliceer dat ik eigenlijk vind dat “die figuur” de kwalificatie “voetballer” 
niet waard is), plus het gezichtspunt van een derde partij, namelijk van Piet. 
Door gebruik te maken van indirecte rede (“Piet zegt dat…”) haal ik als het ware 
Piets gezichtspunt even binnen in het proces van afstemmen van mijn eigen 
kijk met die van mijn gesprekspartner. In theorie zou ik nog meer perspectieven 
kunnen invlechten door bijvoorbeeld te zeggen “die figuur van wie Piet zegt dat 
zijn trainer vindt dat hij een voetballer is”. In de praktijk is dit echter een zin die 
je niet zo snel zult tegenkomen: zodra er meer dan twee of drie perspectieven 
een rol gaan spelen, zie je dat taalgebruikers overstappen naar de verhalende 
modus. Veel waarschijnlijker is dus dat ik zoiets zou zeggen als “Ik sprak Piet 
gisteren en die vertelde dat hij met zijn trainer heeft gesproken. Die is van 
mening…(enzovoorts)”. 
Het is een onderscheidend kenmerk van narratief taalgebruik dat hierbij 
altijd andere gezichtspunten betrokken zijn dan die van spreker en 
geadresseerde. Immers, zelfs als ik een verhaaltje begin te vertellen over hoe ik 
gisteren op straat liep, dan creëer ik als het ware een personage: een eerdere 
versie van mijzelf, waarvan mijn gesprekspartner en ik het gezichtspunt 
binnenhalen in het afstemmen van onze gedachten. Waar grammaticale en 
lexicale elementen op zinsniveau nog geschikt zijn voor het afstemmen van 
twee of drie perspectieven en de verhoudingen daartussen, beschikt verhalend 
taalgebruik over een gevarieerde “gereedschapskist” om een veelheid aan 
perspectieven en gedachtentoestanden weer te geven en op een natuurlijke 
manier met elkaar te verbinden: de zes strategieën van expositie. Daarmee 
faciliteren verhalen in elk geval communicatie: wie een situatie wil delen waarbij 
meer dan twee à drie perspectieven een rol spelen, schakelt doorgaans over 
naar een narratieve modus. Hiermee lijken verhalen bovendien cognitie te 
ondersteunen: een veelheid van perspectieven die in een paar zinnen 
opgesomd, of in een tabel of figuur weergegeven, volstrekt onbehapbaar lijken, 
kunnen gevat in de vorm van een verhaal vaak gemakkelijk worden begrepen. 
De narratieve modus is zo niet alleen een manier van spreken, maar ook van 
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denken. Het leren beheersen ervan levert ons een uitbreiding van ons 
denkrepertoire op in precies het domein waar gedachtenlezen over gaat: het 
begrijpen van sociale situaties in termen van onderliggende perspectieven en 
gedachtentoestanden van de mensen waar we mee omgaan. Door narratieve 
strategieën voor perspectiefcoördinatie te internaliseren, verwerf je naar alle 
waarschijnlijkheid denkpatronen die je ook in de interactie met de werkelijke 
sociale wereld om je heen kunt gebruiken. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 neem ik de inzichten van de analyse tot zover mee naar 
het discours van de roman. Romans zijn niet zomaar verhalende teksten: ze 
hebben een specifieke vorm waaraan verschillende conventies ten grondslag 
liggen. Een belangrijk deel hiervan heeft betrekking op de verteller, de persoon 
of instantie die het verhaal aan de lezer doorgeeft en hierbij keuzes maakt wat 
betreft stijl, waarop de aandacht gevestigd wordt, wat wanneer wordt verteld, 
enzovoorts. Opnieuw neem ik als uitgangspunt enkele passages uit teksten 
waarin een rijk “gedachtenlandschap” (thoughtscape) wordt weergegeven, met 
andere woorden: die een complex netwerk van perspectieven neerzetten. Ik ga 
de discussie aan met de momenteel breedgedragen opvatting van Lisa 
Zunshine (o.a. 2012) dat literatuur ons uitdaagt en prikkelt doordat het de 
grenzen van onze mogelijkheden als gedachtenlezers opzoekt. Zo suggereert zij 
dat Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925) een bij uitstek literair werk is, 
aangezien lezers voortdurend de (volgens haar) cognitief belastende taak 
moeten uitvoeren van het in elkaar inbedden van perspectieven tot aan de 
vijfde of zesde orde. Door middel van taalkundige en narratologische analyse 
laat ik zien dat cruciale passages in de tekst dit hun lezers juist helemaal niet 
laten doen. De verteller neemt de lezer mee op een soort “360-graden-
rondleiding” door het gedachtenlandschap, het netwerk van onderling 
verbonden perspectieven dat de tekst zorgvuldig en geleidelijk aan heeft 
geconstrueerd. Ik stel dat dergelijke romans ons niet zozeer fascineren en 
prikkelen omdat we zoveel moeite moeten doen voor het doordringen tot de 
perspectieven van de personages, maar juist omdat we een inkijkje krijgen in 
complexe sociale situaties vanuit verschillende invalshoeken, op een manier 
die in het “echte” leven niet mogelijk is. De verteller doet het leeuwendeel van 
het gedachtenlezen voor ons, zodat wij als lezers lui achterover kunnen zakken 
en van het gedachtenlandschap kunnen genieten. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 belicht de zaken nog eens vanuit het beginsel van 
cognitieve en communicatieve economie. Het centrale voorbeeld is de 
nieuwsverslaglegging van de zogenaamde Pistorius-zaak. In de nacht na 
Valentijnsdag 2012 schoot de Zuid-Afrikaanse atleet Oscar Pistorius zijn 
vriendin Reeva Steenkamp dood in zijn huis. Hij beweerde dat het een tragisch 
ongeval was, maar de politie arresteerde hem op verdenking van moord. 
Journalisten moesten de ochtend na de schietpartij aan hun lezers overbrengen 
dat nieuwswebsite Beeld.com beweerde dat een woordvoerder zei dat de politie-
inspecteur stelde dat Pistorius claimt dat hij dacht dat zij een inbreker was, 
terwijl de politie denkt dat hij wist dat hij op zijn vriendin schoot. Dit deden zij 
natuurlijk niet met dergelijke gecompliceerde zinnen. Wat de krantenkoppen 
en nieuwsstukjes van die ochtend laten zien is een veelvuldig gebruik van 
woorden die ik viewpoint packages genoemd heb, zoals bijvoorbeeld alleged(ly), 
accidental(ly) of mistaken(ly). Wat deze woorden gemeen hebben is dat ze 
allemaal impliciet een of meerdere perspectieflagen coördineren, die als het 
ware in hun betekenis zitten verpakt of “opgeklapt”. Wie zegt dat “allegedly Y 
happened accidentally”, zegt eigenlijk dat een onbekende partij claimt dat een 
persoon A niet wist dat actie X uitkomst Y zou hebben, terwijl wel bekend is dat 
Y het geval is (in het Nederlands zouden we zeggen “dat iets per ongeluk gebeurd 
zou zijn”; waar in het Engels de lexicale eenheid allegedly beschikbaar is, 
gebruiken wij op deze plaats doorgaans een constructie met zouden). 
Een spreker of auteur kan ervoor kiezen om een situatie waarin 
meerdere gezichtspunten een rol spelen analytisch op te bouwen. Dat wil 
zeggen dat alle gezichtspunten afzonderlijk worden geïntroduceerd en 
onderling gecoördineerd, veelal met talige constructies zoals de directe en 
(vrije) indirecte rede (A wil dat B denkt dat X, terwijl A weet dat Y…enz.). Ook 
kan ervoor worden gekozen om deze situatie holistisch weer te geven in taal, 
door het gebruik van een pakketje (A misleidt B). Het is evident dat het gebruik 
van pakketjes om complexe situaties holistisch weer te geven de 
communicatieve economie ten goede komt: het is ideaal voor een krantenkop 
als een complexe situatie in een paar woorden kan worden gevat. De suggestie 
die ik doe aan het eind van Hoofdstuk 4, voortbouwend op Daniel Dennetts 
idee van “gereedschap voor de geest” (“thinking tools”), is dat het leren 
gebruiken van dergelijke pakketjes in de loop van de taalverwerving bovendien 
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cognitieve efficiëntievoordelen met zich meebrengt. Met andere woorden: 
kinderen die leren wat een misverstand is, wat per ongeluk betekent, of wat 
misleiden inhoudt, voegen hiermee ook scenario’s toe aan hun begripsvermogen 
die als gereedschap functioneren bij het nadenken over complexe situaties 
waarin meerdere perspectieven een rol spelen. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 komen veel verschillende lijnen samen. Hier bespreek ik 
de praktijk van het onderzoek naar gedachtenlezen zoals dat plaatsvindt via 
psychologische tests en in neurowetenschappelijke laboratoria. In een 
veelgebruikte methode krijgen proefpersonen eerst een verhaaltje voorgelegd 
waarin meerdere personages en hun perspectieven een rol spelen. Vervolgens 
moeten de deelnemers vragen beantwoorden van het type: “Klopt het dat A van 
plan was B ervan te overtuigen dat C dacht dat X het geval was?”. De vragen 
variëren in complexiteit, gemeten in het aantal perspectieven dat ze omvatten. 
Zoals gezegd heerst er consensus dat er een bovengrens zit aan het aantal 
ingebedde ordes dat mensen gemiddeld aankunnen. Uitgaande van de meeste 
experimenten ligt deze grens rond vijf ordes, maar sommige onderzoekers 
beweren dat hij hoger ligt, zo rond de zeven. In een kritische analyse van de 
data en resultaten van een viertal experimenten breng ik kritiekpunten naar 
voren op de heersende orde in het onderzoek naar gedachtenlezen, gebaseerd 
op mijn bevindingen uit eerdere hoofdstukken. Om te beginnen gebruiken veel 
tests verhaaltjes voor het presenteren van de situatie, maar zinnen voor het 
stellen van de vragen. Gezien mijn bevinding dat in natuurlijk taalgebruik de 
verhalende modus het overneemt vanaf ongeveer drie ordes, ligt de gevonden 
grens van vijf of zeven ordes wellicht eerder in de manier van vragen besloten 
dan in het vermogen van deelnemers als zodanig om complexe sociale situaties 
te doorzien—immers, zinnen waarin vier of meer perspectieven voorkomen 
zijn erg onnatuurlijk en lastig te verwerken (zie bijvoorbeeld zin (ii) over Othello 
hierboven). Andere kritiekpunten hebben betrekking op de manier van tellen 
van complexiteit via het aantal zinsinbeddingen. Er komen in de verhaaltjes en 
vragen ook pakketjes en andere vormen van impliciete perspectiefcoördinatie 
voor, waardoor “opgeklapte” gezichtspunten ten onrechte niet worden 
meegeteld. Ook wordt de meervoudige complexiteit van het gedachten-
landschap dat de verhaaltjes weergeven hierdoor gereduceerd tot uitsluitend 
inbedding, terwijl gezichtspunten vaak een netwerk van op allerlei manieren 
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verbonden perspectieven vormen. Verder brengt het gebruik van ja/nee-vragen 
problemen met zich mee waarmee in een deel van de tests niet juist is 
omgegaan, en zijn er problemen aan te wijzen die te maken hebben met 
rechtstreeks in de verhaaltjes vertolkte gezichtspunten tegenover gezichts-
punten die alleen langs indirecte weg zijn af te leiden. 
Uiteindelijk ontstaat er een dilemma. Enerzijds vertoont het bestaande 
paradigma van gedachtenleesexperimenten en de hieraan verbonden 
conclusies allerlei problemen, vooral wanneer het bekeken wordt in het licht 
van mijn eerste vijf hoofdstukken over hoe taal en verhalen in de praktijk met 
multi-perspectiefsituaties omgaan. Anderzijds vertoont dit paradigma een 
aantal onmiskenbare consistenties. Zo is er bijvoorbeeld een vaak gerepliceerde 
correlatie tussen de score die iemand behaalt voor gedachtenleestestjes en 
verschillende indicatoren voor diens algehele sociale vaardigheid. Wie hoge 
testscores haalt, heeft bijvoorbeeld vaak ook een groter sociaal netwerk en een 
hogere hoeveelheid grijze massa in hersengebieden die worden geassocieerd 
met sociaal gedrag. Ik sluit Hoofdstuk 6 af met een bespreking van hoe 
dergelijke correlaties kunnen worden verenigd met mijn bevindingen en 
kritiek. 
 
De collectieve, culturele dimensie van het sociale brein 
In de Conclusie formuleer ik een serie beweringen, observaties en 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek, elk rustend op een gedeelte van de 
zes hoofdstukken. Allereerst stel ik vast dat perspectieven waar we in sociale 
omgang en communicatie mee te maken krijgen eerder een netwerkstructuur 
vertonen dan een structuur van recursieve inbedding. Zo’n netwerk heb ik een 
gedachtenlandschap (thoughtscape) genoemd. In de praktijk van taalgebruik in 
verschillende genres (toneelstukken, romans, journalistiek, gesprekken) lijkt te 
gelden dat het werk van het weergeven en onderling coördineren van 
perspectieven verdeeld is over een verscheidenheid van lexicale, grammaticale 
en narratieve betekeniseenheden. Weergave van meerdere perspectieven met 
gebruik van uitsluitend zinsinbedding (A denkt dat B vindt dat C wil…enz.) leidt 
al snel tot een gebrekkige weergave van het gedachtenlandschap: enerzijds zijn 
zulke zinnen ondoorzichtig en lastig te begrijpen, anderzijds geven ze een 
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misrepresentatie van de vaak subtiele complexiteit van het netwerk van 
perspectieven. 
Uiteindelijk stel ik dat ons sociale brein een individuele en een 
collectieve, sociaal-culturele dimensie heeft. Kort gezegd heeft onze evolutie in 
een complexe sociale omgeving volgens mij niet alleen druk uitgeoefend op het 
groter en krachtiger worden van individuele breinen (de klassieke social brain 
hypothesis), maar ook op het vinden van cultureel overdraagbare oplossingen 
om deze breinen zo efficiënt mogelijk te gebruiken. Deze oplossingen zien we 
terug in de “gereedschapskist” die taal en verhalen ons bieden voor het omgaan 
met complexe sociale situaties en de daaronder gelegen gedachtenlandschap-
pen. De lexicale, grammaticale en narratieve conventies van talen zijn het 
resultaat van generaties mensen die probeerden hun gedachten met elkaar en 
met die van derden af te stemmen. Hierdoor is er een schat aan “interactie-
ervaring” gestold in deze conventies. Kinderen die opgroeien en hun 
moedertaal verwerven kunnen hierdoor “op de schouders van reuzen staan”. 
Door zich de lexicale, grammaticale en narratieve conventies van een taal eigen 
te maken, nemen ze het totaal van interactie-ervaring dat in de culturele 
gemeenschap beschikbaar is op in hun individuele cognitieve systeem. 
Vergelijk ons sociale brein met een iPad: in de loop van onze evolutie is de 
hardware beter en krachtiger geworden, maar uiteindelijk bepaalt ook de 
software die erop geïnstalleerd is hoe snel, effectief en gemakkelijk we hem 
kunnen gebruiken voor het uitvoeren van bepaalde taken. Uiteraard gaat dit 
om het uitbreiden van mogelijkheden en prestaties binnen de grenzen van wat 
de hardware kan—er zijn geen apps waardoor je een iPad kunt laten vliegen. 
Hetzelfde geldt voor gedachtengereedschappen zoals de viewpoint packages 
(bijvoorbeeld accidentally of per ongeluk) die werden geactiveerd om de 
Pistorius-zaak te begrijpen: deze pakketjes zijn als het ware stukjes software die 
lezers in de loop van hun leven hebben geïnstalleerd, waardoor het nu mogelijk 
is om binnen de gegeven beperkingen van het brein (zoals werkgeheugen) op 
een snelle en economische wijze complexe informatie te verwerken. 
Deze kijk op de zaken verklaart ook waarom we moeite hebben met het 
begrijpen van een zin als die in (ii) hierboven, terwijl we als we Shakespeare’s 
Othello lezen of in het theater zien, met gemak kunnen volgen hoe alle zes of 
zeven perspectieven zich tot elkaar verhouden. De limiet van vijf ordes (of 
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zeven) die onderzoekers claimen te hebben gevonden via gedachtenlees-
experimenten in het lab ligt niet in onze individuele breinen besloten, maar is 
het gevolg van het samenspel tussen de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van ons 
brein en de gebruikte vormen van representatie via taal en/of verhalen—de 
cultureel overdraagbare gereedschappen. In de praktijk van onze interacties 
hebben we dus een gedeelde set van deze gereedschappen beschikbaar voor het 
omgaan met de complexiteit die verschillende perspectieven met zich 
meebrengen. Worden die op de juiste manier ingezet, dan nemen ze een deel 
van het denkwerk van ons over. Niet alleen zorgen ze daarmee dat we niet zo 
snel tegen een limiet aanlopen, maar ook zorgen ze voor communicatieve en 
cognitieve economie: op het individuele niveau kunnen wij ons het grootste 
deel van de tijd veroorloven om “luie” gedachtenlezers te zijn. Het is niet de 
standaard (zoals gesuggereerd door Scott-Phillips en Sperber, zie boven), maar 
de uitzondering om precies uit te pluizen “wie-wanneer-wat dacht”. Of, in 
termen van Hoofdstuk 4: veel perspectieven blijven opgeklapt in holistische 
pakketjes zitten, en alleen als het nodig is construeren we ze analytisch. 
Bijvoorbeeld pas als er een misverstand optreedt, gaan we ons afvragen of A 
inderdaad bedoelde dat B zou denken dat A wilde dat B dacht… 
En daarmee zijn we terug bij het voorbeeld van mij en de buurman. In 
de loop van ons leven begeven we ons in allerlei verschillende culturele 
gemeenschappen en subgemeenschappen. Voorbeelden zijn Nederlanders, 
studenten aan de Universiteit Leiden, supporters van een bepaalde voetbalclub, 
liefhebbers van een bepaald muziekgenre, volgers van een bepaald 
televisieprogramma, enzovoorts. In elk van die gemeenschappen doet een 
bepaalde set van taal- en verhaalconventies de ronde. Als je geleidelijk aan deel 
gaat uitmaken van zo’n culturele (sub)gemeenschap, wordt er als het ware een 
kopie van deze set in ons geheugen geïnstalleerd. Binnen dezelfde culturele 
gemeenschap kunnen we er dus van uitgaan dat iedereen min of meer dezelfde 
set van culturele gereedschappen aan boord heeft. 
Inderdaad blijkt uit mijn onderzoek dat dit precies is wat mensen 
normaal gesproken doen tijdens een heleboel interactiemomenten. Ze 
handelen bij voorbaat al alsof alle achtergrondkennis gedeeld is. Met andere 
woorden, in plaats van meteen al te redeneren over wat A denkt dat B bedoelt 
dat A wil…(enzovoorts), zetten ze eerst gewoon een stap. Pas als dit niet het 
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gewenste effect heeft of er een misverstand ontstaat, komen ingewikkelde 
gedachtenleestaken in beeld. Wat wilde de buurman dat ik begreep dat hij 
bedoelde? We deelden niet dezelfde relevante set van verhaaltjes—ik wist niets 
van zijn modepolitie-act af. Als we wel dezelfde set hadden gedeeld, wat in de 
meerderheid van de interacties die we de hele dag door hebben het geval is, 
dan was de hele redenering over dat hij bedoelt dat ik begrijp dat hij wil dat ik 
denk… buiten beeld gebleven. Dan was het moment voorbijgegaan zonder dat ik 
extra energie in gedachtenlezen had hoeven steken—en die extra energie, die 
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